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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine China and India’s national interests with regard to 
Tibet, and the ways in which these interests have been shaped and pursued. While drawing on 
the sizeable body of academic literature which already addresses this topic, this thesis contends 
that the conclusions which have been reached to date have tended to be arbitrary, insofar as 
studies have suffered from a lack of theoretical and conceptual clarity on ‘national interest’. 
The intention here is therefore to discuss the two countries’ stances using a more rigorous 
analytical framework based on explicit theoretical and conceptual foundations. From a 
rationalist and critical constructivist perspective in tandem, it attempts to identify and compare 
the rationales behind China and India’s pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet, and to 
examine the domestic processes of interest formation concerning the Tibet issue in elite 
discourse. To develop a rationalist account, content analysis is used to argue that both countries 
are primarily concerned about the security implications of the Tibetan question. For China, 
Tibet is a domestic issue, and symbolises internal integrity and the modernisation of the nation, 
especially with regard to minority areas. For India, Tibet remains a useful means of containing 
China, especially during negotiations over border disputes. To complement these findings, 
critical discourse analysis is used to develop a constructivist account examining the role of 
nationalism in the processes whereby elites have shaped, justified and pursued their national 
interests. This account suggests that the Communist Party of China has constructed a myth of 
Chinese nationhood partly in order to realise its interests vis-à-vis Tibet. The CPC has drawn 
on Han nationalism to fortify the concept of the Chinese nation, and on propaganda about 
development to neutralise Tibetan nationalism. In the case of India, the elite, while 
acknowledging their inability to contain China with the Tibet card, have attempted to boost 
nationalism by emphasising their generous, democratic and peaceful approach towards Tibet, 
and thereby comparing themselves favourably with China.  
 
The thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in two main ways: it departs from the 
existing literature by taking a constructivist approach to China and India’s national interest 
with regard to Tibet; and it is the first empirical study in this research area to explore the role 
of nationalism as a strategic means of shaping and pursuing national interest. 
 
Key words: National Interest, Nationalism, Rationalism, Constructivism, Critical Discourse 
Analysis, China-India Relations and Tibet 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
International disputes can be interpreted as a conflict of interests. All attempts at 
conciliation, management or escalation of the conflict are actually the process of (re) 
balancing the interests between the stakeholders. Sometimes the interests are expressed and 
pursued explicitly, and at other times, implicitly. The story of China and India’s conflicts is 
not different. Especially, it seems that the two countries’ interests with regard to Tibet have 
been in the middle of their disputes. In this regard, investigating their national interests vis-
à-vis Tibet can elicit a meaningful result that is helpful in understanding the nature of Sino-
Indian bilateral relations. The primary purpose of this research is thus twofold: 1) to clarify 
issues in understanding of the concept of national interest and how the concept can be used 
as an analytical tool; and 2) to investigate China and India’s national interests with regard 
to Tibet and its implications on their relations; and how the two countries’ national interests 
vis-à-vis Tibet have been defined, articulated and pursued. 
The aim of this research is presented on the assumptions that 1) national interests 
of China and India are a core factor determining their policies and behaviours regarding the 
Tibet issue; and 2) different bureaucratic and political interests in the two countries are key 
variables shaping their conflicting national interests with regard to Tibet. Regarding the 
assumption 1), many scholars such as Burchill (2005), Drulák (2010), Garrison (2007), 
Kennan (1951), Morgenthau (1962), Nincic (1999) and Weldes (1999) emphasised that the 
concept of national interest is particularly significant to interpret international politics and 
the decision-making process in the sense that it can give the criteria for selecting and 
evaluating state actions to the interest parties such as policy makers and states officials. 
Concerning the assumption 2), according to Allison (1999), Barnett (2010), Burgess (2009), 
Halperin (2006), Lal (2006) and Weldes (1999), elite groups such as states officials and 
bureaucrats are key policy makers who shape the decision-making process and national 
interest. In particular, Lal (2006) and Weldes (1999) argued that in those countries like 
China and India where the power of government is strong, political elites and bureaucrats 
can wield strong influence over the formation process of national interest. 
 Before introducing the structure of this thesis, it is essential to review how the 
previous research has dealt with the Tibet issue in China-India relations and their national 
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interests in order to find out the main viewpoints and limitations in this research topic.  
 Today, diplomatic cooperation between China and India, the world’s two largest 
and fastest-growing economies, is gradually increasing. During Chinese President Xi 
Jinping’s three-day official visit to India in 2014, China and India jointly announced that 
China will invest USD 20 billion in India’s infrastructure over five years (BBC, 2014; see 
also Pant, 2014). The two sides have also attempted to increase their bilateral trade in 
various areas such as tourism, films, healthcare, IT and logistics. Actually in 2010, during 
the former Chinese Prime Mister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, they already agreed to set a 
new bilateral trade target of USD 100 billion a year by 2015 (The Hindu, 2010), which 
touched around USD 70 billion in 2014 (Jha, 2014). The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) may have had not only economic but also strategic purposes behind these visits. 
China, which is rearranging power relations in Asia with an eye toward potential conflict 
between the US and China, may have to politically neutralise India, a real Asian competitor 
with regard to political and economic power. India may also be in the process of 
acknowledging that there is little benefit in getting in trouble with China especially in 
terms of economic cooperation, considering that China is India’s largest trading partner 
(Iyengar, 2014; see also The Times of India, 2014). 
 Despite repeated efforts, many political issues such as the border dispute and 
military expansion between the two superpowers remain unresolved. As indicated above, 
Tibet may be in the middle of the sharpest conflicts (see Bhattacharya, 2007; Chellaney, 
2014; Garver, 2011; Huchet, 2010; Jain, 2004; Kalha, 2012; Liu, 2011; Nadkarni, 2011; 
Norbu, 1997; Topgyal, 2011). Both countries consistently regard the presence in India of 
the Tibetan government-in-exile as one of the most politically sensitive issues (Shankar, 
2010, p.13). Owing to each country’s own national interests in Tibet that might be derived 
from different bureaucratic and political interests (Barnett, 2010; see also, Lal, 2006), their 
negotiations over issues surrounding Tibet have made little progress. For India, Tibet issues 
can be a politically effective negotiation card against China. For the PRC, Tibet might have 
a huge significance in the senese that they could solidify the ‘One-China’ policy and 
occupy potential natural resources and a large regional barrier by possessing Tibet 
(Bhattacharya, 2007, pp.239-240; see also Norbu, 1997; Twining, 2009). Recently, tensions 
in that regard have entered a new phase due to the Dalai Lama’s retirement from political 
life. The political relations between the two countries could be heavily affected in any 
direction according to their stances concerning the changing circumstances in Tibet related 
to the Dalai Lama’s retirement and death (Nadkarni, 2011, pp.21-22; see also Bajpaee, 
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2010, p.4; Bhattacharya, 2007, p.258). In this way, due to issues surrounding Tibet, Sino-
Indian relations have repeatedly, throughout the history of the two countries, seen subtle 
changes and periods of deadlock. 
 To date, there has been a great deal of discussion concerning China-India relations 
and Tibet; and the two superpowers’ interests in Tibet. Many scholars indicate that the 
Tibet issue is a crucial factor deteriorating Sino-Indian relations. Garver (2011) and Norbu 
(1997, p.1087) asserted that Tibet is a core issue in comprehending the PRC’s attitude 
concerning boundary disputes with India. China suspects that India has a hidden intention 
of weakening China’s control over Tibet. Garver (2011) also insisted that the PRC wants to 
continue the contentious mood caused by the territorial issue with India in order to keep 
India sober concerning Tibetans in India to engage in anti-China resistance movements 
among Tibetan exiles. By emphasising the Tibet issue as a centrepiece of the border 
dispute between China and India, Topgyal (2011) characterised Tibet as scapegoat of 
India’s moralistic idealism concerning China in the 1950s and a victim of India’s new 
realist policies toward China in the post-Cold War era. Chellaney (2014), Guruswamy and 
Singh (2009), Huchet (2010, 99), Jain (2004, p.263) and Norbu (1997, p.1093) argued that 
the Tibet issue still significantly affect their global policies and bilateral relations, although 
there have been their continuing efforts to relieve tensions between the two countries. 
Indian strategist Mohan (2008) emphasised the importance of Tibet in Sino-Indian 
relations, describing their relationship as follows: “When there is relative tranquility in 
Tibet, India and China have reasonably good relations. When Sino-Tibetan tensions rise, 
India’s relationship with China heads south.” Garver (2001, pp.1091-92) and Twining 
(2009) also argued that both countries can use the “Tibet card” as a bargaining tool to 
pressure each other in favour of their own national interests. Dr. Jagannath P. Panda, 
Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) of India, during 
an interview dated 31st May 2013 with the author, claimed that: 
  
I think no matter how much Indian experts and Government try to downplay the Tibet issue, I think 
Tibet is an issue that will always remain alive. This is not just for geographical reasons. Geography is 
just a small factor. I would argue that historical factor is becoming more important. It used to be a 
factor, but it has gained more importance… Now we know their [Tibet’s] cultural heritage in even 
Lhasa has been destroyed and that has been replaced by Chinese… I believe that the crash between 
Buddhism and Confucianism is going to be a major factor [for India and China relations as many 
Indian people cannot accept the China’s approach towards Tibetan Buddhism]. We know in China, 
there is the fact that religion does not exist… We have seen that the Tibetan problem has been linked 
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to India-China boundary problem. Now we have seen that we have water problem, we have Arunachal 
problem, Tawang problem, Chinese are playing with Tawang on the basis of historical connection with 
the 6th Dalai Lama. So all these factors, are going to affect India, China, even Pakistan and Tibet… 
I’m not agreeing the people who argue that Tibet does not exist as a factor in China and India relations. 
I think Tibet very much exists, and though Tibet as a political factor does not exist in India and China, 
but Tibet exists as a factor culturally, ethnically and regionally. (emphasis added) 
 
Some analysts and scholars, however, disagree with the significance of Tibet for Sino-
Indian relations. Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, said that because of 
the changed configuration of the world balance of power and the decreased possibility of 
the PRC’s internal collapse, the Dalai Lama and Tibet is no longer a bargaining chip for 
India to use against China; rather, the issue could be a thorn in Sino-Indian relations (The 
Hindu, 2009). Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, senior fellow of the IDSA, in his interview 
on 30th May 2013 with this researcher, maintained that: 
 
There is no Indian Tibet policy. Tibet is not a factor in Sino-Indian relations. India considers Tibet to 
be an autonomous region. Whether the TAR is really autonomous or not is not our [India’] problem. 
It’s their [China’s] problem. But this has changed. In the year of 1954 and around that time, we used to 
say, Tibet is an autonomous part of China, but today we say, Tibet autonomous region is part of China. 
So this is change. So anyway there is no policy. There is policy for the Dalai Lama, as a religious host 
or guest. That is different. That is not political but spiritual and cultural… Tibetans are refugees. 
Tibetans are one of many refugees in India. So Tibet is not important in Sino-Indian relations. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Despite the disagreement, it seems clear that the Tibet issue is still actively discussed when 
it comes to analysing China and India relations. That is to say, its importance can be 
evaluated differently, but it would be hardly thinkable to deal with Sino-Indian relations 
without reviewing the Tibet issue. Recently, as the two countries have reinforced their 
economic cooperation, scholars are tempted to try to examine whether the economic aspect 
can diminish their political tensions and remove the Tibet questions. Huang (2011, pp.115-
21) and Stobdan (2008, pp.703-4) asserted that economic complementarities could ease 
their political conflicts, but if Tibet and Border issues are not solved, the influence of 
economic cooperation as a catalyst in relieving their political tensions might be limited. 
Gray (1995), Wang (1998) and Sautman (2002) stated that unlike the PRC’s belief that 
“only growth brings stability” and “economic development can solve our problems” 
(Brauchli, 1997), remarkable economic development in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 
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has not been able to bring peace and tranquillity in Tibet as well as relations with India. By 
maintaining that “Tibet is changing from barrier to a regional linking China and India 
[sic],” Yeo (2009) argued that Tibet’s rapid economic growth, engineered by China, has 
brought both economic opportunity and a considerable amount of stress to the Tibetan way 
of life. According to him, although there has been double-digit economic growth over the 
last fifteen years in Tibet, the economic performance of Tibetans falls behind that of the 
Han Chinese. The economic exchange between China and India through the Tibetan 
plateau, in this sense, will hardly be flourished in the near future owing to the mistrust and 
poor economic conditions of the Tibet areas. All these studies concentrate on the possibility 
that the economic cooperation between China and India can ease the ongoing tension 
related to Tibet. Many scholars are pessimistic over such possibility owing to the ceaseless 
mistrust between the two countries. It is fact that China and India have not been able to 
make an impressive progress in this matter by boosting the economic cooperation. Indeed, 
behind the economic cooperation, both states have had the “war of words” frequently 
especially on the territorial conflicts over Arunachal Pradesh which is called South Tibet in 
China (see Want China Times, 2014a).  
A myriad of scholars is also concerned with the military aspects in TAR that could 
seriously increase tensions between China and India. China is expanding their military 
capabilities in Tibet rapidly (Pant, 2005, p.217; see also Aiyengar, 2010; Tellis, 2010; 
Ramachandran, 2008; Stobdan, 2006). In particular, their new Qinghai-Tibet Railway line 
opened in July 2006 makes PRC facilitate military expansion and control in Tibet (Patil 
2008, p.296; see also Bhattacharya, 2007, p.258; Chansoria, 2010, pp.178-79; Clarke, 2011, 
p.19; Holslag, 2008a; 2008b; Jetly, 2010, pp.5-6; Khanduri, 2000; Samanta, 2008). The 
PRC also opened the airports in Tibet including Daocheng Yading and Qamdo Bamda 
airport, having a military purpose (Reuters, 2013). By describing Tibet as a militarized 
zone, Pant (2011) stated that because China already has modernised and huge transport 
infrastructure and military bases in Tibet, India is struggling to follow its pace, which 
increases their security concerns. Many Indian military strategists have also warned that 
the PRC will station new short-range missiles that have major Indian cities within their 
reach on the Tibetan plateaus (Bhasin, 2009, p.66; see also Jetly, 2010, p.5; Kumar 2007). 
India is concerned about the build-up of Chinese military force in Tibet because its border 
is directly connected to the Indian northeast border. This national security environment vis-
à-vis China is quite sensitive for India given its bitter experience of the 1962 war with 
China (Garver, 2001). 
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Since Tibetan plateau is source of the riparian headwaters of the Himalayan 
Mountain range, only except for the Ganges River, and most of India’s river systems 
originate in Tibet, the dominance of China in Tibet could also trigger the river flow issue 
between the two countries (Nadkarni, 2011, pp.20-21; see also Bajpaee, 2010, pp.5-6; 
Barnett, 2010; Chellaney, 2006). Despite a number of MoUs on hydrological data sharing 
on River Brahmaputra / Yarlung Tsangpo whose headwater originates in Tibet, India is still 
demanding more data sharing; and China is still building more dams on the river – and 
possibly, China can divert the Tibet’s water to her mainland in the future (see Buckley 
2015; see also Walker, 2015). 
Close and longstanding relations between China and Tibet have occasioned 
confusion among Tibetans concerning their identity, further complicating Sino-Indian 
relations (Yeo, 2009). Both China and India have argued that Tibet is within their historical 
sphere of influence. A “Sinicised Tibet” may not be a welcome outcome for India. Shankar 
(2010, p.5) argued that the fact that China has failed to assimilate the Tibetans into the 
mainstream civilization is the main reason for China’s ambivalence towards India (see also 
Jetly, 2010, p.8). Regarding this issue, Norbu (2001) emphasised ethnic identity as the 
principal origin of the Tibetan uprising: “It seems to have more to do with ethnicity than 
with economics. Ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism—these are the etiology 
and dynamics of the conflict between the Han state and Tibetan ethnicity during the past 50 
years” (p.349). Wang (1998) also stated that it is hard to believe that the development 
programmes in TAR will bring the ethnic peace in that area. 
India’s granting of asylum to Dalai Lama has made the two countries’ relations 
complex as well. The PRC suspects that this is India’s intention to keep the Tibetan issue 
alive (Bhattacharya, 2007, p.258; Jetly, 2010, p.8; Norbu, 1997, pp.1091-92; see also Want 
China Times, 2014b). Liu (2011) indicated that embracing the Dalai Lama and hosting the 
Tibetan Exiles has proven to be a significant factor triggering mutual suspicion between 
the two countries. In order to resolve this difficulty, he argues for the indispensability of 
India’s acceptance that Tibet is an autonomous region of China, a position which implies 
that India may no longer use Tibet as a buffer zone between the two countries (Liu, 2011).  
Around the Dalai Lama’s retirement from his political life and reincarnation issue, 
potential future relations between the two countries receive much attention from scholars 
as well. Nadkarni (2011, p.22) argues that the Tibetan leadership transition can be a 
starting point of new conflicts between China and India as younger Tibetans could take 
more extreme actions against the PRC to achieve their objective of political autonomy for 
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Tibet. In particular, any turmoil along the border near Tibetan exiles can worsen China and 
India relations more. Bajpaee (2010) and Barnett (2009) also asserted that issues 
surrounding reincarnation could deteriorate Sino-Indian relations. In an interview with 
Reuters, Padma Choling, the former Chinese-appointed governor of Tibet said that “it has 
to approve all reincarnations of living Buddhas, or senior religious figures in Tibetan 
Buddhism. And China has to sign off on the choosing of the next Dalai Lama” (Wee and 
Blanchard, 2011; see also Wei, 2015). Therefore, according to India’s response to the post-
Dalai Lama, the issue of reincarnation can bring serious tensions between the two countries 
if the current Dalai Lama’s successor is chosen in the Tibetan exile in India (Sirki 2011, 
p.67; see also Wee, 2015). 
All this being the case, it is reasonable to consider Tibet the centre of the 
considerable emotional gap and mutual distrust between the two countries. However, as 
Barnett (2010) indicated, scholars have given considerably less attention to China and 
India’s political and social interests that shape national interest with regard to Tibet even 
though the PRC has declared Tibet as a core interest since 2006. Also, many studies 
regarding Sino-Indian relations have restricted the Tibet variable to being a subject of the 
Sino-Indian border dispute. The question of how and why their national interests with 
regard to Tibet have been shaped has received little attention by the scholars. The 
fundamental assumption behind the logic of the existing literature is that the 
anthropomorphised states naturally seek security and economic benefits as it is a human 
nature, which is in accord with a realist account. Study of China and India’s national 
interest vis-à-vis Tibet that goes beyond a realist theoretical framework still remains a 
lacuna in this research field. In other words, attempts at examining China and India’s 
domestic process of interest formation regarding the Tibet issues have been frustrated by a 
paucity of reliable in-depth analysis, forcing analysts to rely primarily on circumstantial 
evidence. Most of all, even though the term national interest has extensively been used, 
very little research has been conducted on a rigorous conceptual framework for examining 
and interpreting the concept of national interest in this research field 
This research, thus, by establishing a persuasive conceptual framework on national 
interest, examines the process of the interest formation of the respective countries with 
regard to Tibet. Then it is essential to explore how scholars and theories in IR have 
attempted to understand the national interest. In the IR field, it can be argued that there are 
two theoretical bases when it comes to explaining the concept of national interest: 
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rationalism and constructivism (see Keohane, 1989; see also Smith, 2004).1 To briefly 
explain their approaches towards the concept of national interest, rationalists argue that 
national interest, mostly pursuing security and economic interests, is an exogenously fixed 
and predefined concept and any actors, here states, will naturally seek to maximise such 
interests. On the contrary to this, constructivists claim that national interest is a socially 
constructed concept and ideational factors such as norm and culture highly affect the 
formation process of national interest. This thesis, instead of a single framework, relies 
upon these two competing meta-frameworks and critically assesses China and India’s 
national interests especially with regard to Tibet, as fitting within each of these frameworks. 
As the ontological and methodological perspectives are different from each other, it could 
result in meaningful outcomes presenting varied interpretations and filling a gap of each 
framework. It may be possible to discover whether these frameworks can be in 
complementary relations as well.  
Importantly, this research attempts to develop the constructivist accounts of 
national interest by focusing on the role of nationalism in the process of shaping, justifying 
and pursuing the national interests. It could be argued that nationalism, as a social 
construction, can be used to represent interests as defined and articulated by the actors as 
national interest. It is surprising that there has been little research conducted to particularly 
highlight the relationship between the two concepts in this research topic. The actors may 
need a certain level of social agreement to articulate the interests at the national level – 
though the process of collecting people’s opinions varies across regime types. Nationalism 
can act as an excellent foil to elicit such agreement. That is to say, it is through nationalism 
that the actors, usually government and state officials, could legitimise and justify their 
actions to reify and realise national interest. Thus, it may be reasonable to concentrate on 
how nationalism plays a role in defining and pursuing the national interest. 
Lastly, this research strongly argues that examining the case of China and India’s 
interests in Tibet can help grasp the issues of understanding the concept of national interest 
and nationalism, because the way China and India pursue their interests with regard to 
Tibet is very different – the former is very explicit, strong and most of all, nationalistic; 
whereas the latter is implicit and passive. This aspect can give an excellent opportunity to 
compare patterns of states’ actions and discursive construction concerning the pursuit of 
national interests and use of nationalism as a political instrument.  
                                           
1 This will be discussed in detail in chapter II, the concept of the national interest. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the research 
including an outline of the thesis. Chapter II is a conceptual framework for the concept of 
national interest. The purpose of this chapter is to review and analyse the existing literature 
on the concept of national interest in order to have my own position towards the concept 
for this research. In this chapter, this research mainly explores rationalist (realist and 
liberal) and constructivist (conventional and critical) accounts on national interest; and 
discuss how they understand a vague concept, national interest, as an analytical tool. This 
chapter especially highlights the usefulness of critical constructivism adopting the 
postmodernist sociolinguistics when it comes to understanding the concept of national 
interest – national interest is socially constructed and linguistically realised and represented. 
This means that rather than simply assuming that China and India’s interest in Tibet is a 
“natural” phenomenon, this research focuses on the way the ruling and intellectual elites of 
both countries have dealt with the Tibet issue as their national interest. 
 Chapter III concerns the theories of nationalism. As indicated above, this research 
focuses on the role of nationalism in defining and pursuing national interest. Thus, in this 
chapter, this research examines the main issues of nationalism – ontological and 
axiological debates – that have always been the subject of debates among scholars; and 
proposes how to see nationalism in this research. This research argues that nationalism is 
also a social construction that can be shaped either by elite or by the public. However, 
obviously, nationalism tends to be used, or abused by powerful actors (usually elite groups) 
in the pursuit of their own interests in the name of national interests. This chapter finally 
highlights the relationship between nationalism and national interest – nationalism as a 
means to shape and pursue national interest. As indicated above, this thesis assumes that 
elites in China and India have used and stimulated nationalism in the processes whereby 
they have shaped, justified and pursued their national interests. 
 In Chapter IV, this research discusses the methodology. Based on the conceptual 
frameworks in chapters II and III, this chapter presents the research questions, followed by 
the methods of analysis. This research has two sets of research questions, for the rationalist 
account and that of constructivist. It mainly deals with the textual analysis to be used in 
this research: qualitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis. Especially, 
reviewing the existing literature on discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis, this 
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research tries to establish its own mode of critical discourse analysis. This chapter also 
includes a discussion on the methods of interview as a tool for the purpose of collecting 
data to be analysed. 
 Chapter V analyses China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet with a 
rationalist perspective. The main purpose of this chapter is to find out the factors of Tibet 
that are of interest to China and India. By examining economic and security / geopolitical 
factors, this chapter attempts to discover the rationale behind the China and India’s pursuit 
of interest vis-à-vis Tibet. It also indicates the limitations of the rationalist approach to the 
topic and why alternative theoretical viewpoint, here, constructivism, is necessary. 
 In chapters VI and VII, with the proposed constructivist understanding on the 
concept of national interest and nationalism, this research examines how China and India’s 
national interests vis-à-vis Tibet have been constructed in elite discourse, focusing on 
domestic political complexity. Each chapter gives the historical and socio-political context 
surrounding the Tibet issue in the respective countries which is a background to the interest 
formation. Especially, in these chapters, this study analyses the ways of discursive 
construction of China and India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet. Nationalism as a 
strategic tool to pursue the national interest is also highlighted.  
 The final chapter, conclusion, reviews all the findings of this research and tackles 
the research questions. This research argues that China and India’s national interest with 
regard to Tibet is actually the product of elite discourse; and nationalism has been 
generated, used and even manipulated in the discursive construction of national interest. 
 
Originality and Limitation of the Study  
 
The concept of national interest has been interpreted arbitrarily without adequate 
theoretical and conceptual backgrounds even though there has been a preponderance of 
discourse and use of the term, national interest, in many studies on this topic. Through 
conceptualising national interest under rigorous theoretical foundations, it is expected for 
this research to take a meaningful step to avoid arbitrary analysis. Most of all, this 
research’s attempt at conceptualising national interest can be used and referenced for other 
various empirical studies. Actually, studies that concentrate on the concept of national 
interest have failed to give the way their explanations can be applied to varied empirical 
research on international politics. 
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 Studies in this filed are also prone to overlook the domestic process of interest 
formation of China and India concerning the Tibet issue. It is worth mentioning that this 
thesis represents probably the first study that devotes considerable attention to 
constructivism in order to examine China and India’s national interest with regard to Tibet. 
Most of all, it has been no noticeable empirical research highlighting the relationship 
between national interest and nationalism that goes beyond the mere explanation that 
nationalism is a kind of political ideology to make people believe and pursue the national 
interest. This thesis genuinely the first attempt at expanding the discussion of the role of 
nationalism as a strategic tool when it comes to shaping and pursuing national interest in 
this research area. I hope that this research can be the foundation stone of the future studies 
on this topic.  
 This research, at the same time, has some limitations. One of the most challenging 
issues was to conduct the interviews. Especially it was not easy to have an interview with 
Chinese scholars, politicians and analysts. According to the criteria to select the potential 
interviewees, based on their topics and contents of publications related to the Tibet issue, I 
contacted 18 scholars, 2 politicians and 7 analysts (27 in total). I believed that I could 
generate meaningful raw material by conducting interviews with them as their publications 
contain, in my opinion, strong and even provocative arguments (vis-à-vis the Tibet issue) 
which may represent the interest of Chinese government and elites. However, unfortunately, 
I could receive only one response (with very broad and general content) from anonymous 
interviewee. Maybe due to the political sensitiveness, many potential interviewees ignored 
my interview requests; or refused to be interviewed. Of course no one wanted their names 
to be reveled in my thesis. Also, some of them, rather than accepting my interview request, 
merely “recommended” some particular books, articles and their own writings. I also 
attempted to approach a number of scholars whose research interest is related to 
contemporary Chinese politics whenever participating in academic conferences, in order to 
have an interview with them. However, their response to my request was rather 
disappointing. Most of them did not want to have a serious discussion on China-Tibet issue 
saying that it is no longer meaningful and contested topic when it comes to evaluating 
China’s national interest. This ignorance of the topic can also be a good source to be 
analysed, but the problem was, no one was willing to have a formal interview with me. 
These difficulties have arisen may be because 1) for Chinese, it would not be easy to 
discuss the Tibet issue explicitly with foreigners due to political sensitiveness; or 2) they 
may think that it is not necessary to discuss Tibet any more as the issue is already resolved. 
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Thus, via the method of interview, unfortunately it was impossible to generate a 
meaningful and fresh content for chapter VI. Constructing National Interests: China’s 
National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet.  
Contacting Indian scholars and analysts was relatively easier. Actually, my initial 
plan was to visit some faculty members of the universities located in Delhi and analysts 
who seem to be interested in the Tibet issue. However, because of extremely hot weather 
and my illness, I could not easily arrange an interview with them. Especially, contacting 
the faculty members was not easy because majority of my requests were ignored and some 
of them did not allow me to visit them due to their busy schedule. In this reason, majority 
of my interviews were conducted in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), 
one of the biggest security policy think-tanks in India located in New Delhi, in which I had 
stayed during my filed trip to India. The interviewees include: 1) Col P K Gautam, research 
fellow of the IDSA; 2) Brigadier Mandip Singh; 3) Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, senior 
fellow of the IDSA; 4) Dr Jagnnath P. Panda, research fellow of the IDSA; and 5) Dr. R. N. 
Das, senior fellow of the IDSA. They were selected as an interviewee based on their 
publications dealing with the Tibet issues in India. Each interview lasted around 30-40 
minutes and I could have very meaningful conversations with them for this research. All of 
them were very careful to answer the questions particularly with regard to Tibet’s role in 
India-China relations. Rather than focusing on the political implications of the Tibet issue 
in India, they all emphasised the cultural relationship between India and Tibet. In other 
words, it seemed that they were reluctant to explicitly express their concern and idea on the 
political aspects of the Tibet issue in India. This tendency and the data generated in the 
interviews are extensively discussed and analysed in chapter VII. Constructing National 
Interests: India’s National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet. 
However, there was a barrier as well. As explained above, thanks to my supervisor, 
Professor. Dibyesh Anand’s help, I could stay in the IDSA, for about 4 months. I wanted to 
conduct the interviews with Indian scholars and state officials there and attend conferences 
and seminars on China and India relations and Tibet, but it was impossible to do so. 
Basically, the institution did not allow me to attend any events whose topic is related to 
China. Even some people explicitly and implicitly suspected me of a Chinese spy. They 
wanted me to say something about South Korean politics only. Majority of the members of 
the institution were personally very kind to me and I enjoyed the stay in India very much, 
but academically, I felt a sense of frustration many times. Actually I regret that I could not 
have enough opportunities to develop my idea much more from there. Also, it was not easy 
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to find “objective” and reliable data related to this Topic. Especially, when I collected the 
data for chapter V, I realised that interested bodies and individuals related to the Tibet issue 
generate and use the different data on the same topic according to their political and social 
preferences / interests. Simply, there is no agreement and trust on the data available. This 
aspect hampers researchers in this field from conducting a reliable and productive research. 
I discussed this point in detail in chapter V. 
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Chapter II. The Concept of the National Interest 
 
We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and 
perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. 
― LORD PALMERSTON, Speech to the House of Commons 
 
 
National Interest 
 
“I went to Brussels with one objective, to protect Britain’s national interest. And that is 
what I did.” British Prime Minister David Cameron told lawmakers in the House of 
Commons on 12 December 2011. Many politicians and scholars have frequently used, or 
abused, the concept of the national interest to justify and assess a nation’s foreign policy 
and action. However, the concept is still vague and controversial even though there has 
been a great deal of attempts to define and analyse it. Its characteristics of ambiguity and 
vagueness are not because of a lack of research trying to define it but because of a myriad 
of such attempts that bring about many interpretations and controversies (Drulák, 2010, 
p.12). 
 There have been concepts that reflect the “interests” of rulers and elites such as 
“the will of the prince” of Machiavelli, “dynastic interests” of Henry VIII or “general will” 
of Rousseau. In this course of history, as the scope of the concept of interests was 
broadened and transferred to a modern state, the concept of the “national” interest emerged. 
Until the early 20th century, however, the research that attempts to conceptualise the 
national interest was rare though scholars and politicians used the term frequently in order 
to explain foreign policy and international politics (see Mowrer, 1924). Charles A. Beard 
(1934), in his publication The Idea of National Interest, was one of the first to contribute to 
developing the modern concept of the national interest. By distinguishing the national 
interest from the “public interest,” he argued that the economic interest is the most 
significant factor in shaping the national interest. According to Beard, as far as the national 
interest is concerned, the property owners’ interests cannot be ignored. Thus, he claimed 
that since interests and human motive and concern are inextricably related, there are no 
objective national interests that are permanent and fixed. His research is meaningful in that 
it raises awareness of the importance of the concept as a tool for analysis of foreign policy 
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and international politics. However, his publication lacks theoretical foundation and over-
relies on empirical and historical intuition. Moreover, he almost neglected other factors 
such as political power and culture that might affect the people’s behaviours and national 
interest. Thus, it seems reasonable to evaluate that his study fails not only to analyse how 
national interests are generally constructed but also to examine the concept of the national 
interest through a diverse and sophisticated spectrum of perspectives. 
 From Beard’s research on national interest, many scholars have attempted to 
clarify this overused concept itself more theoretically. Frankel (1970) gave more concrete 
shape to the concept. He categorised the concept of the national interest into two types: 1) 
objective national interests that are permanent and independent, for instance, those of 
geography, history and resources; and 2) subjective interests that are changeable and 
dependent on many factors such as the certain government’s preferences and a tendency of 
policy makers, for example, those of ideology and religion. His study contributes to the 
progress of the development of the concept in that he presented more specific and 
pragmatic criterion for the analysis of the national interest. However, as Kratochwil (1982) 
indicated, Frankel “fails to tell us why a given classification is sensible or fitting” (p.1). 
Also boundary that he proposed between objective and subjective national interest may be 
debatable. Frankel indicated that the factor of neighbours is objective national interest 
which is independent of any form of government. However, much empirical evidence goes 
against his argument. For example, Conservative and Liberal governments in South Korea 
have very different attitudes and policies towards North Korea, the nearest neighbour; the 
former describes North Korean regime as the main enemy while the latter opposes this. 
They both argue that their stances accord with South Korea’s national interest. Their terms 
of national interest are rather highly subjective. Therefore, it is questionable whether this 
categorisation is a good way to analyse the concept of national interest. 
 By defining national interest as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign 
state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment,” 
Nuechterlein (1976) divided the national interest into four basic interests: Defence, 
Economic, World Order and Ideological interests (p.247, 248). With the case examples 
such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, US intervention in 
Vietnam in 1965 and the Korean War in 1950, he attempted to analyse how leaders make 
the decisions under his categorisation of national interest. Nuechterlein, however, only 
concentrated on the decision-making process of the elite and almost neglected domestic 
conflicts with regard to national interest. Also, the scope of each category of national 
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interest is too broad and oversimplified to apply to any other case studies. By highlighting 
the national interest as “a highly resilient concept,” Rochester (1978) claimed that two 
assumptions are embedded in the concept of national interest: 1) there exists an objectively 
determinable collective interest which all individual members within a given national 
society share equally; and 2) this collective interest transcends any interests that a 
particular subset of those individuals may share with individuals in other national societies 
(p.79). Her point in these assumptions is that “whatever the differences between various 
subnational groups in a national society, those groups have more interests in common with 
each other than they do with groups in other national societies” (p.80). However, there is 
no clear empirical-based evidence to support this argument; and her argument might not be 
enough to explain civil wars such as in 1970s and 1980s Lebanon or today’s Syria. Also, it 
may be necessary to explain how such interests in common in national societies can be 
shaped. 
 Though above studies that concentrate on the concept itself shed meaningful light 
on the way national interest can be understood and explained, there is a common tension 
among them. It is not clear how their explanations can be applied to varied empirical 
research on international politics. Apart from the controversies over metatheoretical and 
epistemological issues, it seems that they do not lend any clear explanations for the way 
one can identify whether there exists actual causality between the national interest and 
political phenomena in international relations. 
 Many empirical studies that use the term national interest also suffer from lack of 
theoretical clarity on the conceptualisation of the national interest (see Behrman, 1970; 
Casey 2003; Dosman, 1975; Gupta, 1956; Hayes, 1984; Horn, 2006; Johansen, 1980; 
McGee, 1989; Mediansky, 1988; Miklóssy, 2003; Nichols, 1987; Schonberg, 2003; Von 
Vorys, 1990). In these studies, national interest is interpreted arbitrarily in order to explain 
the phenomena of international politics. Their arguments are that foreign policies are 
established based on national interest, but they fail to explain why and how the specific 
national interest is important and defined. For them, it may be a series of commonly held 
views about national interest to regard economic power and security as “true” national 
interest without exception. Some could argue that these studies follow a rationalist 
viewpoint because they “affirm,” in spite of no clear mention about it, that promoting 
national security and acquisition of economic power are unchallengeable national interest. 
It is, however, difficult to evaluate that their research were derived from a rationalist 
approach because they do not present any metatheoretical ground, namely, ontological and 
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normative assumptions with regard to national interest. In short, their notions of national 
interest are too “oversimplified and wrongheadedly dogmatic” (Hoffmann, 1978, p.133). 
 Many scholars criticise such indiscriminate abuse of the concept and reveal a very 
sceptical view of the usefulness of the national interest as an analytical tool (Boulding, 
1970; Crabb, 1975; Frankel, 1970; Hoffmann, 1978; Rosenau, 2006; Quigg, 1971; see also 
Clinton 1994). By arguing that the international relations theories are of no use to the study 
for the quest for the meaning of national interest, Frankel (1970) claimed that it is 
impossible to conceptualise the national interest theoretically. Similar to this, Rosenau 
(2006) also asserted that as an analytic concept, the national interest has “little future” 
(p.254). He also criticised that “the national interest has never fulfilled its early promise as 
an analytic tool” (p.248). He defined the national interest as two categories, objective and 
subjective, which is similar to Frankel’s perspective. However, for him, objective reality is 
“neither predictively nor retrospectively can its contents be clearly demonstrated” (p.250). 
Subjective one is also “hardly suitable to the description, explanation, and evaluation of 
foreign-policy goals due to its vagueness” (p.252). Clinton (1994) also indicated that “any 
defence of the national interest bears a heavy burden of proof” (p.21). The concept was 
also branded as “a sort of Rosetta Stone” (Quigg, 1971, p.107) and “a kind of incarnation 
or nostrum of foreign policy” (Crabb, 1975, p.226). 
 Such criticisms might result from the inherent ambiguity, vagueness and 
uncertainty of the concept of national interest. As many previous studies show, it may not 
be easy to completely overcome the limitations of the concept. However, as Kratochwil 
(1982) indicated, abandoning the concept of national interest “would probably cause 
embarrassment, since the notion of the national interest is part of our political reality and is 
integral to our discourse on public affairs” (p.2). Nuechterlein (1976) also claimed that “the 
term national interest is so deeply ingrained in the literature of international relations and 
diplomatic language that it is unlikely to be dismissed from our vocabulary simply because 
some scholars find it useless” (p.246). Drulák (2010) argued that even if it is difficult to 
identify clear national interest, “the focus on the national interest is still beneficial since it 
brings us to the question of why this is so, i.e. whether there are domestic or external 
reasons for not reaching a national interest” (p.182). In fact, some scholars have given a 
meaningful clue with regard to the way national interest can be used in empirical research 
in convincing manner (see Datta, 2005; Drulák, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; Hook 1995; 
Kabiraj, 2007; Krasner, 1978; Tumlir, 1978; Weldes, 1999; Yan, 1996). Though each 
researcher may have different ontological and normative assumptions and, of course, 
Chapter II. The Concept of the National Interest                                       Seokbae Lee 
  18 
limitations, there is the common denominator that needs to be considered. They attempt to 
conceptualise the concept of national interest more theoretically strictly and discover the 
causal relations between the national interest and political phenomena that they want to 
investigate. In other words, they focus on how national interest can be the criteria for 
specific political actions. Different from the research without any conceptualisation and 
convincing interpretation of national interest, studies by these scholars show how national 
interest can be interpreted in international politics. 
 Thus, it may be essential to explore how scholars and theories in the discipline of 
international relations have attempted to understand the national interest in order to 
establish a persuasive conceptual framework for the analysis of China and India’s national 
interest with regard to Tibet. In fact, there has been a preponderance of rationalist 
framework when it comes to much of the writing on China-India relations, to date. This 
may be because their remarkable economic development, growing power in international 
politics and boundary disputes are good enough to attract scholars to conduct their research 
regarding China-India relations under a rationalist framework, realist one, in particular 
(this will be discussed later). However, rationalist approaches may not provide an enough 
explanation for Sino-Indian relations with regard to Tibet because many other variables 
such as culture and identity should be involved in the process of shaping national interest 
when considering their history and actions surrounding this issue. Such variables may go 
beyond the mere range of security, economy and power, so different framework from 
previous research must be necessary not only to find the undiscovered and unperceived 
(but might be important) national interest of China and India with regard to Tibet but also 
to discover how such national interest can be shaped and linked to their actions towards 
each other and Tibet. This thesis would argue that social constructivism can result in 
meaningful research outcomes in that its ontological and methodological perspectives are 
different from those of rationalists and no empirical studies has been conducted under 
constructivist approaches to analyse China and India’s national interests. It may not be 
desirable, however, to ignore rationalist approaches for this research because it can still 
give an opportunity to discover important aspects that can explain the national interest of 
two countries in that writing on national interests of China and India is of relatively recent 
origin and remains a largely underdeveloped field for IR scholars. With two different 
frameworks, it may also be possible to discover whether these frameworks can be in 
complementary relations. 
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In summary, as stated in Introduction, instead of a single framework, this thesis 
will rely upon two competing meta frameworks (rationalist with realist and liberal strands 
and social constructivist), and critically assess China and India’s national interests 
especially with regard to Tibet, as fitting within each of these framework. It is expected for 
this thesis to offer a refreshing account with social constructivism as no researcher has 
used any version of constructivism in this field so far. 
 
Approaches to the National Interest 
 
1. Rationalist 
 
Realism and liberalism have arguably dominated the discipline of international relations 
since the end of World War II. They are generally regarded as rationalist theories in the 
sense that “they are both constructed upon the choice-theoretic assumptions of 
microeconomic theory” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.216). Rationalists assume that human beings 
are rational and self-interested; and the action “must be the best means of satisfying their 
desires, given their beliefs about the available options and their consequences” (Elster, 
2007, p.193). The important aspect of their assumption is that actors’ interests and 
identities are fixed, exogenously given and defined. They argue that actors are independent 
of social structures; so they do not concentrate on the internal process of interest formation 
(see Waltz, 1979, pp. 91-92; see also Der Derian, 1995; Reus-Smit, 2009, p.216; Smith, 
2004, p.502). 
 They also attach a deep significance to the concept of national interest when 
explaining a characteristic of international relations and state actions. Despite considerable 
disagreement about the way of interpreting the phenomena regarding international relations, 
they both argue that states are highly2 rational, self-interested and the most important actor 
(see Reus-Smit, 2009, p.214). For them, national interest as a concept is not contested in 
the sense that there are economic and political objective national interests that states 
always seek. They do not concentrate on interest formation, but strategic game where states 
are involved in according to their national interests (see Smith, 2004). Their explanation 
for correlation between national interest and state actions is thus relatively straightforward 
                                           
2 I use that term “highly” because some liberals contend that states can also be irrational (see Simon, 1957). 
This will be explained in detail in the next section. 
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in empirical studies. For instance, the tensions between China and Japan over the disputed 
islands in East China Sea3 can be explained in the following manner: since the area in 
which the islands are located is resource-rich and of vital strategic importance, both states 
have asserted ownership of the islands. Two states rationally pursue their national interests, 
security maximisation and material forces. Other variables such as the history and culture 
of China and Japan might not be seriously considered in this logic. 
 This section explores two mainstream rationalist approaches, realism and 
liberalism, in order to discover how both realist and liberal are similar and how both are 
rationalist. This part also attempts to examine their strong and weak points with regard to 
their understanding of the concept of national interest when it comes to interpreting the 
phenomena of international relations. 
 
a. Realist 
Realists have mainly led the development of the concept of the national interest in spite of 
many harsh criticisms. They, regardless of the “category” such as the “classical-“ and “neo-
,” regard the national interest as crucial factor in understanding of international politics 
(Weldes, 1999, p.5). The fundamental premise of the realist paradigm is “states can be 
treated as unified actors pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest” 
(Krasner, 1978, pp.12-13). Realists argue that in international politics, each nation state 
thinks and acts according to national interest to protect its fixed and eternal goals from an 
external milieu, for instance, promoting national security and preserving national territory. 
 Realist modern understanding of national interest conspicuously stems from Hans 
J. Morgenthau who conceives of the acquisition of economic and military power as the 
most crucial interest (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p.345; see also Hoffmann, 2006, p.166; 
Landsberg, 2010, p.274). He claimed that national interests are permanent and fixed, and it, 
the concept of interest, must be “defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau, 2005, p.5). 
Morgenthau (1962, p.79), by arguing that “a theory of international politics must be 
focused on the concept of the national interest,” also insisted that foreign policy goals must 
be defined in terms of the national interest. Morgenthau clearly presents his perspective 
and understanding of the national interest by listing the “six principles of political realism.” 
 
 
                                           
3 The islands are known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. The islands have been under valid control 
of Japan since early 1970s. 
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The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept 
provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be 
understood. … We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, 
and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. … The concept of interest defined as 
power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the 
subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. 
… A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the 
concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences. (Morgenthau, 2005, p.5, 
emphasis added) 
 
For him, the national interest is an objective political reality, and this is not realised by “the 
whim of a man or the partisanship of party”, but a rational statesman. This argument is 
based on the assumption that the state acts like an amoral human being, so the behaviour of 
the anthropomorphised state can be predicted in that human nature has not changed since 
the earliest beginning of the philosophies of human nature. Morgenthau assumes that 
political leaders are rational actors who know what their national interests are and what 
they have to do in order to defend their national interests. With regard to this, he (2005) 
contended that “Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an 
objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a 
meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of 
politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place” (p.12). By emphasising 
that “any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must 
obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity which we call a 
nation,” he also claimed that all nations must “protect their physical, political, and cultural 
identity against encroachments by other nations” (Morgenthau, 1952, p.972). 
 Through these arguments, Morgenthau attempts to make the concept of the 
national interest into a scientifically more concrete analytical tool (Kratochvíl, 2010). His 
definition of the national interest wielded strong influence over realism in academia, in 
particular, the classical realists (Clinton, 1994; Coicaud and Wheeler, 2008; Drulák, 2010; 
Kissinger, 1957; Landsberg, 2010; Weldes, 1999). George F. Kennan (1951) largely shares 
Morgenthau’s perspective on national interest and international politics. Kennan insisted 
that national interest based on power is more reliable guide to foreign policy than any other 
criteria. He agrees with the idea, in particular, that “universal moral principles cannot be 
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applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be 
filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau, 2005, p.11). 
By criticising United States diplomacy as the “legalistic-moralistic” approach, he warned 
that some system of legal rules and restraints cannot be helpful in dealing with the conflict 
between different national interests of states in international politics. In a sentence, he 
contended that “there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the 
U.S. government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles” (Kennan, 
1979, p.43). 
 However, not every classical realist agrees with above perspectives on national 
interest and international politics. By claiming that “Realism becomes morally cynical or 
nihilistic when it assumes that the universal characteristic in human behavior must also be 
regarded as normative,” Niebuhr (1953, p.130; see also 1947, 1949), who is also regarded 
as a classical realist, criticised that realism excessively addresses the role and importance 
of national interest. According to him, the will-to-power of individuals and groups, which 
extends beyond the desires of the instinct of survival, becomes more amplified when such 
interested parties are involved in the common members of any national community. The 
main thrust of his argument is, as his title of book Moral Man and Immoral Society shows, 
man can be moral, but it is almost impossible for society to be moral. He insisted that the 
problems of society have to be solved not by ethics but by power and politics in that the 
reality can hardly change even if ethics and morality are much more emphasised. He also 
argued that such power has to be used for justice and a broad social interest, not self-
interest of particular groups or individuals. Therefore, according to him, too much focus on 
national interest can exacerbate the characteristics of the international anarchy where there 
is a lack of the moral sense since it is difficult for a nation to be ethical in international 
politics. Niebuhr’s perspective on national interest may partly be different from that of 
Morgenthau in that the former more emphasises the role of morality and ethics as essential 
elements when explaining the interest of nation. He also denied the idea that the politicians 
are basically indifferent to morality, which is different from Morgenthau’s argument of the 
human nature. However, Niebuhr also indicates power as the most important element when 
it comes to explaining international politics and national interest as Morgenthau argues. 
 Carr (1939) also shows different understanding from Morgenthau’s concept of 
power. He contended that it is unrealistic to ignore a moral factor in terms of understanding 
the international order. According to him, though power is a very fundamental element for 
every government, “an international order cannot be based on power alone, for the simple 
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reason that mankind will in the long run always revolt against naked power” (p.235). 
Wolfers (1962) also claimed that it is impossible to explain the phenomena of international 
politics only through power, so other factors such as ideology and morality should be 
considered when investigating national interest and international politics. 
 Even though there is some disagreement among classical realists, they share the 
ideas: 1) the (anthropomorphised) state has its own interests like an individual; 2) the state 
behaves according to the interests as a rational actor; 3) state survival and maximisation of 
power are very significant elements that define the national interest; and 4) it may be naïve 
to believe that morality can manage the international disorder. 
 However, their perspective on the national interest has been challenged in many 
aspects. It may not be easy to objectively define and delineate the elements of power in 
international politics. Therefore, a judgement of interest defined according to power can be 
highly subjective, which is inconsistent with his argument. Most of all, Morgenthau’s 
distinction between objective and subjective components is not clear, and even what he 
defines as objective facts has to be subjectively defined and identified (Burchill, 2005). 
Donnelly (2000) also claims that Morgenthau fails to provide “theoretical account of when 
and why a state will chose one strategy over another” (p.46). This is because Morgenthau 
ignores historical and circumstantial variable aspects, especially those of independent of 
power, which may differ from time to time and nation to nation (Donnelly, 2000; see also 
Clinton, 1986; 1994; Kratochwil, 1982). The case of the Republic of Korea and United 
States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) could be a good example. During the process of the 
treaty, they had to amend a negotiated agreement many times due to severe public 
opposition in both countries, which was unexpected circumstance for them. Morgenthau’s 
explanation may not be enough to discover this kind of domestic dynamics which affects 
state’s strategic choice. Thus, Morgenthau’s claim that national interest can be defined only 
by power cannot fully lend enough and adequate understanding of the concept of the 
national interest in terms of an analysis and interpretation of international politics. 
 Moreover, in classical realism, the concept of human nature in international 
politics is “constant,” not “variable,” so it is not easy to explain the differences between 
various types of interactions among nations. In other words, their notion of invariable 
pessimistic human nature can be helpful when it comes to explaining conflict between 
countries, but it might not be easy to understand peace and cooperation in international 
politics only with their perspective. To take an example, one can interpret conflicts 
between North and South Korea as struggle for power between two anthropomorphised 
Chapter II. The Concept of the National Interest                                       Seokbae Lee 
  24 
states having an amoral human nature, but one may have difficulties in explaining inter-
Korean cooperation and South Korea’s Sunshine policy towards North Korea to eradicate 
the remnants of the Cold War. 
 The leading neorealist scholar Kenneth Waltz (1979), who regards security 
maximisation as an objective and eternal law of international politics, develops realist 
understanding of the national interest more explicitly (Drulák, 2010, p.13; see also 
Davidson, 2009). Instead of focusing on human nature and ethics of statecraft, he attempts 
to offer a scientific explanation of international politics by concentrating the structure of 
the system, unlike Morgenthau (Jacson and Sørensen, 2006). According to Waltz, the 
national interest is given by the structure of the international system, not by political elites 
and leaders. He states that “structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly 
used despite differences in the persons and states who use them” (Waltz, 1979, p.117). 
Different from Morgenthau, he thought that human nature can either be selfish or altruistic. 
In short, he, neo-realist, asserts that the national interest can be shaped by anarchical 
international system. Waltz also insisted that the essence of international politics is not 
struggle for power that most classical realists argue, but struggle for security. He asserts 
that states seek the national interest that is defined by security. In fact, neo realists do not 
share a central idea of classical realism that power maximisation is the core national 
interest. They contend that security maximisation is the ultimate aim of states. They regard 
power as a useful tool for security maximisation in international politics. 
 It seems reasonable to evaluate that Waltz’s understanding of the national interest 
contributes to overcoming the ambiguous and contradictory perspectives of classical 
realists in that he brings “greater intellectual rigour and systematic understanding to the 
behaviour of states by analysing the issue in systemic rather than reductionist terms” 
(Burchill, 2005, p.61). However, both of classical and neo realists seem to have overlooked 
a domestic social complexion. It might be very difficult to be totally confident that a state’s 
foreign policy can really be autonomous from an internal situation. Their claim that 
security and state survival is a nation’s common interest, which allows the state to act free 
from other peripheral interests, is also problematic (Weldes, 1999; see also Davidson, 
2009; Holsti, 1992; Keohane, 1986; Tucker, 1961; Sondermann, 1987). Separatist and 
minority groups, who struggle to achieve their own goals, independence, for instance, 
under the state’s strong control, may not share an interest in the state’s territorial security. 
Tibet case makes a striking example. Tibetan people have strived for their “genuine 
autonomy” from the PRC. Recent Tibetan self-immolation provides a microcosm of how 
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Tibetans react against the PRC’s rule and policy. Even the most casual glance at Tibet’s 
case, security issue in Chinese territory is not an interest of Tibetans. Thus, with only 
realist approaches to the national interest, it might not be easy to fully understand a certain 
international politics such as the Tibet issue above. 
Also, there should be other national interests that go beyond those defined by 
power and security. Though realists have attempted to define the elements of the concept of 
power in various ways, they mostly regard military power as the main one.4 This might be 
because it is relatively easier to quantitatively (or objectively) evaluate and compare 
military strength among countries. This idea would be helpful in explaining the cases like 
the current arms race in Asian countries such as China, India and Pakistan. However, many 
empirical evidences are contrary to their perspective on national interest defined by power. 
We need to look no further than an example of the Lula government in Brazil. Brazil’s 
former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva actively introduced social welfare policies 
especially for the very poor people for the long-run interests of Brazil. No matter what the 
result and evaluation are, this case clearly demonstrates that states can pursue the national 
interest that is not defined by the realist concept of power. Also, turning to the case of an 
armament race among South Asian countries, Pakistan case in particular, it may be 
doubtful whether the recent growing military budget of Pakistan is desirable for their 
national interests even though they have been in economic crisis especially since 2008, the 
year Pakistan government accepts IMF conditions for financial aid. If their increasing 
military strength is interpreted as defensive actions towards external threats, how their 
domestic ruined economy can be explained. For Pakistan, are security issues more 
important than the economic crisis? If so, under what criteria and from whom such 
decision was made? Regardless of the fact that Pakistan’s approach is accordant to realist 
perspective on national interest, the picture, however, needs to be more specific in several 
ways. In other words, it seems hard to specify national interests of states only with realist 
ideas. Therefore, it should be necessary to take multidimensional approaches to the 
analysis of the national interest in order to avoid superficial understanding of international 
politics. 
                                           
4 Morgenthau (2005) classified national power into two categories: tangible elements (geography, natural 
resources, Industrial capacity, military preparedness and population) and intangible elements (national 
character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government). However, he himself 
indicated that it may be hard to measure the concept of national power because the boundary among elements 
is not clear. Though he warned that military force is usually overemphasised when analysing national power, 
he often regards military power as the most crucial factor in the concept of power (see Morgenthau, 1952; 
1960; 1962; 2005). 
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b. Liberals 
Though much of progress of the analysis of the national interest has been conducted by 
Realists IR, their accounts of the national interest have been criticised harshly by liberals. 
Liberals deny the Realists’ top-down approaches to the national interest and claims that the 
concept of the national interest should be analysed by bottom-up perspectives (Drulák, 
2010; Keohane 1982; Mitrany, 1966; Nye, 1988; Putnam, 1988). They argue that rational 
individuals can only have true objective interests. For them, subjective interests are almost 
always defined by dominant groups, and this obstructs the objective goals of foreign policy 
such as free trade and minimal state (Keohane, 1986; Nye, 1999; see also Burchill, 2005). 
In other words, according to liberal notion, “national interest is subject to change according 
to the preferences of domestic actors rather than being an atemporal reality waiting to be 
discovered by the statesman” (Drulák, 2010, p.13). 
 Liberals hypothesise that states can also be an irrational actor, and it is difficult for 
them to make a “rational” decision regarding national interest because of the conflicting 
interests between various irrational non-state actors and the bureaucrats. According to 
Simon (1957), humans can only have limited rationality in the decision making process, so 
under liberalism, it may be impossible for states to realise all possible consequences of the 
proposed national interest, which could make them irrational. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 
(1954) also criticised classical realists who too much obsess the concepts of national 
interest, power and balance of power in order to explain international politics since such 
concepts are hard to empirically be defined. They argued that it is necessary to know how 
decision makers define or interpret the internal and external situations in order to 
understand the actions and interests of states. Thus, it can be evaluated that they attach 
importance to human dimension, not to anthropomor-phised states. 
 Liberals also challenge realist notion that anarchical international system cultivates 
conflict and competition between states. They assert that international institutions help 
states cooperate each other. They believe that interdependence between countries, 
transnational interdependence and international institutions can bring new definition of the 
concept of interest (Grieco, 1988). That is, liberals are interested in how interdependence 
between states and international institutions change the way national interest is defined. 
Keohane and Nye (1987, p.741) emphasised the importance of “characteristics of 
international institutions, domestic politics and learning by elites and shifts in relative 
power capabilities” to explain the nature of international regimes or changes among them. 
According to them, characteristics of international institutions and domestic structure affect 
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each other. Therefore, in order to understand the way state preferences and national interest 
change, liberals insist that it is essential to investigate domestic politics and structure. They 
also argue that “economic and technological forces” play a crucial role in bringing political 
interdependence among countries as an important form of power (McGrew, 1992, p.20). 
 Furthermore, liberals refute the concept of “balance of power” that has been 
mostly studied and defended by realist scholars. They assert that balance of power is 
product of collusion among elites for arrangement of international relations in order to 
meet their interests (Kauppi and Viotti, 1992). Liberals regard the way great powers seek 
their economic and political interests at the expense of weak powers as injustice and 
violation of international law. For them, the pursuit of peace should be the priority of the 
national interest with collective security arrangements, not with balance of power 
diplomacy (Nye, 1999; see also Burchill, 2005). Realists, however, refute this liberal 
criticism of the concept. They claim that preserving international peace is not the main 
function of the balance of power. For realists, preserving the states system is the principal 
function of the concept. Even they argue that smaller powers can be absorbed during the 
process of war to retain international order as the necessary cost (Bull, 1977). Settling 
aside an evaluation of the concept of balance of power, liberal perspective on the national 
interest in international politics seems somewhat idealistic. As Howard (1978, p.132) states, 
“a degree of mutual confidence, a homogeneity of values and a coincidence of perceived 
interests” are required for a collective security system. However, it may be difficult to find 
these conditions in the current competitive and suspicious atmosphere of international 
system. 
 Again, liberals do not share the idea that the national interest is basically pursued 
by a state itself. Liberals think that the concept of the national interest is incompatible with 
the liberal notion of an unregulated single global economy and a united human community. 
They also believe that human beings are now on a line towards a “better future” where 
liberal democracy and genuine democracy are strongly settled. However, it seems hard for 
liberals to answer the questions about “the unequal benefits of globalisation and why its 
victims would share a common interest in the pursuit of free trade and unfettered foreign 
investment” (Buchill, 2005, p.210; see also Nye, 1999). With liberal accounts on the 
national interest, it might be hard to explain the situations and circumstances that 
international politics have been experienced. Though there have been a lot of conflicts 
triggered by power struggle and wealth, they too much underestimate such inevitable 
disputes. Liberals also do not clearly state that which domestic and external factors can 
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affect the actions of states and national interest. Their understanding of the national interest 
is too broad to explain how a certain interest can be shaped and shared as well. 
 So far, this thesis has examined rationalist perspectives, that is, two mainstream 
approaches in IR, realist and liberal approaches, towards the concept of national interest. 
Realists and liberals share three assumptions as a rationalist: 1) political actors – be they 
individuals or states – are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and rational; 2) actors’ 
interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction; 3) society is understood as a 
strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their 
predefined interests (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.216). They also argue that “whatever actors want 
(and this is canonically to maximize utility), they choose what they believe to be the best 
means available to attain it” (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel, 2003, p.12). Actors’ decisions 
can be regarded as a rational choice under the name of national interest which is fixed and 
permanent. Though, as indicated above, there are some limitations to explain and analyse 
the concept of national interest, rationalist approaches can be particularly helpful in 
examining visible phenomena of international politics with regard to content of interests 
that is usually regarded as material forces. As Elster (1989) stated, “when faced with 
several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best 
overall outcome” (p.22), rationalism also gives great theoretical parsimony regarding 
behaviours of actors and agents. Checkel (1998) also claimed that “when interests were 
stable, rationalism might be the right method” (p.346). 
Thus, this thesis, under a rationalist framework, examines how China and India 
approach the issues surrounding Tibet, focusing on power, security and economic interests. 
With this, it is expected to discover their coherent actions towards objective national 
interests that is fixed, and fundamental logic to evaluate their interests with regard to Tibet.  
 
2. Constructivist 
 
a. Constructivism and National interest 
Constructivists reject the idea that the national interest is fixed, given and permanent, 
which is realist basic understanding of the concept. They also deny the argument that true 
objective interest determined by material forces can be realised only by self-regarding 
individuals whose rationality is exogenously given, which is liberal notion of interest. 
Constructivists basically share the idea that “the structures of human association are 
determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and the identities and 
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interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by 
nature” (Wendt, 1999, p. 1). That is to say, according to constructivism, the social world 
and national interest is not exogenously given, but endogenously constructed. What they 
disagree with rationalist account on the concept of national interest can be encapsulated in 
four points: 1) national interests are social constructions; 2) Identities of actors who are 
involved in the process of shaping national interests are socially constructed and crucial to 
interpreting the phenomena in international politics in the sense that “identities are the 
basis of interests” (Wendt, 1992, p.398; see also Reus-Smit, 2009); 3) National interests are 
culturally produced and reproduced; 4) National interest are changing and contested. 
 They criticise that dominant approaches in international relations academia usually 
assume interests and preferences without attempt at explanation of those interests and 
preferences (Chafetz et al, 1999). As indicated before, rationalists assume that actors are 
pre-social and not interested in identities and interests formation but in strategic game. For 
constructivist, where and how interests are shaped is a core point to examine a 
characteristic of international relations. Constructivists maintain that interests are 
endogenously shaped in social interaction “as a consequence of identity acquisition, as 
learnt through processes of communication, reflection on experience, and role enactment” 
(Reus-Smit, 2009, p.223). By highlighting that “states are embedded in dense networks of 
transnational and international social relations,” Martha Finnemore (1996, p.2) claimed 
that identities and interests are shaped and defined by international social structure and 
international forces, not by objective criteria, that is, power. It might be debatable that 
international organisations play a crucial role in defining interest and identities, but the 
most important point of her argument here is that actors (states) are socialised in the 
process of accepting new identities and interests. Hopf (1998) also claimed that “by 
making interests a central variable, constructivism explores not only how particular 
interests come to be, but also why many interests do not” (p.176). He noticed identity 
formation process in terms of interest construction. That is, he indicates social interaction, 
understanding of identity and interest are significant factors when it comes to 
differentiating constructivists and rationalists. 
 
Neorealism and constructivism share fundamental concerns with the role of structure in 
world politics, the effects of anarchy on state behavior, the definition of state interests, the 
nature of power, and the prospects for change. They disagree fundamentally, however, on 
each concern. Contra neorealism, constructivism assumes that actors and structures mutually 
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constitute each other; anarchy must be interpreted to have meaning; state interests are part of 
the process of identity construction; power is both material and discursive; and change in 
world politics is both possible and difficult. (Hopf, 1998, p.181, emphasis added.) 
 
Alexander Wendt (1999), a leading scholar in the field of constructivism, stated that “I 
define the national interest as the objective interests of state-society complexes, consisting 
of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-
esteem” (p.198).5  By describing neo-realism and neo-liberalism’s understanding that 
interests and identities of agents (states) are exogenously given as a mistake, he also 
asserted that: 
 
Identities refer to who or what actors are. They designate social kinds or states of being. 
Interests refer to what actors want. They designate motivations that help explain behavior. (I 
say “help” because behaviour also depends on beliefs about how to realize interests in a given 
context.) Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it 
knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests. 
(Wendt, 1999, p.231, emphasis added) 
 
His argument that interests are constituted either by material forces and ideational factors, 
plays a significant role in differentiating his notion of national interest from that of 
rationalist. However, according to him, this notion has been largely ignored because there 
is the material bias in IR theory when it comes to explaining the concept of national 
interests due to the dominance of realist hypothesis of national interests. 
 Constructivists also emphasise the role of culture. According to Weldes (1999), 
“national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the inter-
subjective and culturally established meanings within which the world, particularly the 
international system and the place of the state in it, is understood” (p.10). She also argued 
that through “articulation” and “interpellation” process, concrete elements of the imaginary 
can be constructed, which shapes the national interest. By indicating that “culture is not a 
sector or sphere of society distinct from the economy or polity, but present wherever 
shared knowledge is found,” Wendt (1999, p.142) also argued that concern with culture “in 
                                           
5 This argument seems controversial because this may indicate that he accepts a realist approach that there is 
fixed objective interests for state survival though he should have different epistemological and ontological 
different positions from rationalism towards this issue. Such problems have not been persuasively tackled by 
Wendt, and early constructivists. Criticism surrounding a constructivist approach will be discussed later. 
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the form of discourse, norms, and ideology has been at the heart of their (constructivists) 
work form the start.” For rationalists, culture is just a mere variable when it comes to 
explaining national interest because they argue that national interests are permanent and 
fixed; so there is little room for culture to be involved in interest formation. However, it 
may be difficult to say that the recognition of interest is all the same in every states and 
people. Even it might not be easy to evaluate that meaning and idea of material forces are 
the same among every actor in world politics as well. That is why constructivists pay 
attention to cultural variables to explain the concept of interest in the sense that interest is 
shaped and reshaped in “the context within which people give meanings to their actions 
and experiences, and make sense of their lives” (Tomlinson, 1991, p.7). In other words, it 
can be said that cultural variable such as ideas and norms mutually affect identity and 
national interest. 
 Furthermore, while rationalists contend that national interest is permanent and not 
disputable, constructivists argue that national interest is changing and contested. According 
to Hobson (2000), interests and identities “constantly mould and re-mould states through 
subtle processes of socialisation” (p.146). Rationalists claim that all states rationally pursue 
maximisation of material forces under the name of national interest, and such interest has 
not changed in human history. They almost neglect social interaction where interests can 
be shaped. Constructivist, however, argue that interests are endogenous to social 
interaction “as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learned though processes of 
communication, reflection on experience and role enactment” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p. 199). 
That is to say, national interest can be contested among actors even in a domestic scale, and 
change according to abnormal historical and circumstantial aspects. 
 Despite many disagreements among the different constructivist school, it seems 
clear that they all regard the national interest as a constructed product of shared ideas, 
national identity, inter-subjectivity and normative practices. Thus, constructivist 
approaches about the national interest contain questions such as: 1) How do people express 
their interests and think these interests should be expressed by their representatives? 2) 
What do they think they have in common with fellow nationals and conversely how do 
they think their interests diverge and separate from outsiders? 3) How do people want their 
beliefs, prejudices, values, traditions and history to be translated into political institutions 
and diplomatic behaviour? (Burchill, 2005, p.197). Though constructivists agree with the 
idea that national interest is a social construction, there still remains a question that how 
such national interest can be analysed under what criteria. There are epistemological and 
Chapter II. The Concept of the National Interest                                       Seokbae Lee 
  32 
methodological disagreements among constructivists, which may affect their methods of 
analysis and approaches to the concept. Therefore, reviewing the main strands of 
constructivism and their features should be preceded before establishing a framework for 
the analysis of the concept of national interest. 
 
b. Problems of Constructivism 
Constructivism has become an important paradigm in the field of international relations 
since the late 1980s. “The social construction of …” is no longer unfamiliar phrase in this 
discipline (Guzzini, 2000, p.147). After Nicholas Onuf (1989) used the term constructivism 
in his publication, World of Our Making, a constructivist approach gained vitality in 
international relations theory. Wendt, with his article, Anarchy is What States Make of It, 
then contributed to spreading constructivism in the discipline of international relations (see 
Ruggie, 1998, p.11; Zehfuss, 2002, p.10-11). The advent of a constructivist approach can 
be regarded as the challenge to positivism that can be represented by neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism. Hopf (1998) described this emergence as “constructivism is 
regarded with a great deal of skepticism by mainstream scholars” (p.171). 
Constructivist understanding of inter-subjective relations between structure and 
agent, norm and identity as well as idea and actors gives many researchers insight into 
international politics which can be interpreted beyond materialistic view. Scholars such as 
Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf led the development of early stage of constructivism, and the 
increasing number of scholars accumulates empirical research findings in the field of 
constructivism. Since constructivist theories in IR have various theoretical foundations in 
the areas of ontology, epistemology and methodology, there categorisation, namely, 
typology, is also diverse. However, it might be difficult to categorise constructivists 
according to specific criteria due to their uncertain positions of theoretical backgrounds. 
Palan (2000) even criticised that “… yet, for a theory that is so obviously dependent upon a 
rigorous working of the relationship between social theory and its IR variant, it is curious 
that, with one or two exceptions, IR constructivists often advance positions that 
conventionally are viewed as either incompatible or at least highly debatable” (p.577). 
Zehfuss (2002) also indicated that “we still lack clarity on what constructivism is” (p.6). 
However, it seems reasonable to classify constructivist theories regarding their applications 
of positivism. This is because such categorisation is relatively clear in terms of 
epistemological and theoretical aspects (see Adler, 2002; Carlsnaes, 2002; Checkel, 2004; 
Hobson, 2000; Hopf, 1998; Palan, 2000; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Reus-Smit, 2005; 
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2009; Ruggie, 1998; Sterling-Folker, 2000; Wendt, 1999). To be specific, if a theory 
acknowledges positivist conventions epistemologically and methodologically, it could be 
evaluated that the theory is under “Conventional” constructivism, not that of “Critical” 
(though there is a different use of terminology among constructivists).6 The following 
table summarises how constructivists categorise constructivist theories according to above 
criterion. 
 
[Table. 1] Category of Constructivism7 
    Background 
Scholar Conventional, Modern Critical, Postmodern 
Hopf (1998) 
Conventional Constructivism 
(Jepperson, Katzenstein, Wendt) 
Critical Constructivism 
(Ashley, Campbell, Linklater, Walker, Weber) 
Price & 
Reus-Smit 
(1998) 
Systemic 
(Wendt) 
Holistic 
(Kratochwil, 
Ruggie) 
Postmodern Constructivism 
(Doty, Litfin, Price, Thompson, Weber) 
Ruggie (1998) 
Neo-Classical 
(Adler, 
Elshtain, Hass, 
Finnemore,  
Katzenstein, 
Kratochwil, 
Ruggie) 
Naturalistic 
(Bhaskar, 
Dessler, Wendt) 
Post-modernist 
(Ashley, Campbell, Derian, Peterson, Walker) 
Katzenstein, 
Keohane, 
and Krasner 
(1999) 
Conventional Constructivism 
(Finnemore, Meyer) 
Critical 
Postmodern 
(Ashley) 
Wendt (1999) 
Construc-
tivism 
(Kratoch-
wil, 
Ruggie) 
English 
School 
(Bull, 
Dunne) 
World 
Society 
(Meyer) 
Postmodernism 
(Ashley, Walker) 
Feminism 
(Peterson, Tickner) 
Carlsnaes 
(2000) 
Thinner Constructivism 
(Adler, Barnett, Checkel, 
Finnemore, Katzenstein, Risse-
Kappen, Ruggie) 
Thicker Constructivism 
a. Modernist Linguistic (Rule Oriented) 
(Kratochwil, Onuf) 
b. Postmodernists 
(Ashley, Walker) 
c. Feminism 
(Peterson, Tickner, Sylvester) 
Hobson 
(2000) 
State-
Centredness 
(Berger, 
Katzenstein, 
International/ 
Global society 
centredness 
(Adler, Hass, 
Radical (Postmodernism) 
(Ashley, Alker, Bartelson, Campbell, Doty, 
Derian, Walker, Weber and Feminist) 
                                           
6 Wendt’s (1999, p.39) argument might be helpful to understand this. “Given my idealist ontological 
commitments, therefore, one might think that I should be firmly on the post-positivist side of this divide, 
talking about discourse and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing and objective reality. Yet, in fact, 
when it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry I am a strong believer in science - a pluralistic science to 
be sure, in which there is a significant role for “Understanding,” but science just the same. I am a “positivist”. 
7 Song (2006, p.315) summarises the content of the table in more detail. 
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Kier) Finnemore, 
Klotz, Sikkink) 
Palan (2000) 
Soft Constructivism 
(English School) 
Hard Constructivism 
(Koslowski, Kratochwil, Onuf) 
Adler (2002) 
Modernist 
(Adler, Barnett, 
Checkel, 
Finnemore, 
Risse-Kappen, 
Ruggie, Wendt) 
Modernist 
Linguistic 
(Kratochwil, 
Onuf) 
Critical 
(Cox, Linklater) 
Radical 
(Ashley, Campbell, 
Derian, Peterson, 
Walker) 
Checkel 
(2004) 
Conventional Constructivism 
(Barnett, Finnemore, March, Olsen, 
Sikkink) 
Interpretative 
(Banchoff, Hopf) 
Critical/Radical 
(Bourdieu, Habermas, 
Wittgenstein) 
Reus-Smit 
(2005) 
Sociological Institutionalism 
Communicative 
action Theory 
(Habermasian) 
Knowledge and 
Power 
(Foucauldian) 
 
Above table divides their theoretical backgrounds into two categories: 
Conventional/Modern and Critical/Postmodern. The former is more closely linked to 
mainstream “rationalistic” international theory, and the latter does that of “reflective”8 that 
challenges rationalism. Though constructivist scholars use varied terms and categorisation, 
it seems clear that they all regard epistemological and theoretical positions against 
positivism as a significant criterion for their classification.9 The terms in social theories 
such as Postmodernism, Critical Theory and Feminism have been used to explain critical 
strands of constructivism as they share an anti-positivist view (see Price and Reus-Smit, 
1998; see also Campbell, 1998; Tickner, 1992). Hopf (1998) clearly compared two main 
strands of constructivism, concentrating on epistemological and ontological relations 
between constructivism and critical theory. 
 
To the degree that constructivism creates theoretical and epistemological distance between 
itself and its origins in critical theory, it becomes “conventional” constructivism. Although 
constructivism shares many of the foundational elements of critical theory, it also resolves 
some issues by adopting defensible rules of thumb, or conventions, rather than following 
critical theory all the way up the postmodern critical path. (Hopf, 1998, p.181, emphasis 
added) 
                                           
8 About this, see Keohane (1989). International Institutions and State Power, 161-174. According to him, 
reflective scholars all “emphasize the importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and 
ultimately for the character of world politics” (p.161). Wendt (1992, p.393), in his article, Anarchy Is What 
States Make of It, replaced the term “reflectivist” with constructivist. 
9 Although to date, many scholars except for those whose names are found in the table above have attempted 
to develop constructivism, it seems that there is little notable accounts that go beyond the categorisation 
given here. 
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He argued that conventional constructivism seeks to present a middle ground between 
mainstream international relations theory such as neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, while critical constructivism tends to be more close to critical social 
theory and criticises existing theories (see also Campbell, 1998; Der Derian, 1987; Tickner, 
1992; Walker, 1993).  
 
[Table. 2] Conventional Constructivism versus Critical Constructivism10 
Theory 
Element Conventional Constructivism Critical Constructivism 
Methodology 
& 
Epistemology 
- does not use “any special 
interpretivist methodology.” 
- does not depart from “normal 
science.” 
- against positivism. 
Understanding 
of Identity 
- wishes to discover identities and their 
associated reproductive social 
practices, and then offer an account of 
how those identities imply certain 
actions. 
- also wishes to surface identities, but 
to elaborate on how people come to 
believe in a single version of a 
naturalized truth. 
Actors and 
Observers 
- The observer never becomes a 
subject of the same self-reflective 
critical inquiry. 
- The actor and observer can never be 
separated. 
The Origins of 
Identity 
- accommodates a cognitive account 
for identity, or offer no account at all. 
-accepts the existence of identities and 
wants to understand their reproduction 
and effects. 
- accepts the assumption: the need for 
others to construct oneself. 
- more likely to see some form of 
alienation driving the need for identity. 
- uses critical social theory to specify 
some understanding of the origin of 
identity. 
- The former allows difference to 
reign, whereas the latter implies either 
the assimilation of the other, if deemed 
equal, or his oppression, if inferior. 
Assumptions 
about Power 
- remains “analytically neutral” on the 
issue of power relations.  
- shares the idea that power is 
everywhere, because social practices 
reproduce underlying power relations, 
but is not necessarily interested in 
interrogating those relations. 
- Power being exercised in every social 
exchange, and there is always a 
dominant actor in that exchange. 
- Unmasking these power relations is a 
large part of critical theory’s 
substantive agenda. 
Theoretical 
Agenda 
- the production of new knowledge and 
insight based on novel understandings 
- analyses social constraints and 
cultural understandings from a 
supreme human interest in 
enlightenment and emancipation. 
Shared 
Theoretical 
Fundamentals 
- Both aim to “denaturalize” the social world, that is, to empirically discover and 
reveal how the institutions and practices and identities that people take as 
natural, given, or matter of fact, are, in fact, the product of human agency, of 
social construction. 
- believe that intersubjective reality and meanings are critical data for 
understanding the social world. 
                                           
10 Source: Hopf (1998, pp. 182-185). 
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- insist that all data must be “contextualized,” that is, they must be related to, and 
situated within, the social environment in which they were gathered, in order to 
understand their meaning. 
- accept the nexus between power and knowledge, the power of practice in its 
disciplinary, meaning-producing, mode. 
- accept the restoration of agency to human individuals. Finally, both stress the 
reflexivity of the self and society, that is, the mutual constitution of actor and 
structure. 
 
Katzenstein et al. (1999) contended that though conventional constructivists ontologically 
very differ from rationalists, it is difficult to find any significant differences between 
conventional constructivists and rationalists in terms of epistemological and 
methodological aspects. They also summarised the characteristic of critical constructivism: 
1) In rejecting rationalist conceptions of human nature, critical constructivists agree with 
conventional constructivists on the issue of ontology; 2) Like conventional constructivists, 
they are interested in how actors and systems are constituted and coevolve; 3) Their 
research program focuses on identity issues that include, besides nationalism, subjects such 
as race, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality; 4) Critical constructivists also accept the 
possibility of social scientific knowledge based on empirical research. They are, however, 
deeply skeptical of the possibility of formulating general covering laws, and they are 
pluralistic about appropriate research methodologies; 5) Institutional arrangements, norms, 
and identities are embedded in specific historical contexts that can vary so dramatically 
that they can only be investigated through an ideographic rather than a nomothetic 
approach; 6) Emphasis is placed on the detailed study of texts to understand the symbolic 
systems that govern actors’ discourses, rather than on an analysis of a large number of 
cases; 7) Critical constructivists insist that scholars’ work has normative consequences; 8) 
Critical constructivists are developing a research program that is generating new and 
significant insights on important issues in world politics for which rationalist analysis has 
lacked compelling answers (p.676-677). 
 Checkel (2004) claimed that conventional constructivists are “largely positivist in 
epistemological orientation” (p.230). By indicating linguistic approaches as “key sources 
of theoretical inspiration of interpretative and critical constructivists,” (p.231) he argued 
that they all emphasise the importance of discourse-theoretical methods. According to him, 
critical constructivists, however, attach more importance to the power and domination 
inherent in language. Devine (2007, p.2) also stated that “critical social constructivism can 
be distinguished from conventional social constructivism (and neoliberalism) through its 
anti-essentialist ontology and qualified-foundationalist epistemology, the use of 
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poststructuralist approaches and a concern with ‘omitted variable bias’ in mainstream IR 
theorizing and the consideration of ‘identity’ as a driver of foreign policy.” 
 To date, conventional constructivism has dominated empirical studies adopting a 
constructivist approach, maybe because this strand has much contributed to developing 
constructivism to become a new IR theory. However, it has faced strong criticisms from the 
outside and even inside of theoretical schools in many aspects. Such controversies should 
be examined in order to discover a potential method of overcoming the problems. 
 Many recent studies adopting constructivist perspective are prone to fall into state-
oriented approach. Though they, especially conventional constructivists, appreciate the 
importance of non-stats actors, it seems that such scholars too much emphasise the role of 
states as the dominant actors in the process of social interaction in which national interest 
is defined. This means that they mealy define states as a basic agent in international 
politics. Wendt (1994), in his publication, Collective Identity Formation and The 
International State, affirmed that “states are the principal units of analysis for international 
political theory” (p.385). He (1999) also insisted that “since states are the dominant form 
of subjectivity in contemporary world politics this means that they should be the primary 
unit of analysis for thinking about the global regulation of violence” (p.9). This idea has 
been widely shared among constructivists. Ruggie (1998) also claimed that “at the level of 
individual actors constructivism seeks, first of all, to problematize the identities and 
interests of states and to show how they have been socially constructed” (p.196, emphasis 
added). Regarding this issue, Weldes (1999, p.9) indicated that “Wendt’s 
“anthropomorphized” understanding of state continues to treat states, in typical realist 
fashion, as unitary actors with a single identity and a single set of interests.” She also 
argued that “the political and historical context in which national interests are fashioned, 
the collective meanings that define state identities and interests, cannot arbitrarily be 
restricted to those meanings produced only in interstate relations.” It may not be necessary 
for constructivists to define states as the principal units of analysis. According to 
constructivist basic notion, the agents that constitute international politics are not fixed or 
given, but socially constructed. Therefore, if constructivists continuously obsess about 
state-oriented approach, their arguments could contradict the key thrust of constructivism, 
that is to say, agent itself is also socially constructed. 
 Recently, many researchers have indicated that constructivist scholars tend to 
overemphasise ideational (or liberal-idealist) factors and deemphasise material variables 
(Barkin, 2003, p.335; Ham, 2010, p.22; Noguchi, 2011, p.77; Shiping, 2008, p.145; see 
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also Steele, 2007). Ham (2010) clearly highlighted this issue: “All too often, constructivist 
scholars overemphasize the underlying normative structures of international politics, by 
focusing on ideas and identities to the detriment of material power resources. Due to their 
focus on ideas and the desire to juxtapose their arguments to Realist notions of power, 
ideational theories often neglect the fact that normative structures are frequently, if not 
always, themselves infused by power” (p.22). Along the lines of this argument, Sterling-
Folker (2000) criticised constructivists’ understanding of normative structure of 
international politics. She contended that constructivism tends to have the similar, in other 
words, almost the same, perspectives on international politics compared to that of 
neoliberal institutionalists.  
 
Yet in emphasizing their differences with neoliberal institutionalism, constructivists have 
made far too much of what are relatively small distinctions in the metatheoretical scheme of 
things. Not only do constructivists and neoliberal institutionalists rely on the same functional-
institutional logic to explain social change, they actually share the same ontology so that 
neoliberal institutionalism is “rationalist” only to a point. Ultimately constructivism makes 
explicit an assumed but unexplored step in situationally strategic liberal arguments which 
accounts for the maintenance of cooperation. Thus when the metatheoretical commitments 
made by constructivists and neoliberal institutionalists are closely compared, one discovers 
that the epistemological and ontological differences disappear, and they turn out to be 
complementary theories within the larger framework of liberal IR theory. (Sterling-Folker, 
2000, p.100, emphasis added) 
 
Zehfuss (2002) also indicated the liberal tendency of constructivists: “Wendt claims an 
affinity to ‘strong’ liberal scholarship which addresses complex learning and therefore 
changes of identities and interests. He aims ‘to build a bridge’ between the liberal and the 
constructivist tradition and as a consequence ‘between the realist-liberal and rationalist-
reflectivist debates’” (p.13). Barkin (2003) contended that the idea that intersubjective 
norms affect definitions of interest is liberal-idealist, “in the sense that these norms are 
accepted largely uncritically as good ones, as are the elements of international civil society 
involved in spreading these norms” (p.335). By criticising that Constructivism “has tended 
to replicate liberal arguments” and “fails to offer a paradigmatic alternative to liberal IR 
theory and neoliberal institutionalism,” Sterling-Folker (2002, p.99) insisted that 
“conventional” constructivists have been “far from agnostic about change in world 
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politics,” when it has been used for causal explanation because they have the same causal 
mechanism as neoliberal institutionalism does. Thus, according to her argument, they 
should attain the similar conclusions regarding social change. 
 Wendt’s conception of collective identity formation cannot avoid these criticisms. 
He indicated “Cultural (Structural) change in international politics involves collective 
identity formation,” and “interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-
restraint” as four “master variable” that affect the process of collective identity formation 
(Wendt, 1999, p.44). His argument is based on the assumption that all involved actors 
maintain a cooperative relationship, which is in accord with a liberal approach. It seems 
obvious that, however, our world is not always in such a friendly atmosphere and 
collective identity may not be shaped only in mutually favourable relations. With Wendt’s 
assumption, it might not be easy to interpret cooperative relations between China and India 
under ongoing conflicts surrounding border and Tibet issues; and coexistence between 
India-Pakistan and South-North Korea with harsh conflicts. Therefore, it may be crucial to 
overcoming above issues of constructivism, overemphasis on ideational variables and 
excessive affinity to liberalism. 
 Zehfuss (2002) gives a critical hint for overcoming above issues. In her book 
Constructivism in International Relations, she reviewed Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf’s 
approaches towards Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)’s participation in international 
military operations. She argued that their understandings and theoretical frameworks have 
a problem in terms of explaining how the reality is constructed. According to her, their 
processes of shaping reality in their studies lack discuss of the politics: “Using Derrida’s 
thought, I argue that the treatment of reality in constructivism and in politics are not two 
separate issues but rather two manifestations of the same problem” (p.36). She also 
asserted that reality that human beings can recognise is the reality that is linguistically 
reconstructed. Thus, if researchers do not explore linguistic processes in reality, it would be 
impossible to realise a genuinely constructed reality. Since this process is very political, 
discourse in politics should be analysed in order to define the “real” (p.246). The 
implication in her study is that considering a specific factor such as “politics” and utilising 
postmodernist epistemological method can diminish the vagueness of the way 
constructivist analyses real international politics. 
 Guzzini (2000) emphasised the importance of intersubjective power analysis in 
order to understand the reflexive link between the two levels of observation and action 
(p.147). For him, knowledge and actions are both constructed and interconnected, and a 
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key for this interconnection is power. Thus, it may be important to analyse how knowledge 
of the agents is intersubjectively shaped in certain political power relationships and how 
certain agents having the knowledge establish and change the social power. He also argued 
that “constructivism is epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and 
ontologically about the (social) construction of the social world” (p.174). Guzzini’s 
argument can lend an important clue to this research in that he gives more concrete 
criterion, that is, constructed power, for constructivist analysis. 
 Mattern (2001) also presents a meaningful argument that may allow constructivists 
to avoid abstract analysis and a strong liberal tendency. She did not deny that realist 
analysis of international politics according to power and economic factor. However, she 
argued that power and force are meaningful in terms of not only physical aspects but also 
discursive and representational dimensions. 
 
Force is a kind of power that actors wield through blunt, nonnegotiable and self-interested 
strategies in order to radically limit the options of their victim. International Relations 
scholarship has tended to focus on the physical aspects of force but force also has discursive 
or representational dimensions. Wielded through language, representational force enables a 
perpetrator to bluntly, self-interestedly and nonnegotiably compel his victim to abide by his 
version of some contested story. It accomplishes this by brandishing a threat, which traps the 
victim with no real option but to comply. In this sense, representational force works like 
coercion but without using physical or material threats. (Mattern, 2001, p.351, emphasis 
added) 
 
Mattern named this phenomenon “a power politics of identity.” In this arena, the powerful 
identity can wield strong forces to adversarial identities. 
 
When representational force is applied to the ‘we’ to hold it together in this manner, it 
amounts to a power politics of identity. This form of power politics is quite different from 
traditional power politics, but it is power politics nevertheless. Whereas traditional power 
politics wield coercive threats of physical force to trap physical adversaries into acquiescence, 
the power politics of identity wield coercive threats of representational force to trap 
adversarial identities into acquiescence. (Mattern, 2001, p.351, emphasis added) 
 
Mattern’s understanding can be helpful in interpreting India’s position on China in terms of 
the Tibetan government-in-exile. Even though India, with Tibetan Exile, has no material 
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and economic force against China, they can have representational force. Behind the formal 
recognition that the area known as the Tibetan autonomous region is part of the PRC, they 
have allowed Tibetan exiles to stay in their area, and say “Dalai Lama is an important guest 
of India.” It seems clear that this action is intentionally designed by India in order to retain 
the Tibetan exile as a bargaining chip against the PRC. Thus, India, without any physical 
force and cost, can make the PRC, at least, irritated. It can be evaluated that this situation is 
one practical example of representational force under a power politics of identity. 
 These scholars attempt to overcome the limitations of early constructivist 
approaches such as a state oriented tendency, overemphasis on ideational aspects and a 
close affinity to liberalism. They regard linguistically reconstructed reality as the reality 
itself (see also Weldes el al., 1999). In this regard, they believe that postmodernist 
sociolinguistics can allow constructivists to overcome vague and abstract analysis in that 
the reality exists in a form of linguistic representation, which can be regarded as a critical 
constructivist perspective. As Adler (2002, p.149) stated, “why constructivists and 
postmodernists cannot hold a fruitful and constructive debate, aiming to achieve not 
supremacy of one approach over the other, but mutual learning.” Weldes (1999) also 
argued that the language of the national interest is rhetorically constructed. This clearly 
indicates that with language of the national interests, we can conjecture the real content 
and meaning of the national interest.  
 
The language of the national interest is the content and meaning of the national interest. It is 
in this language that objects, threats, and relations are understood and persuasively presented 
as real and that warrants for drawing political conclusions from that reality are provided. 
Maintaining a rigid distinction between rhetoric and reality, far from helping us to understand 
the content of the national interest and thus state action, actually precludes the systematic 
examination of the construction of national interests. National interests truly are saturated 
with rhetoric, but, as I have tried to argue here, there is nothing “mere” about their rhetorical 
character. (Weldes, 1999, p.118, emphasis added) 
 
They also pay attention to the concept of power that is specified and interconnected during 
the process of linguistic representation of the reality. Wendt and early constructivist usually 
ignore the aspect of power and force, which is generally studied by realist scholars 
(Sterling-Folker, 2002). However, scholars, who focus on a strategy of the agent producing 
discourse and linguistic representation, attempt to highlight the process of power politics 
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and ideational shift in order to analyse international politics more specifically and avoid 
liberal tendency. 
So far, this section has examined 1) constructivist recognition of the concept of 
national interest; 2) two main strands of constructivism; 3) criticisms over conventional 
constructivism; and 4) attempts at overcoming such issues. All things considered, I would 
argue that a critical constructivist approach can help overcome the limitations of a 
conventional constructivist approach. Therefore, according to the notion of critical 
constructivism, it is this study’s assumption that national interest is socially constructed, 
and linguistically realised and represented. I would also emphasise the important role of 
politics and power, as well as culture and representations in order to analyse how national 
interest is intersubjectively constructed in linguistically represented power politics 
structure. 
 However, there are some tensions in this notion. If we overemphasise the role of 
power and politics to overcome liberal tendency, this can be evaluated as we, 
unintentionally, accept power orientation of human nature, which may be similar to realist 
conception. To take an example, only with such notion, it might not be easy to explain the 
first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru’s favourable attitude towards 
China. Reviewing his writings before 1947, it is clear that Nehru wanted to establish 
mutually beneficial relationship with China.11 He may regard China as a progressive anti-
imperialist who fights Western imperialism and feudal remnants (Guha, 2011). The 
construction of political reality shaped by Nehru’s rhetoric could not be adequately 
explained by selfish orientation of human nature. 
Also, it may not be easy to ascertain that how much power politics can be free 
from material forces and how much it can explain certain phenomena regardless of a 
distribution of material capabilities. This issue, actually, can also be applicable to 
conventional constructivism. Constructivists emphasise that identity and interest are not 
directly defined by the distribution of material forces, but by the content and distribution of 
ideas (see Wendt, 1999). However, they have struggled to clarify whether such normative 
structure is related to the material forces, and if so, how they become intertwined. For 
instance, it might be uncertain whether and how much India’s excessive economic 
dependence on China12 affects their process of linguistic representation of the power 
                                           
11 About his remarks and statement, see Chung (1998).  
12 According to Sen (2011), “China could account for 75% of India's manufacturing in the next five years, up 
from the present 26%.” 
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politics, with regard to Tibet issue, in Particular. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the 
relations between linguistic representation of the power politics and politics during the 
process of the distribution of material capabilities, in order to overcome constructivism’s 
ambiguous treatment of the ideational problem. 
 I argue that focusing on “culture” can help overcome above issues. That is to say, I 
assume that national interests are cultural productions in the sense that “the structures of 
human association are primarily cultural rather than material phenomena” (Wendt, 1999, 
p.193; see also Weldes, 1999). According to fundamental notion of constructivism, cultural 
variables, ideas, and norms for instance, and identity are inseparably related (see Lapid and 
Kratochwil, 1996); and “identities inform interests and, in turn, actions” (Reus-Smit, 2009, 
p.221). In fact, it seems that critical constructivists have not deeply investigated the long-
term construction processes of identity, which is significant topic of conventional 
constructivists. However, if we deny the argument that political reality and structure are 
externally given and fixed, and follow constructivism, it would be indispensable to 
examine the role of socially established identity to discover how such identity and the 
structure of power politics are mutually constituted. Therefore, this thesis attempts to 
highlight how the cultural production of the identities and interests are shaped and 
implicated in actors’ actions. 
 With this assumption, we could explain China and India’s ambivalent political 
relations in spite of huge economic cooperation. Even though they frequently express the 
importance of economic and political cooperation, there are, in reality, still many 
unresolved tensions between two countries such as the expansion of armaments in border 
areas. Many scholars have indicated that this may result from mutual mistrust and 
suspicion because they were in a situation of War in 1962 and have had harsh conflicts 
over the issues surrounding territorial disputes and Tibet. It is though culture that it would 
be possible to understand anomalous political phenomena in their relations. This is because 
in doing so, we could realise how identities and interests of actors such as state officials 
and elites in two countries have been established and how such cultural production of the 
identities and interests affect their relations. It may also allow us to grasp why their 
national interests against each other have continuously changed. Thus, considering culture 
can fill the gaps of a critical constructivist approach towards power politics where national 
interest is intersubjectively constituted. 
 However, culture is a highly broad and vague concept. The term can be used in 
various subjects in different ways. Thus, it is necessary to explain how the concept of 
Chapter II. The Concept of the National Interest                                       Seokbae Lee 
  44 
national interest can be interpreted as a cultural phenomenon. As discussed above, I argue 
that the formation of national interest is cultural as it is defined and shared in “the context 
within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences, and make sense of 
their lives” (Tomlinson, 1991, p.7). Here, this research focuses on “context.” It is not easy 
to grasp if a certain phenomenon is consistent; contingent; or abnormal if context is not 
taken into consideration. The way and intent of language use can change according to a 
particular situation – the situation here is, context. Therefore, this research, before 
analysing the discursive constructions, examines the historical and socio-political context 
that have affected the linguistic practices. This will be discussed in detail in the 
methodology chapter.    
 In summary, for the second reflectivist framework, 1) I adopt a critical 
constructivist approach that emphasises postmodernist sociolinguistics to explain the 
linguistically represented reality; 2) I assume that national interests are social constructions 
which are linguistically represented and realised; 3) I focus on intersubjective politics and 
power that are interconnected during the process of linguistic representation of the reality, 
under the assumption that recognition and knowledge of interests and identities of the 
agents can be intersubjectively defined and delivered in structure of power politics; and 4) 
I claim that the formation of national interest is cultural and culture produces and 
reproduces the structure of power politics and may be mutually constituted as well.  
As discussed earlier, the PRC and the Indian government have not been able to 
make an agreement on the Tibet issue since the late 1940s. There must be a conflict of 
interests which has been changed or reinforced by elites in both countries. With the critical 
constructivist account, it is expected that this research can find out how their interest vis-à-
vis Tibet has been shaped, changed and even manipulated by intentionally designed elites’ 
discourses.  
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Chapter III. Nationalism and National Interest 
 
Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.  
― ROBERT FROST, The Death of the Hired Man 
 
I wanted to live outside the history that empire imposes on its subjects, even its lost 
subjects. I never wished it for the barbarians that they should have the history of Empire 
laid upon them. How can I believe that that is cause for shame?’ 
― JOHN MAXWELL COETZEE, Waiting For the Barbarians 
 
 
“Raise our national flag, and love our motherland.”13 This is a slogan from a CCTV 
public service announcement on TV. This message has been delivered to the world 
several times a day since the early 2000s. If the latter part of the slogan, “gong ai yi ge 
jia” is literally translated, it means that “love one home together.” It could be interpreted 
that regardless of ethnic, religious or other social status, all 56 ethnic groups living in 
China and overseas Chinese, must be united in the name of China. This slogan might be 
highly related to the concept of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s “the great family 
of the Chinese nation.”14 The term, great family, may signify that the existing ethnic 
groups share the same national consciousness. The concept reflects the CCP’s 
willingness to unite all 56 recognised ethnic groups in China in unanimity (see Yoon, 
2006). Why does CCP have emphasised such concept and slogan and how can we 
interpret this situation? Actually it paradoxically implies what Chinese government is 
struggling with. As is widely known, some minorities, the people in Tibet and Xinjiang 
in particular, rarely appreciate Chinese rule. However, for the CCP, as they continuously 
declare, minorities and their assimilation with the nation of China are its core interest 
that is not negotiable and reconcilable. Thus, the CCP’s obsession with such concept 
and slogan could be interpreted as a strategic choice – awaking and stimulating dormant 
nationalism – to instill the sense of unity into people’s minds. 
 The government and state officials may need a certain level of social consensus 
                                           
13 Tóng shēng yī miàn qí Gòng ài yí gè jiā (同升一面旗 共爱一个家) (2009). Youku(优酷) video (2012). 
14 Zhōnghuá mínzú dàjiātíng (中华民族大家庭). This concept may be closely connected and influenced 
by Fei’s theory on “diversity in unity of the Chinese nation” (Zhōnghuá mínzú duōyuán yìtǐlùn, 中华民
族多元一体论). About this, see Fei, X. (1988). 
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to articulate the interests at the national level.15 Nationalism can act as an excellent foil 
to elicit such agreement. Since nationalism is more sentimental than rational and 
concentrates more on must-do than why-do, it may easily be liable to be combusted and 
ignited (see Margalit, 2001, p.155). It may be difficult to find a more effective and 
highly contagious tool to unite people in a common bond in that nationalism provides 
people having different interests with the reason that they must unite and work towards 
a common interest for the nation. That is to say, it is through nationalism that the 
government and state officials could legitimise and justify their actions to articulate and 
realise the national interest.16 This may be the reason why politicians and elites overuse 
the word that could stimulate nationalist sentiment – framing the nationalism narrative. 
The above example clearly represents this aspect. 
 However, nationalism may not always be driven, used and even manipulated by 
the states, bureaucrats or elites.17 The public also can urge their state to take some 
policies and actions in defence of the interests of the nation.18 Today’s anti-Japan 
protests in China over island row may provide a microcosm of this aspect. The protests 
can be evaluated as an outburst of nationalist sentiment. Then, is it possible to explain 
this nationalist psyche of the Chinese people only under a top-down approach? It would 
be neither appropriate nor desirable. The protests from the public appeared before and 
regardless of the CCP’s official response to Japan’s islands purchase. Furthermore, 
though Chinese Government strongly accused Japan, they may not totally welcome 
protesters radical actions such as attacking Japanese companies and embassy because 
establishing amicable economic relationship with Japan might be China’s one of the 
important long-term national interests considering the trade volume between two 
countries (see Huang, 2012; Voigt, 2012; Wassener, 2012).19 Even seriously radicalised 
nationalism could put Chinese Government in trouble dealing with conflicts at home 
and abroad. Domestically, in the strong nationalistic atmosphere, different opinions are 
                                           
15 The question may arise in this argument: how about a dictatorship? An authoritarian regime may 
compel the public to follow and support what the state is doing. In other words, the state might force 
people to agree its decision. Though the process of collecting people’s opinions varies across regime 
types, the state anyway needs people’s consent to operate the system in the sense that the labour force and 
funds positively necessary to put an idea into practice. 
16 Anand (2010) insisted that “Nationalism is the primary ideology through which the state seeks to gain 
internal sovereignty” (p.280). 
17 The question of the origin of nationalism is a different debate. Here, the point is how it is expressed 
and used by different actors.  
18 About this, Connor (1990, p.95) claimed that “nationalism is a mass, not an élite phenomenon.” On the 
other hand, Smith (2002) refuted his idea as nations are not necessarily “mass phenomenon” (pp.9-10). 
19 Total trade between China and Japan reached $345 billion in 2011. About this, see BBC (2012a). 
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usually passed with silence, which can hamper the verification process of the situation. 
Internationally, neighbouring countries may feel uncomfortable with the Chinese 
people’s strong behaviour toward a contentious issue, which could invigorate so-called 
the China-threat theory.20 Neither of the situations might be favourable to Chinese 
government. Instances like this are all too common in today’s world. We have observed 
the Tibetan self-immolations, Arab spring, Greece protest against austerity plan, Belfast 
city hall flag protests and so on.21 Though there may be different reasons for the actions 
in the respective situations, such movements may have one thing in common: they try to 
achieve their goals that may be against the current rule by the states – they believe that 
the goals are national interests.22 In this regard, it can be claimed that nationalism does 
not always go along with the intention of the states or elites. That is, nationalism can 
also have a negative impact on the government’s pursuit of national interest. 
 Regardless of whether nationalism is used by elites or forced by the public, it 
seems obvious that nationalism can play a significant role in the process of defining and 
pursuing national interest. Seton-Watson (1965) insisted that “nationalist movements 
aim to realize the interests of the nation at the expense of its enemies” (p.5). However, 
the picture is not a simple diagram as he drew. We could ask ourselves: how on earth 
can nationalism moblise people and even make them die for the national interest? One 
thing that has to be addressed is that the national interest is a quite tricky concept. 
Whose interests? Because in a society, there are various kinds of groups and individuals, 
it is difficult to judge that which interests are truly national. This may be one of the 
reasons that rationalists limit national interests to very broad concepts such as security 
and material forces, largely assuming that every actor puts the same value to such 
variables, which could be less controversial in the society. Then why nationalism works 
for such unclear interests of the nations? Marxists asserted that the ruling classes define 
national interests for their own sake, especially for their economic interests, and 
indoctrinate nationalism to the people in order to make them equate “the interests of the 
sheep” with those of “butcher” (Ö zcan, 2005, p.180; see also Glenn, 1997). However, as 
indicated above, nationalism also could stem from “grass-roots” level. It might be 
                                           
20 About the China-threat theory, see Gries (1999). See also Hoffman (2012); Yang (2010). 
21 About the Tibetan self-immolations, see Buffetrille and Robin eds. (2012); About the Arab Spring, see 
BBC (2012b); About Greece protest against austerity plan, see Kitsantonis and Donald (2012); About 
Belfast city hall flag protests and its background information, see Devenport (2013). 
22 Their actions for the goals are not always generally accepted and even cause controversy sometimes. 
As a notable example, see Anand (2011a). 
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undesirable to describe people who have devoted their lives for their nations only as the 
brainwashed public or scapegoats for the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, how does the ruling 
classes’ nationalism be shaped then? Only by their economic interests? It may not be 
adequate explanation. The aspect of social interaction among members of society is 
imprudently neglected. Elites are not those who live in a completely isolated island. 
There have been many elites who work for their nations regardless of any interests. 
Were they victims of elite of elites? Where is the zenith of the ruling class? 
 Actually, despite a great deal of discussion about nationalism and nations, the 
subject is still up for severe debate and so is the national interest. Even scholars have 
failed to have an agreement on “the definitions of key concepts” and “the fundamental 
theoretical objectives” (Smith, 1998, p.221). Thus, there might not be much room for 
bringing the concept of the national interest to the research area of nationalism to 
examine their relations and vice versa – scholars are busy having a fundamental 
theoretical debate on the concepts. Naturally, it has been no noticeable research 
highlighting the relationship between the two abstract concepts that goes beyond the 
explanation that nationalism is a kind of political ideology to make people believe and 
pursue the national interest. However, abandoning the profound research on a 
correlation between the two concepts that overcomes the existing superficial 
explanation must be needed considering a flood of nationalist discourse around us. 
Whether or not it is intangible and difficult to examine, it is obvious that the national 
interest is inside an impenetrable fortress enclosed by ramparts of nationalism.  
 The discourse seeking national interest inevitably accompanies the nationalist 
sentiment and such discourse strongly stirs the domestic as well as international politics 
in today’s world. About a renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron argued that it is for the national interest, while the former 
Labour leader Mr Miliband claimed that it is the party interest and nothing to do with 
the national interest.23 On the contentious South China Sea territorial issue, a collision 
of nationalist sentiments and strong words among the countries involved is becoming 
more severe. Many Tibetans in China and Baluchis in Pakistan are shouting out the 
name of their nations for the national interests. 
 In this chapter, this study explores the central issues of nationalism that have 
been the subject of much debate among scholars; and indicates the problems of their 
                                           
23 About this issue, see Hunt (2013). See also BBC (2013). 
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interpretations and analyses. This thesis then proposes how nationalism can properly be 
explained and interpreted by giving ontological and epistemological stances towards 
nationalism. Most of all, this chapter attempts to highlight the relations between 
nationalism and national interest, especially, the role of nationalism in defining national 
interest.  
 
Problems with Nationalism 
 
“Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?” 
In their book, Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p.29) gave a question to us. 
For them, a nation is the “capitalist axiomatic” (ibid., p.184) in which “the people are 
missing” (Deleuze, 1989, p.216). More specifically, a nation is social production that is 
“purely and simply desiring-production itself” under the conditions of capitalism (1983, 
p.29). In such a socially produced entity, the voice of majority must be heard and the 
sacrifice and subordination of minorities is the last bastion of majority supremacy. Even 
people could shout out “More taxes! Less bread!” (ibid., p.29) for their nations. 
 Even though there is no explicit mention of nationalism and its problems, 
Deleuze may implicitly leave the issues regarding nationalism that need consideration – 
those of ontology and axiology. To condense his argument into a single sentence, people 
are suffering from the manipulated entity necessarily and voluntarily. He may criticise 
nationalism as a means of forbidding the people to escape from invisible and forged 
community, that is, a nation. Thus, it can be argued that he may regard a nation as an 
aeriform entity and nationalism as irrational momentum to support it. 
 His ontological and axiological arguments on nationalism may provide a 
microcosm of the recent debates on nations and nationalism in the past few decades.24 
The questions about the origins and values of nations and nationalism have always been 
the centre themes in this field of study. Ontologically, there are rival opinions on 
whether nations and nationalism are pre-modern or modern25; and whether nationalism 
                                           
24 Studies on nationalism naturally and generally accompany the theoretical review of nations and vice 
versa. It has been disputed over whether nations are prior to nationalism or nationalism did to nations. 
This topic may go beyond the scope of this research. In this chapter, the focus is to highlight the 
relationship between nationalism and national interest. The concepts of nations and nationalism are thus 
dealt with at the same time as highly intertwined social phenomena. 
25 I regard this debate as ontological one because the controversy always accompanies with the question 
whether nations and nationalism are real. This will be discussed later with the argument that this dispute 
may arise due to the different epistemological perspectives; and about pre-modern and modern divisions, 
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is a death rattle or not. When it comes to the value debates, it has been discussed over 
whether nationalism is a bad and irrational thing that must be eradicated; and what sorts 
of nationalism are “good” and which types are “bad” (see Liebman, 2007, p.348).  
 Researchers have usually been poles apart in their opinions with regard to these 
questions, which may be due to their different focus on critical junctures in history and 
the interpretation on them. I would argue that this is an unhelpful polarity. It seems that 
scholarships in this area are caught in a reductionist trap, namely, that of various 
typologies of nationalism such as primordialism, perennialism, ethno-symbolism and 
modernism.26 It is true that all the attempts to categorise the research groups and 
phenomena of nationalism have greatly contributed to the studies in this area as it 
vouchsafes a clear guidance and theoretical parsimony to understand diverse social and 
political phenomena. However, as Hall (1993) maintained, “no single, universal theory 
of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse so too must be our 
concepts” (p.1). Thus, to more critically examine the above long-lasting controversies 
over nationalism, it should be essential to avoid an excessive obsession with a particular 
theoretical paradigm – an attempt at diagnosing the problem in the way the scholarship 
on nationalism perceives the different viewpoints on nationalism should be carried out. 
 This chapter makes a dive at the centre of this extreme controversy by giving 
the following two questions: “if it is invisible, does it not exist?” And “if it is cognised, 
does it truly exist?” These questions imply this chapter’s message to point out the 
problem that the scholarship has shown. The scholars of nationalism have obsessed with 
the matter of “reality” of nations and nationalism. To be specific, the disputes over 
ontological issues are actually about those of the nature of nationalism. Scholars like 
Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm, who are usually regarded as modernists,27 ignited 
the intense debate. They claimed that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena 
that are “invented” (see Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; see also Gellner, 1983) or 
                                                                                                                           
there are other views like nations are pre-modern and nationalism is modern. About this, see Breuilly 
(2006). 
26 This is a widely used category of theoretical paradigms on nations and nationalism presented by 
Anthony Smith. About this, please see Smith (1998). Ö zkirimli (2000) well summarised this: “The 
common denominator of the modernists is their conviction in the modernity of nations and nationalism; 
that of the ethno-symbolists is the stress they lay in their explanations on ethnic pasts and cultures; finally, 
that of the primordialists is their belief in the antiquity and naturalness of nations. Beyond these common 
denominators, the theories developed by the scholars of each category exhibit a bewildering diversity” 
(p.64). 
27 It goes without saying, there are different opinions on the way nations and nationalism are shaped 
among modernists, especially about how does modernity link with nationalism. However, they have 
concurred with each other in the view that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena. 
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“imagined” (see Anderson, 1991) in the process of modernization (see also Breuilly, 
1993; Kedourie, 1993). This argument is unacceptable for those who emphasise the role 
of “primordial ties” (see Geertz, 1963, p.107) such as social custom, kinship, language, 
race, region, religion and territorial roots to account for the origins of nations and 
nationalism as objective natural existence (see also Connor, 1994; Grosby, 1995; Hearn, 
2006; Obidinski, 1978; Storey, 2011). 28  In other words, the former emphasises 
“subjective” factors while the latter, primordialists, stresses those of “objective.”29 
 The crux of this ontological issue here is, again, they are actually arguing with 
each other about whether nations and nationalism are a mirage or not. Since modernists 
have claimed that nations and nationalism are modern “artefacts” (see Gellner, 1983, 
p.7) that should be imagined and made, they have been asked to answer the question: 
are nations and nationalism not “actual things” if they are psychologically processed 
products in modern times? This may be a sensitive issue especially to the people of 
weak powers, struggling for liberation or independence from big powers. It might be 
difficult for them, for instance, the Tibetans having self-immolated, to welcome the idea 
that they are dying for the communities that exist only in their brains. Moreover, in 
some countries like China, Korea and Japan, whose history is long and primordial ties 
may be vivid, there might be disputes over the idea of nationalism as “a radically novel 
mode of consciousness” (see Duara, 1999, p.131; see also Fei, 1999; Shimazono, 2004; 
Shin, 2006; Trauzettel, 1975). Those who disagree with the modernist view also criticise 
that modernists have failed to explain causality between nationalism and the necessary 
factors for modernisation, especially “industrial society” of Gellner and “print 
capitalism” of Anderson (see Chatterjee, 1993, p.21). Even Breuilly (1993), who calls 
himself modernist, stated that “A major concern of modern social thought is the 
problem of community, of how common identity and a sentiment of solidarity can be 
created in the face of impersonal, abstract, ‘rational’ relationships based upon 
instrumental considerations” (p.415). Also, it may be controversial to apply the 
                                           
28 Similar to this, so-called perennialists also disagree with the modernists’ understanding of nationalism 
as a modern creation. They argue that though nationalist sentiments in the modern world are more 
discernible and perhaps stronger, such sentiments have always been traceable in human history. About the 
difference between primordialism and perennialism, perennialists are generally not very keen on 
ahistorical approach, focusing on a biological aspect, to nationalism. Greenfeld and Eastwood (2007) 
maintained that “it is hard to see precisely what separates perennialism from primordialism, or, rather, the 
difference seems to be merely a matter of degree” (p.263). 
29 About this, see Smith (2001). He argued that “Definitions of the concept of the nation range from those 
that stress ‘objective’ factors, such as language, religion and customs, territory and institutions, to those 
that emphasize purely ‘subjective’ factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments (p.11).   
Chapter III. Nationalism and National Interest                                      Seokbae Lee 
  52 
modernists’ ontological understanding to explain nationalism in many African and Asian 
countries, in which the Western experience of modernisation is absent. 
 In terms of this ontological issue, one could argue that modernists have not 
provided an explicit answer that clearly overcomes Marx’s materialist approach to 
nationalism: since it is impossible to find out tangible and material grounds, nations and 
nationalism are an illusion made by the ruling classes in the period of industrialization 
(see Marx, 1978, pp. 482-484; see also Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm, 
1990). They do not concede the status of nationalism as a natural form that has always 
been with us for a long time. In other words, modernists almost ignore the pre-modern 
(or primordial) social elements such as cultural sentiments and ethnic ties that could be 
interpreted as the basis of nations and nationalism. 
 This evaluation, however, could be too harsh in the sense that they have dealt 
with some possible pre-modern connections with modern nations and nationalism. 
Hobsbawm (1990) may show the most notable example. 
 
… why, having lost real communities, people should wish to imagine this particular type of 
replacement. One reason may be that, in many parts of the world, states and national movements 
could mobilize certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which 
could operate, as it were, potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern 
states and nations. I shall call these bonds ‘proto-national’. (p.46, emphasis added) 
 
By indicating that “there is no reason to deny proto-national feelings to pre-nineteenth-
century” (p.75), he maintained that some elements such as language, ethnicity and 
religion can be linked closely with today’s national consciousness. It seems that he 
admitted the possibility of pre-modern aspects of nations and nationalism, but actually 
he did not. He claimed that the continuities between proto-nationalism and modern 
sentiments may be quite “factitious” and there is “no historical continuity” (p.76). What 
Hobsbawm really wanted to say is that “proto-nationalism alone is clearly not enough to 
form nationalities, nations, let alone states” (p.77). Therefore, it seems obvious that he 
strongly (but perhaps not completely) denies the idea that pre-modern elements affect 
and constitute nations and nationalism. 
 Gellner (1996) also attempted to respond to the criticism that he conveniently 
ignores the pre-modern variables. In the 1995 Warwick debates with Anthony Smith, he 
described pre-modern ethnic and cultural national communities as the “navel,” link 
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between primordial elements and modern nationalism, and, however, claimed that 
“some nations have it and some don’t and in any case it’s inessential” (p.367, emphasis 
added). In other words, “there is a certain amount of navel about but not everywhere 
and on the whole it’s not important” (p.369). Basically, he does not think that the navel 
plays a crucial role in shaping nations and nationalism. For him, in any case, the process 
of modernisation is crucial for “invention” of nations and nationalism. According to him, 
“the modernists have a greater sense of the kind of navel invention as opposed to the 
sense of continuity of navel” (p.370). Thus, like Hobsbawm, his naval story seldom, if 
ever, gives a different account from his early argument about nations and nationalism as 
modern invention. 
 Considering all these into account, it seems that there is not much room for 
reconciliation between the contested arguments in the ontological issue on nationalism. 
However, this chapter would argue that the dispute can be compromised in that it is 
actually derived from the misunderstanding about the modernist perception of nations 
and nationalism. In other words, I claim that the ontological debates and criticisms have 
resulted from the different epistemological perspectives among the scholars of 
nationalism. It may be inappropriately radical to evaluate that modernists deny the 
actual existence of nations and nationalism like Marxists,30 if they insist that nations 
and nationalism are imagined and invented in the process of modernisation. Actually, 
modernists have not negated the fact that nations and nationalism as “social things” 
around us, but rather, the modernists like Gellner have claimed that nations and 
nationalism are “real” sociological phenomena (see Smith, 1996, p.358).31 Anderson’s 
expression, an “imagined political community,” may play a big part in widening this 
epistemological gap due to the literal meaning of the word, “imagined” (see Anderson, 
1991). However, in his research, there are no explicit clues to evaluate him as a 
pessimist who is totally against the reality of nations and nationalism, in spite of the use 
of the term “imagined.” His point was about how nations and nationalism are shaped, 
not about whether nations and nationalism are real or not. Tamir (1995) clearly 
                                           
30 As indicated before, though modernists and marxists share the idea that nations and nationalism are 
modern phenomena and by-products of modernisation, marxists more clearly deny the real existence of 
nations and nationalism because of lack of the tangible evidence. Modernists, however, do not totally 
deny the substance of nations and nationalism in general. 
31 In the 1995 Warwick debates, Smith, Gellner’s student, stated this. One could argue that this is 
controversial because Gellner (1971), in his book Thought and Change, asserted that “Nationalism is not 
the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (p.169). This 
statement could be interpreted in various ways due to different epistemological perspectives. This will be 
discussed later.  
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indicated this: “If real is taken to mean “existing as a fact” then, as every realist in 
international relations will attest, the existence of imagined communities is a social fact. 
The term imagined communities is therefore not to be used synonymously with 
imaginary ones” (p.423).32 What modernists really do not accept is that nations and 
nationalism are the naturally given existence with objective criteria that are prerequisite 
elements for national consciousness. They are more focusing on the process of social 
change that could stimulate the circumstances in which nations and nationalism can be 
defined. 
 When discussing something about hierarchy, legitimacy, racism and security, 
not many people would be passionate to prove the substantial reality of such concepts 
even though they are not physically tangible and expressed, as is nationalism. The 
topics on them are usually about what constitutes them; and how they can be interpreted 
and perceived; not about whether or not they are real. If someone is excessively 
obsessed with the primitive ontological debates on the above topics, he or she could be 
regarded as a person who is falling into the epistemological fallacy. It goes without 
saying, invisibility and intangibility do not mean that something is not real. In this 
regard, it could be maintained that the scholars of nationalism, who criticise modernists 
as they do not admit the existence of nations and nationalism, are those who are caught 
in a trap of the epistemological fallacy – I would call this a trap of radical materialist 
evidentialism.33 It is highly doubtful that the obsession with reification of nations and 
nationalism as natural things is a very productive way for the research area of 
nationalism. 
 As indicated above, researchers who insist that nationalism is natural existence 
which is permanent emphasise the role of primordial attachments that are natural and 
“given” (see Geertz, 1973, p.259; see also Armstrong, 1982; Van den Berghe, 1978). For 
them, “there exist objective entities with inherent features such as territory, language, 
recognizable membership, and even a common mentality” (Tishkov, 1997, p.1). The 
explanation seems plausible in that history textbooks usually date back to even 
prehistoric times to find the origin of nations. Some countries like China are very proud 
of a rich history of the nations. The elements of the historical ties are regarded as 
objective variables to prove such long-lasting natural existence of nations and nationalism. 
                                           
32 Balibar (1991) also asserted that “Every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions 
is imaginary… only imaginary communities are real” (p.93). This may be a more radial interpretation.  
33 Or, in other words, it is a strict positivist view. 
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 However, the fact that such objective factors for nations and nationalism are 
genuinely objective is questionable. It is no doubt that every nation has different 
primordial ties – in some nations, language and ethnicity may be very important; and in 
some other nations, religion, territory and even culture might be crucial. Then, what is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining the status of nations and national 
consciousness? No nation would have exactly the same characteristics with others and 
everything can be interpreted differently by scholars. This is rather highly subjective. 
Applying the same yardstick is impossible to measure the sufficient requirements for 
nations and nationalism. We can easily realise that London’s the Shard (310m) is higher 
than the Great Pyramid of Giza (147m),34 but what are enough and essential criteria for 
judging the fact that “something is high”? 
 Even it could be contested that the primordial elements adequately account for 
the phenomena of nations and nationalism as well. To take an example, the case of the 
two Koreas can be counter-evidence against the argument of absolute role of primordial 
ties. The two Koreas share the same language, ethnicity, culture as well as history and 
territory until the division in 1945. However, today’s two Koreas show a different 
complexion on nationalism though there are still common nationalist sentiments such as 
their uncomfortable feelings towards Japan. In South Korea, it may not be easy to 
observe extreme anti-Americanism that is dominant national sentiment in North Korea. 
North Korean style socialism and the military first policy could not touch South 
Koreans’ souls. Thus, it seems undesirable to evaluate that their features of nations and 
nationalism are the same or similar “enough” according to the natural objective aspects 
that they are still sharing or had shared for a long time. 
 Smith (1998) may take a moderate position towards this contested issue.35 By 
describing his perspective as ethnosymbolism, he admitted that nationalism and nations 
are generally modern phenomena, but kept distance from the modernist viewpoints by 
emphasising the role of the cultural aspects such as symbols, myths, memories, values 
and traditions (see also Smith, 1991; Hutchinson, 2005; Roshwald, 2006). Importantly, 
he understands nations and nationalism as sociological reality in that there was no 
nationalism before the eighteenth century and it is rare to find nations before the modern 
                                           
34 About the Shard, see The Shard (n.d); and about The Great Pyramid of Giza, see Great Pyramid: 
Earth’s Largest (n.d.). 
35 Smith (2003, p.361), himself stated that “Ethnosymbolism may stand ‘in-between’ perennialism and 
modernism.” 
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age (see 1996). However, for him, it is impossible to understand modern political 
nationalisms without the pre-modern elements stated above. Especially, he proposed the 
term ethnie that means “a human population with shared myths of ancestry, common 
historical memories, one or more elements of culture, a link with a territory, and a 
measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (Smith, 2003, p.359). According to him, 
ethnies are primodial and may persist regardless of time and place through “an intense 
nostalgia and spiritual attachment” (1991, p.23). What he claimed here may be that 
nations and nationalism are not merely formed by modernity, but strongly affected by 
ethnic ties and cultural sentiments. However, Smith did not blame modernists as they 
deny real status of nations and nationalism. He maintained that modernists, especially 
Anderson and Hobsbawm, would not regard nations and nationalism as totally imagined 
existence. He also indicated that what modernists have done is to refute the idea of 
primordial and perennial characteristics of nations and nationalism (see Smith, 1996).  
 His studies greatly contribute to the research field of nationalism and lend the 
persuasive account of the origins of nations and nationalism, but there is also an issue 
that has to be tackled. He may attempt to find a kind of causality between pre-modern 
(or primordial) and modern phenomena. However, he may fail to find a consistent 
mechanism to explain the reasons why some ethnies show different nationalism and 
form different nations though they share the same or very similar cultural background; 
and how some ethnies shaped nationalism and nations in the process of modernisation 
whereas others could not do so. Even it is not clear how we can realise the boundaries 
between ethnies and who can be included and who should be excluded in a certain 
ethnie. For instance, today’s China and Taiwan undoubtedly share pre-modern roots 
considerably. However, it may be difficult to evaluate that their nationalism always 
shows striking similarities, but rather, the topic of political status of Taiwan has always 
led huge conflicts between the two countries and they also have visibly different 
national sentiments towards Japan. What is more, why did Taiwanese aborigines, who 
can be regarded as ethnies, fail to shape modern nations based on strong nationalism?; 
and why they were excluded in the process of establishment of Taiwan? Actually, as 
history tells us, it is not very cultural, but political.36 In this case, the concept of ethnie 
                                           
36 This does not mean that smith and ethnosymbolists totally ignore the political aspects when it comes to 
explaining nations and nationalism. They focus on how the ethno-symbolic elements have been 
rediscovered during the process of shaping nationalism and nations. This process should be political. 
About this, see Guibernau (2004). 
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may not adequately shed light on the origins of the two countries’ nationalism due to a 
lack of enough investigation of political causality between ethnies and modern 
nationalism and nations.37 
 At this point, we need to recall the questions previously given: “if it is invisible, 
does it not exist?” And “if it is cognised, does it truly exist?” When it comes to 
nationalism, my answers to these questions are in the “negative.” As has been discussed, 
the former question may arise from the epistemological fallacy based on radical 
materialist evidentialism, and the latter one may be due to overconfidence about 
“objective” factors. I would argue that nationalism is a social construction. For me, 
regardless of whether nationalism is modern or pre-modern, nationalism cannot be 
shaped without a certain kind of social process. The momentum of the social processes 
varies – it can be more cultural, political or economic. Surely, there is no quintessence 
of nationalism in that the timing and the process are all different. It is not necessarily 
Western-style industrialization as well. Primordial and natural elements can be the 
potent factors in forming nationalism in many cases, but they, themselves are neither 
necessary condition nor that of sufficient. It can be claimed that such long-lasting 
cultural aspects can naturally lead national consciousness, and it could be true. However, 
I assert that such national consciousness is like “pottery before firing.” Without any 
social motives and événements, it is highly unlikely that such national consciousness, by 
itself, leads or turns into nationalism that is enough to mobilise the social norms into 
one point. Thus, the focus should be the social and political process, not the natural 
elements. 
 So far, this chapter has examined the ontological debate on nationalism as real 
and natural existence. Next ontological issue is about whether nationalism is in decline 
or not. It may be natural to think nationalism is neither stronger nor appropriate concept 
anymore in the sense that the world becomes more and more integrated and globalised. 
Obviously, the digital and ICT38 revolutions have allowed people to be interacted much 
easier and faster. This is the age when more than 1.2 billion people all around world are 
watching Gangnam Style music video and dancing the horse riding dance together 
                                           
37 Similar to this, Eriksen (1993) criticise ethnie as “it would be misleading to claim that there is an 
unbroken continuity from the pre-modem communities or ‘cultures’ to the national ones (p.107). He took 
the case of Norway as an example to refute the Smith’s idea that “nationalisms have identifiable 
‘objective’ cultural roots.” He asserted that modern ethnic identity in Norway was constructed by 
“political circumstances” (p.93). 
38 The term ICT here refers to information and communications technology. 
Chapter III. Nationalism and National Interest                                      Seokbae Lee 
  58 
regardless of their ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds.39 
 By quoting Hegel’s owl of Minerva, Hobsbawm (1990, p.192) insisted that 
“‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are no longer adequate terms to describe, let alone to analyse, 
the political entities described as such, or even the sentiments once described by these 
words.” He expressed his argument metaphorically as “The owl of Minerva which 
brings wisdom… flies out at dusk” (p.192). Even Wendt (2003), in his article Why a 
World State is Inevitable, anticipated that “more new states − ‘more anarchy’ – may be 
created” because of continuing “nationalist struggles for recognition” (p. 526). 
According to him, 
 
…the rise of nationalism can actually be seen as evidence for my argument, because it is 
about the struggle for recognition. In 1945 a majority of the world’s population lived in 
empires that did not recognize them as full subjects. As a result they struggled for self-
determination and eventually won it. In that sense nationalism has made it possible for 
previously unrecognized actors to participate in the system, and even contemplate binding 
themselves to supranational institutions. Any such constraints they accept will be 
consensual and correspondingly stable. (p.526, emphasis added) 
 
This may be a unique interpretation of the relationship between nationalism and 
supranational system in that he indicated nationalism as a driving force for the world 
state construction (see also Kleingeld, 1999).40 However, anyway he did not disagree 
with the idea that nationalism is expected to weaken and dissipate. Thus, it may be clear 
that there is a strong opinion that the more the world is globalised, the less nationalism 
can be seen. My aim is to refute the idea that nationalism is a death rattle by giving 
theoretical and empirical evidence that nationalism is still strong and will not vanish in 
the near future. 
 By indicating that “we live in an age of insecurity,” Webster, Lambert and 
Beziudenhout (2008), asserted that “Faced with insecurity, persons tend to retreat into 
the familiar – their country, their neighbourhood, their home, their family – and 
sometimes their ‘race’” (preface, para.1-2). This argument seems plausible considering 
today’s myriad of international conflicts. Despite the extreme difficulties, why have 
                                           
39 About the song and dance, see YouTube video, PSY - GANGNAM STYLE (강남스타일) M/V (2012). 
40 As a counterargument to this, see Lechner and Boli eds. (2011). They argued that nationalism will not 
disappear owing to globalisation in the sense that globalisation and growing similarity will rather 
stimulate reactions against them. 
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many Tibetan people tried to flee to Dharamsala in which the Tibetan Government in 
Exile is located? Also, why have many people around the world participated protests 
against the big multinational corporations in order to keep the domestic companies? It is 
through nationalism that we may be able to understand these kinds of desires for 
belonging and protection (see Smith, 1991; Lechner and Boli, 2011). In other words, 
nationalism may allow the people to regain their mental security. When on earth can we 
totally escape from this world being filled with the innumerable conflicts? It is certainly 
impossible for us to grasp the opportunity in the near future–in practice, currency wars 
are still underway, 41  and protectionism based on selfishness is becoming more 
prevalent in the current global economic crisis.42 Aside from the economic situations, 
there is also a myriad of political and religious conflicts such as the Indo-Pakistani 
conflict, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Germany-Greece tension and China-Japan island 
dispute. Taking a casual glance at the circumstances, nationalism is still alive and 
continuing.43 
 One could assert that nationalism is dying, with the evidence of 
multiculturalism. Obviously, a lot of people are moving to other countries for various 
purposes and intermarriage is no longer special case for many people. However, behind 
this scene, it seems that the tension is growing with regard to multiculturalism 
considering the negative discourses about multiculturalism from the leaders in European 
countries. By indicating that “we have allowed the weakening of our collective 
identity,” the Prime Minister of the UK David Cameron, at a security conference in 
Munich in 2011, said that “we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at 
home… we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, 
muscular liberalism” (Cameron, 2011). The German chancellor, Angela Merkel 
mentioned that “Germans should also talk about their values and their increasing 
alienation from religion, in order to affirm their sense of country and society.” Even she 
also argued that their attempts to create a multicultural society have “utterly failed” 
(Hall, 2010). The former French President Nicolas Sarkozy insisted that the concept of 
multiculturalism “had failed.” He also claimed that “We have been too concerned about 
the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough about the identity of the 
country that was receiving him” (The Telegraph, 2011). These remarks may imply that 
                                           
41 About this, see Stewart (2013). 
42 About protectionism, see Plummer (2012). 
43 It does not mean that nationalism is always an evil force. This will be discussed later. 
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even though many people have moved to other countries, they have strongly kept their 
original identities and rituals and this could make the natives feel nervous and even 
generate tensions. Regardless of whether this is genuinely serious or not, the situations 
may represent the collision of different identities and nationalist sentiments.  
 This issue is actually very sensitive and controversial, but it seems that 
multiculturalism, at least to date, has not made nationalism completely obsolete, but 
rather it could stimulate dormant nationalism in certain respects. Many scholars have 
attempted to investigate their causal relations and seek the way the two concepts can be 
peacefully integrated, but the conclusions were almost the same: it still has a long way 
to go (see Aleinikoff, 2001; Holtug, Lippert-Rasmussen and Læ gaard, 2009; Kernerman, 
2005; Kymlicka, 2001; Miller, 2000). Wehler’s case may clearly make a good example 
for this issue. He believed that nationalism will vanish if peace persists for a long time 
and other alternatives mostly derived from the Western experience of modernisation 
replace the role of nationalism as a basis of legitimation and justification, and it must be 
realised (see Benes, 2005; see also Wehler, 2001). However, by maintaining that 
“Regarding its geographical location, historical past, religion, culture, and mentality, 
Turkey is not a part of Europe,” he insisted that “this Muslim country [Turkey] should 
never join the EU, as a Muslim state a deep cultural boundary separates this country 
[Germany] from Europe.” He also claimed that “Turks would destroy the historical 
character of the [European] Union” and “multiculturalists” were weakening Europe with 
Christian tradition (Wehler, cited in Huggan and Law, 2009, p.105; see also Eberhard, 
Lübke and Benthin 2010; Eley, 2007; Küçük, 2011).  It is surprising that these 
nationalistic, exclusive and Eurocentric remarks are from Wehler who emphasised the 
future welfare state without nationalism. Ironically, he himself showed a strong sense of 
nationalist sentiment. Paradoxically, the future he dreamed, in the light of his attitude, 
seems still highly unimaginable. 
 Like this, nationalism still wields strong influence to people, to a greater or 
lesser extent. 44  Though it is expressed differently depending on the situation, 
nationalism can be deeply ingrained in people’s minds involuntarily and unconsciously. 
By introducing the term “banal nationalism” as “the ideological habits which enable the 
established nations of the West to be reproduced,” Billig (1995, p.6) critically indicated 
that “these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed.” 
                                           
44 About this, Anand (2010), though he may take a negative view on nationalism, asserted that “There is 
no doubt that nationalism matters in global politics” (p.281). 
Chapter III. Nationalism and National Interest                                      Seokbae Lee 
  61 
Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic 
condition… Because the concept of nationalism has been restricted to exotic and 
passionate exemplars, the routine and familiar forms of nationalism have been overlooked. 
In this case, ‘our’ nationalism slips from attention. There is a growing body of opinion 
that nation-states are declining. Nationalism, or so it is said, is no longer a major force: 
globalization is the order of the day. But a reminder is necessary. Nationhood is still being 
reproduced: it can still call for ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, its symbols and assumptions 
are flagged. (Billig, 1995, pp.6-8, emphasis added) 
 
His argument clearly highlights the reason why people are under the illusion that 
nationalism is in decline. People do not have an intense feeling of nationalism not 
because it is fading away, but because it is too common. Very simple examples could 
illustrate this. People are rooting for their national teams in international sports events 
such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup; people are celebrating their national 
memorial day; and people are singing their national anthems as well as waving the 
national flags. Civilians killed in the war on terror are largely ignored and media gave 
prominent coverage on the news that Prince Harry’s killing Taliban fighters in 
Afghanistan as it is worthy of praise. These kinds of things are usually regarded as the 
sacrifice of the lesser for the greater – or liberation of the people; and or revenge for 
justice. Instances like this are all too common and natural in today’s society. Putting 
aside the disputes over ethical and political issues, if nationalism is excluded, what can 
make the explanation for these situations? 
 All things considered, I cannot agree with the idea that nationalism is being 
enfeebled, but rather it is still potent and deeply entrenched in people’s minds. As the 
recent cases of South Sudan, Palestine and Scotland show, attempts and desires to be a 
sovereign state still continue.45 The high-handedness of Multinational corporations 
agitates for forming the new cartel of nationalism. Scholars come on to “online/cyber 
nationalism” (see Shen and Breslin, 2010; see also Bagchi, 2011).46 Smith (1991, p.x) 
claimed that “national identity and nationalism are likely to remain powerful and 
proliferating forces in the foreseeable future” as it renders “the sole vision and rationale 
of political solidarity today” (p.176; see also Greenfeld, 1992; Brubaker, 1996). This 
                                           
45 About South Sudan independence, see Rice (2011); About Palestinian case, see MacAskill and 
McGreal (2012); About Scottish independence referendum, see Black (2013). 
46 They focused on the phenomena that people show very strong nationalist sentiments on the web, and 
such online interaction could consolidate nationalism. 
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moment might be inside his foreseeable future and could last far into another future. 
 Controversies over the endurance of nationalism are usually in company with 
the moral debates on nationalism. For the critics of nationalism, their focus is not just 
that nationalism is in decline, but that it must be eradicated due to its irrational, 
exclusive and violent characteristics. Nationalism is harshly criticised as “one of the 
most serious causes now of violence and war” (Popper, 1997, p.39); “fearful of the 
others” and “arrogant” (Keane, 1995, p.194); “the starkest political shame of the 
twentieth century” (Dunn, 1979, p.57); “extremely difficult” to be reconciled with 
“political liberties” (Kedourie, 1993, p.107); “a move to create, awaken and strengthen a 
masculinist-nationalist body, which is always already vulnerable to the exposure of the 
masculine as non-masculine” (Anand, 2008, p.175); as well as “the pathology of 
modern developmental history” (Nairn, 2003, p.347). Obviously, we have witnessed 
numerous situations that nationalism is abused and expressed in irrational, extreme and 
exclusive ways. Sometimes, it has been manipulated by powerful individuals or groups 
to maintain their vested interests; and at others, it has been misused by dominant groups 
as a means of oppressing social, ethnic and religious minority groups around the world. 
However, if we agree with the idea that nationalism is socially constructed, can we 
stigmatise nationalism as a sheer evil force? Is the social process always concluded in a 
negative direction? I do not agree with this. It is true that nationalism has played a 
crucial role in oppressive and expansionist momentum, but it is also true that 
nationalism has provided emotional stability for those who are living in dangerous and 
tough lives (see Greenfeld, 2005).  
Seyla Benhabib (2004), in her book, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and 
Citizens, stated that, 
 
Collective identity, privileges of political membership, and the entitlement to social 
benefits are no longer bundled together within a unified institution of national citizenship. 
They are disaggregated and come under the purview of different rights regimes and 
multiple, nested sovereignties. Yet disaggregated citizenship is not cosmopolitan 
citizenship. The developments it describes may be driving the worldwide mobility of 
peoples without democratic attachments and civic commitments, leading to the formation 
of a world proletariat, participating in global markets but lacking a demos. (p.23, 
emphasis added) 
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She critically indicated that cosmopolitanism can result in the creation of another form 
of unequal and oppressive political community and membership. “Universal principles” 
under the current neoliberalism have not always led the liberation of the oppressed 
people – they have made people economically and politically more marginalised as well. 
Nationalism can offer an emotional shelter to those who are uncomfortable with such 
universalism, and arguably, in spite of the limitations, nation-states are one of the most 
significant actors to moderate any kind of radical tendency of this aspect. Berlin (2003) 
emphasised wanting to belong and feeling at home to explain this aspect of nationalist 
sentiments. As a Zionist, he strongly believed that Jews need a home in Israel to relieve 
their sense of social unease. For him, “a sense of home” rightly means “a sense of 
freedom” in that people can be mentally emancipated from social and political pressure 
from external forces (see also Margalit, 2001, p.164). Apart from the territorial conflict 
between Israel and Palestine, his idea clearly shows how nationalism could positively 
affect people’s feeling of safe and comfort. 
 By highlighting the collapse of nation-state Europe as one of the most 
important factors to bring out totalitarianism, Arendt (1976) indicated that stateless 
people cannot have the “right to have rights,” and “people without their own national 
government” could be “deprived of human rights” (p.272).  
 
The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the 
deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective… They [people deprived of human rights] are deprived, not of the right to 
freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of 
the right to opinion… We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that 
means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a 
right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people 
emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global 
political situation. The trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilization, 
backwardness, or mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because 
there was no longer any “uncivilized” spot on earth, because whether we like it or not we 
have really started to live in One World (pp.296-297, emphasis added). 
 
 
Her notions of “a right to have rights” and “a right to belong” plainly shed light on the 
important role of nationalism in this globalised and competitive international society. 
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That is to say, nationalism can be the fundamental basis for human equality with a right 
not to be politically and socially excluded.47 Smith, by maintaining that “Nationalism 
may not be responsible for the many instances of reform and democratization of 
tyrannical regimes,” also asserted that nationalism “is a frequent accompanying motive, 
a source of pride for downtrodden peoples and the recognized mode for joining or 
rejoining ‘democracy’ and ‘civilization’” (1990, p.176). In these regards, it may not be 
desirable to totally inculpate a certain kind of nationalist solidarity as the primary cause 
of today’s international conflicts. In fact, it is questionable whether nationalism is 
completely responsible for the problems that international society is undergoing. 
According to Anand (2010), the state “may come up with a majoritarian nationalism 
that excludes minorities within.” This “then may lead to minority nationalisms and 
sometimes violent resistance to the existing state and demand for a new state” (p.281). 
This logic may be true in international politics as well. Needlessly to say, many weak 
states are forced to follow “global standards” by the great powers. This also may 
provoke a storm of protest against such standards that ignore the values of the minor 
states. Then, what is the fundamental cause of the problems? Nationalism of the weak 
powers or that of great powers? Who are the great powers? Are they really directly 
involved in the situation? Then, is it really a matter of nationalism? It may be more 
appropriate to evaluate that these problems are the matter of violence of universalism 
and cosmopolitanism. It may be difficult to blame those who withdraw to their nations 
in order to avoid such one-sided global principles as well. 
 It seems that scholars are prone to easily attribute the negative issues to 
nationalism. Nationalism has generally accused of resulting in racism, violence, gender 
inequality and even irrational form of communism (see Miles, 1987; Yuval-Davis, 1997; 
Kedourie, 1993; Popper, 1997). Their studies are absolutely fine and fruitful to 
understand nationalism as a negative force. However, even so, it might be dangerous to 
generalise that nationalism is always maleficence. Actually, there is no strict logical 
evidence and absolute causality between nationalism and the negative concepts. It is 
highly contingent in history and depends on interpretation. To take an example, Mosse 
(1995) claimed that nationalism is being condemned “without distinction, or identifying 
it automatically with racism, deprives us of any chance to humanize an ideology whose 
                                           
47 However, she criticised ethnically based nationalism. What she advocated in terms of nationalism is 
about so-called “civic” nationalism, especially that of French model (see Rensmann, 2006). The types of 
nationalism, civic and ethnic nationalism in particular, will be discussed later.  
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time, far from being over, seems to have arrived once more” (p.168). This means that 
racism and nationalism may not have a direct correlation. Like this, there is always 
room for different interpretations and of course there is a myriad of other irrational and 
morbid phenomena that are not necessarily connected with nationalism. There are a lot 
of conflicts related to religious beliefs. Then, should we totally denounce religion itself? 
There must be positive sides that religion contributes, so it is more productive to take a 
balanced approach to elicit more objective and unbiased results. 
 Actually nationalism can have a positive effect on many circumstances. 
Scholars like Yael Tamir (1995) even argued that “nationalism is not the pathology of 
the modern age but an answer to its malaise – to the neurosis, alienation, and 
meaninglessness characteristic of modern times” (p.432). In practice, nationalism has 
played a pivotal role in anticolonialism in many cases such as China, India and Korea. 
For some minorities like Tibetans and Balochis, nationalism is what holds the people 
together, which allows the nations to be sustained. It also acts as a defense mechanism 
to protect domestic markets against invasion of big multinational corporations. These 
kinds of minor or marginalised interests (if it is viewed in international level) could 
easily be discarded if nationalism is absent in that it seems that the role of global ethics 
and humanism is still very limited. International organisations such as UN and WTO are 
struggling to solve the tensions around the world, and we have observed the situations 
how the treaty of the UNFCCC48 and the Kyoto Protocol have frequently been negated 
(See Boer, 2012). In other words, in international level, a dilemma of “the tragedy of the 
commons” (see Hardin, 1968) has not been impressively relieved yet. One could argue 
that this has been caused by selfish nationalism as well. It may be true. However, the 
point which claims our attention is that the international agendas are usually set by the 
great powers and obviously and unfortunately there is not enough room for the weak 
nations to be involved in the decision-making process. Their positions and interests may 
not be dealt with as a matter of cardinal importance, regardless of the value and 
rationality. Nationalism may help such unsung interests not to be given up by the weak 
nations themselves even in very difficult circumstances. If we predicate that nationalism 
is completely bad and dangerous, the pursuit of such interests and attempts at survival 
can be interpreted as always unethical and irrational movements, which may be unfair 
evaluation and the violent logic of the powerful. 
                                           
48 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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 These sorts of different instances and interpretations may lead the discussions 
on which types of nationalism are good, or bad. Many typologies on this topic have 
been proposed by scholars, which has strongly affected the studies in this filed. Usually 
nationalism has been classified by a dichotomous way. From Friedrich Meinecke’s (see 
1970) attempt at distinguishing between the “Kulturnation” (cultural nations) and the 
“Staatsnation” (political nations), the dichotomous framework has been commonly 
adopted to explain the types of nationalism. Hans Kohn might present the most notable 
theoretical dichotomous typology (see Shulman, 2002, p.555). He (1944) classified 
nationalism into two types: Western and Eastern nationalism. For him, the former is “a 
rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards 
the city of the future,” while the latter “was basically founded on history, on monuments 
and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal 
society” (p. 574). His idea may be the foundation of the analytical distinction between 
“civic” and “ethnic” nationalism (see Shulman, 2002, p.556; Schnapper, 1995; see also 
Breton, 1988; Greenfeld, 2000; Smith, 1986). Though there are more or less different 
interpretations on the issue among the scholars, it is a largely held view that civil 
nationalism is political, which usually accompanies liberty, democracy, universality and 
civilization, represented by the experiences of England, France and the United States 
(see Buckley, 2000; Delahunty, 2012), while ethnic nationalism is cultural, which is 
usually associated with irrationality, inefficiency and undemocratic aspects, generally 
found in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia (see Heisler, 1990; Held and McGrew, 
2003; Horowitz, 1985; see also Lecours, 2000). 
 Leaving aside its Eurocentric bias, it is doubtful about how effective this 
dichotomous framework actually is, when it comes to distinguishing between good and 
bad nationalism. Does really nationalism has such a fixed characteristics? Geertz (1973) 
stated that “There is, in such matter, no simple progression from “traditional” to 
“modern,” but a twisting, spasmodic, unmethodical movement which turns as often 
toward repossessing the emotions of the past as disowning them” (p.319). Nationalism 
must be selectively recognised and differently reconstituted in history as well. It is 
almost impossible to accurately demarcate civic and ethnic; Western and non-Western; 
as well as modern and pre-modern. Thus, there are no naturally given characteristics of 
nationalism, but rather, it is the matter of interpretation and implementation, which is 
historically contingent process. Actually, many scholars have indicated that civic 
nationalism is not necessarily beneficial concept. By indicating that “banal 
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[nationalism] does not imply benign,” Billig (1995, p.6) warned of a “Jekyll and Hyde” 
duality of nationalism. 
 
… some forms of nationalism, most notably movements for national liberation from 
colonialism, tend to be classed as positive, whilst others, such as fascist movements, 
belong to the shadowed half. It would be wrong to assume that ‘banal nationalism’ is 
‘benign’ because it seems to possess a reassuring normality, or because it appears to lack 
the violent passions of the extreme right… In the case of Western nation-states, banal 
nationalism can hardly be innocent: it is reproducing institutions which possess vast 
armaments. As the Gulf and Falklands Wars indicated, forces can be mobilized without 
lengthy campaigns of political preparation. The armaments are primed, ready for use in 
battle. And the national populations appear also to be primed, ready to support the use of 
those armaments (p.7, emphasis added).  
 
His argument implies that it is dangerous to conclude that banal or civic nationalism is 
always a positive force. Every nationalism is actually ready for a change depending on 
the different situations. Similar to this, Brubaker (1999), by claiming that “all 
understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive 
and exclusive,” he maintained that “what varies [between civic and ethnic nationalism] 
is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or 
criteria of inclusion and exclusion” (p.64). He critically examined the exclusive 
characteristics of civic understanding of nationalism.  
 
… citizenship itself, by its very nature, is an exclusive as well as an inclusive status. On a 
global scale, citizenship is an immensely powerful instrument of social closure… Access 
to citizenship is everywhere limited; and even if it is open, in principle, to persons 
regardless of ethnicity, this is small consolation to those excluded from citizenship, and 
even from the possibility of applying for citizenship, by being excluded from the territory 
of the state. This «civic» mode of exclusion is exceptionally powerful. On a global scale, it 
is probably far more important, in shaping life chances and sustaining massive and 
morally arbitrary inequalities, than is any kind of exclusion based on putative ethnicity. 
But it is largely invisible, because we take it for granted (1999, p.64, emphasis added). 
 
This clearly demonstrates the fact that the exclusive feature of nationalism is not 
reserved just for ethnic nationalism. Therefore, considering the above arguments, there 
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are no originally and absolutely good or bad types of nationalism. It must be interpreted 
and evaluated in the frame of the social and historical context. Obviously, Western 
concept of nationalism has also been shaped through the mechanism of disputes, 
conflicts, exclusion, invasions and colonialism. Ethnic, gender, racial and cultural 
minorities were, or are, suffering from harsh discrimination. As an example, how can 
we interpret the citizenship process for “green-card soldiers” of the US? A lot of illegal 
immigrants mostly from Latin America have joined the wars to get a US citizenship (see 
Krikorian, 2003). Is this “civic-way” of shaping nationalism? Furthermore, the 
numerous unsung heroes of the “just-war” are remembered, but how about the innocent 
unnamed war dead on the battlefields? Are their dignity truly respected in civic and 
Western societies? 
 
Nationalism and National Interest: Nationalism as a Strategy 
 
So far, we have examined the contested issues on nationalism and attempted to find out 
how nationalism can be properly interpreted. To summarise, I argue that nationalism is a 
social construct that can be driven either by the states or the public. There is no 
objective sine qua non for the process of defining nationalism, which can be applicable 
to every case. Nationalism is still alive and kicking, and it must be interpreted and 
understood in the social and historical context. It is difficult to evaluate that nationalism 
is always an evil force, and there are no sheer good or bad types of nationalism. 
 I do not think that nationalism claims any particular new prominence, value and 
vision for the future. It has not given any special and clear doctrines to be achieved. In 
history, nationalism has been used as a strong driving force to pursue hope, desire and 
purpose of the nations, that is, the national interests. This may be the reason why 
nationalism has been found in any ideological regimes, namely, liberal states and 
communist states as a tool for mobilising the people to realise the ideological goals (see 
Delahunty, 2012, p.18). Different from other broad concepts such as liberalism, 
communism, socialism and capitalism, nationalism is simple. It does not need to give 
the actors any specific justifications or reasons for the pursuit of nations’ interests in the 
sense that nationalism is operated by feelings and sentiments, not by the rationale 
behind the actions. Anyway, it is obvious that nationalism matters in the pursuit of 
national interests since the national interest is the ultimate place in which nationalism is 
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expressed and realised. 
 To examine China and India’s National interest vis-à-vis Tibet, this research 
especially concentrates on nationalism as a strategy to pursue national interest. As 
discussed above, some scholars, Marxists, in particular, argued that elites shape and use 
nationalism to mobilise people to pursue their own interests. So-called instrumentalists 
who focus on the instrumental nature of nationalism agree with this idea. They explain 
“the genesis of and continuing support for nationalism by the interests it is alleged to 
serve. In this view, ethnic and national identities become convenient tools at the hands 
of competing elites for generating mass support in the universal struggle for wealth, 
power and prestige” (Ö zkirimli, 2000, p.88). For them, nationalism is a creation of 
elites who sell interests defined by them as national interests.  
 As politics is usually dominated by the elites, one can say that nationalism as a 
strategy is the preserve of elites. However, as it is indicated, nationalism can be 
generated and evolved by the public as well. Even such nationalism can go against elite 
defined national interest. In this regard, I challenge the idea that nationalism is “always” 
an elites’ creation – however, I do agree with the opinion that nationalism can be used 
by actors as a political strategy to define and realise national interests. For me, the 
relationship between nationalism; and the formation and pursuit of national interest is a 
kind of socially, politically or culturally constructed contract. Sometimes it is relatively 
easier to complete the deal – for example, the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s use of 
Han nationalism; and other times it is difficult to even have a negotiation – for instance, 
the CPC’s nationalistic approach towards the Tibetan people within the PRC boundary. 
The contract is discussed and made in the structure of power politics; and delivered and 
shared via various discourses.  
The linguistic practices inside the discursive structures are not always based on 
rigorous and logical rationality. They are based on feelings, emotions and sentiments. 
These feelings can sometimes become extreme, and lead to abnormal contracts such as 
Nazi Germany and China’s Cultural Revolution. The “terms and conditions” of 
nationalism in the contract is unclear and unwritten. The contract is always exposed to 
the possibility of manipulation and deception. Actors who want to benefit from the 
contract can abuse this aspect. Such actors usually provoke majoritarianism. In a society, 
there is a tendency of “Normative social influence,” which leads to the willingness of 
conformity. It is “where people follow group norms. This influence arises from people’s 
desire for approval and acceptance, and their anxiety and discomfort about the 
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possibility of being ostracized or ridiculed, or simply being seen as impolite” (Stainton 
Rogers, 2011, p.357). In other words, social forces can alter the people’s opinions or 
make people just follow majoritarian perspectives even if such viewpoints are against 
their beliefs. Thus, once the majoritarian nationalism is set, it is difficult for someone 
who can challenge it. This situation can help the immoral actors facilitate the pursuit of 
their own interests in the name of national interests. 
It goes without saying that the contract would not necessarily be negative, but 
there is a risk in the nationalism-national interest deal. Especially in the countries like 
China and India where the tendency of majoritarianism (ethnic and religious, 
respectively) is vivid, there must be always possibility that nationalism can be 
strategically abused in the process of pursuit of “forged” national interests. This 
research, keeping this in mind, attempts to find out if nationalism is used, or abused, as 
a strategy to define and realise the two countries’ national interests vis-à-vis Tibet, 
through the examination of language practices – the CPC may have drawn on Han 
nationalism to fortify the concept of the Chinese nation, and on propaganda about 
development to neutralise Tibetan nationalism. In the case of India, the elite, while 
acknowledging their inability to contain China with the Tibet card, have attempted to 
boost nationalism by emphasising their generous, democratic and peaceful approach 
towards Tibet, and thereby comparing themselves favourably with China. This will be 
dealt with in the chapter VI and VII in more detail.  
All in all, in today’s world, it seems that there are a lot of leviathans who 
pursue its interests. Nationalism, on the one hand, could be abused by the unethical 
leviathans as momentum for irrational absolute power; on the other hand, it could be 
worked as insurance against such irrational actors. It may not be easy to anticipate 
whether nationalism will be a giant wall that should be broken by Nomads (see Deleuze, 
1994) for survival, or will provide them with comfortable shelter. However, it seems 
obvious that if each nation continuously tries to define and realise their national 
interests, nationalism would not easily disappear in the sense that the pursuit of the 
national interests can be justified in the name of nationalism.
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Chapter IV. Methodology 
 
We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would 
have only to decipher. The world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no 
prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour.  
― MICHEL FOUCAULT, The order of Discourse 
 
 
Research Questions 
 
The primary purpose of this research is to investigate how china and India’s national 
interests vis-à-vis Tibet has been defined, articulated and pursued. As previous chapter 
indicated, this study will be conducted under the two theoretical bases: rationalism and 
constructivism. In so far as rationalists understand the concept of national interest, it is 
exogenously given and fixed, as well as independent of any different circumstance and 
situation. That is to say, interest itself is predefined, and it is natural for various actors, 
whatever they are states or individuals, to pursue the interest as it is inherent human 
nature. Importantly, objective variables such as material forces and security are of the 
utmost importance to shape the national interest, which determines “true” interest. In 
view of rationalist account, this thesis presents the following questions: 
 
As seen in the questions above, it is a key to discover the objective factors which may 
lead China and India to the strategic game over the Tibet issue. Thus, the presented 
questions may be none other than the following questions: “what issues and themes can 
be significant to define and explain China and India’s national interests with regard to 
Tibet?” and “what is evidence that such issues and themes matter when it comes to 
Q 1-1: 
 
Are there objectively significant factors in Tibet inducing China and India’s 
interests? 
Q 1-2: 
 
Are the objectively important aspects of Tibet the leading cause of defining 
China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet? 
Q 1-3: 
 
 
Are the two countries’ conflicts and tensions about the Tibet issue a power 
and strategic game, pursuing the objective interests that they have vis-à-vis 
Tibet? 
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explaining their national interests?” Questions about “how” and “why” such national 
interests have been shaped are not the main concern for rationalists as the process of 
interest formation is not an epistemologically and ontologically significant theme for 
them. 
 Constructivist approach, however, has a different story. For constructivists, how 
the national interest has been shaped is an important issue. They put great importance 
on ideational factors that are not significantly dealt with in rationalist approach when it 
comes to explaining the process of defining the interest. As already discussed in the 
previous chapter, this study argues that the national interest is socially constructed and 
linguistically realised and represented. This thesis particularly highlights the role of the 
two countries’ nationalism in the process of shaping, justifying and pursuing the 
national interests. Considering the conceptual frameworks with regard to national 
interest and nationalism provided, this research poses the following questions: 
The questions of “how,” “who” and “why” are the basis of the research questions above. 
That is to say, the focus here is to examine the internal process of interest formation. To 
find out this, it may be necessary to understand the social, historical, political and 
cultural contexts in which the defining and pursuing process of China and India’s 
interests with regard to Tibet has taken place. It means that this thesis attempts to delve 
into the conditions, situations and backgrounds of the dynamics of interest-defining 
processes in China and India under the assumption that such domestic circumstances 
have significant implications for interpretation of their interests vis-à-vis Tibet. Then, 
                                           
49 In this paper, the term “elites” would mean those who can have a large impact on the social agenda, for 
example, politicians, state officials, scholars and other influential figures, namely, dominant people, 
groups and institutions. This will be dealt with in the next relevant chapters in more detail.  
Q 2-1: Is it through a domestic, cultural and political complexity of causal factors 
that China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet have been shaped 
and pursued? 
Q 2-2: Are China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet driven (originated and 
defined) by the elites49 in general? 
Q 2-3: In China and India, does nationalism play an instrumental role in the process 
of defining, pursuing and justifying (legitimising) the national interests with 
regard to Tibet? 
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how to understand and analyse the contexts is a crucial issue. As already discussed in 
the previous chapter, this research takes the epistemological position that people 
recognise and understand reality through language. Thus, investigating the linguistic 
process in the reality concerning the national interest is imperative to discover the 
contexts in which relevant parties and people interpret and understand the situation that 
they are involved in.  
 
Methods of Analysis 
 
1. Textual Analysis: Content Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
To examine all the presented research questions, this thesis employs qualitative research 
methods. Quantitative approach may not be adequate to meet the methodological needs 
of this research because the aim of this thesis is not to prove the general tendency and 
causality that can universally be applicable to the situations regarding the relationship 
between China and India according to their interests vis-à-vis Tibet, but the complicated 
phenomena that the two countries are undergoing. Also, owing to the complexity of the 
concepts of interest and nationalism, it may be difficult not only to control the 
meaningful or insignificant variables but to generate the quantified data as well.  
 To return, basically, textual analysis is used to analyse the data. As stated before, 
the purpose of this study, in brief, is to tackle the questions of what attracts China and 
India’s interests vis-à-vis Tibet (for the rationalist framework) and how and why such 
interests have been defined and pursued (for the constructivist framework). To approach 
the former research question, that of the rationalist framework, this study adopts content 
analysis. Content analysis is helpful in revealing “recurrent instances of items of 
themes” (Julien, 2008, p.121). That is to say, it is through content analysis that this 
research expects to identify the main themes that have been dealt with in the various 
primary and secondary sources about the China and India’s conflict of interests with 
regard to Tibet. That is to say, this process would allow this study to discover the 
significant aspects and factors that may be of interest China and India.  
 Actually, content analysis has widely been used in quantitative research, media 
and communication studies in particular (see Berelson, 1952). According to Bryman 
(2008), content analysis is “an approach to the analysis of documents and texts that 
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seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and 
replicable manner” (p.274, emphasis added). Quantitative content analysis focuses not 
heavily on the implication of contents, but on “the objective, systematic and quantitative 
description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952, p.263). 
Frequency of intensity of certain words or visual images is the basic ground for the 
analysis, as this method, epistemologically, assumes that counting the occurrence may 
mean measuring the significance (see Rose, 2001). It may be inappropriate to maintain 
that quantitative content analysis is merely dependent on the frequency and deductive 
manner, but it is true that the method is usually prone to use various kinds of numerical 
analysis that inevitably accompanies quantifying process based on the frequency of 
certain data (see Winkler and Kozeluh, 2005).  
 This study, however, may need to consider latent elements of content that are 
beyond the frequencies. In other words, this thesis claims that more frequencies do not 
necessarily mean more importance and interest. To take an example, it may be difficult 
to evaluate whether China’s national interest with regard to Tibet has been increased or 
decreased on the basis that the frequency of use of the term Tibet in their historical 
defence white papers. In the white papers, China’s National Defence in 2008 and 2010, 
“Tibet” appears only once and twice respectively, but in the report of the Diversified 
Employment of China’s Armed Forces published in 2013 (defence white paper in 2013), 
the word is used four times. However, the Tibet has long been regarded as China’s one 
of the most important core interests, and there is no significant sign to conjecture that 
China’s interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been declining since 2008. Actually, while the 2013 
paper concentrates on the social infrastructure in terms of the Tibet issue, the 2008 and 
2010 papers have a stronger voice about Tibet with the sentences that “Tibet 
independence pose threats to China’s unity and security” in 2008 and “Tibet 
independence have inflicted serious damage on national security and social stability” in 
2010. Thus, the frequency of quantified data cannot be enough element to analyse the 
phenomena related to the topic of this research. This may be why Krippendorff (2004, 
p.16) indicated, “[U]ltimately, all reading of texts is qualitative, even when certain 
characteristics of a text are later converted into numbers.” Julien (2008, p.120) also 
indicated that “[I]n qualitative research, content analysis is interpretive, involving close 
reading of text,” and “text is open to subjective interpretation, reflects multiple 
meanings, and is context dependent.” 
 Therefore, it may be undesirable for this research to confine the method of 
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content analysis to the epistemology of quantitative approach. Rather, this study actively 
attempts to interpret the varied contents of the primary and secondary sources in order 
to find out the two countries’ rationale behind their consistent and coherent behaviours 
defining and pursuing the interests concerning Tibet. Again, under the rationalist 
framework, to demystify the behaviours of the two “rational” actors, namely, Chinese 
and Indian states, it is essential to delve into objectively attractive factors of Tibet that 
could satisfy the desires and interests of the two countries. The factors comprise 
material objects and security concern, which transcends time and space and independent 
of beliefs and ideas about them. Naturally, the contents related to economy, security and 
geopolitics can be major data sources to be contemplated. This thesis, thus, categorises 
the contents from the primary and secondary sources into these three themes: economy, 
security and geopolitics. From the primary sources, it is expected to get the point of 
what the actors have articulated and done about Tibet. Reviewing these sources would 
help grasp the priority of their interests at the time as well as coherent actions towards 
the objective interests. By examining the secondary sources, this study could gain the 
idea that what actually and potentially drives them to jump into the strategic game vis-à-
vis Tibet. Not only do these sources analyse and interpret the actions done by the actors, 
but they provide the diverse significant economic and strategic aspects upon Tibet that 
may provoke the appetite of China and India. Through the analysis of these contents, we 
can understand what China is interested in, and what India is interested in with regard to 
Tibet, as rational actors who seek economic and political objective national interests. 
Based on the findings from the content analysis, this research also attempts to highlight 
the elements that significantly cause a conflict of interests between China and India vis-
à-vis Tibet.  
 Content analysis, however, has some limits to be applied to the constructivist 
framework presented by this research. Ontologically, content analysis takes the ideas 
that there is objective reality and interest is given and fixed. Content analysis also 
adopts a positivist approach, which is incompatible with the epistemological position of 
this research (see Herrera and Braumoeller, 2004; see also Kassarjian, 2001). A 
qualitative approach to content analysis could be used in the constructivist studies to a 
certain extent as it leaves us more room for interpretive forms of analysis than 
quantitative work. However, due to the different position towards relations between text 
(language) and reality, it is doubtful whether content analysis can provide the 
constructivist framework with a proper analytical tool or not. Especially, content 
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analysis cannot meet the methodological rigor in terms of interpreting context. As 
indicated above, it is vital to understand various contexts that are the certain setting in 
which the actors’ interests, intentions and experiences are inextricably interwoven and 
mutually affected. Content analysis is not very concerned with those contexts in the 
sense that it “focuses on the text abstracted from its contexts” (Hardy, Harley and 
Phillips, 2004, p.19). Even if content analysis can be context dependent if there is less 
obvious content, the method denies the perspective that cultural or historical contexts 
comprising ideational factors and going beyond the text would significantly affect the 
behaviours of the rational actors who pursue their interests.  
 Therefore, to analyse the sources under the constructivist framework, this thesis 
may need a different mode of analysis. Usually, discourse analysis (DA) is largely used 
in the constructivist studies. DA takes the position that reality is the intersubjective 
construction, that is, social construct. It also assumes that the reality is linguistically 
recognised and there are strong relations between context and text. While content 
analysis seeks the coherent logic of the consistent pursuit of interests according to the 
objective factors that are taken for granted, DA postulates that meaning and implication 
of interests can change according to the various situations and circumstances, namely, 
contexts and structure. It goes without saying, analysing text is also the important theme 
of DA, but it is more concerned with the structural context shaped by social, historical 
as well as discursive strategy. Thus, DA can satisfy the methodological demand of this 
research as it shares ontological and epistemological positions towards the viewpoint on 
reality and interest.  
 Actually, there is no generally and universally accepted definition and method 
of DA. It varies depending on the different approaches towards discourse and reality. 
Among the varied subfields of discourse analysis, this thesis adopts critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). Not only does CDA investigate language but it examines “the 
discursive conditions, components and consequences” of power relations, ideologies 
and discursive strategies (Van Dijk, 1995, p.24; see also Fairclough, 1989; Wodak 1996). 
Wodak and Meyer (2009) argued that the difference between DA and CDA is that CDA 
is “not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social 
phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and 
multi-methodical approach” (p.2). They also indicated the principles that CDA 
scholarship shares: 1) “all approaches are problem-oriented” and “necessarily 
interdisciplinary and eclectic”; and 2) scholars in this field have “the common interests 
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in de-mystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and retroductable 
investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)” (p.3). 
 CDA is basically originated from sociolinguistics, semiotics, Gramsci’s 
hegemony theory, Harbermas’ colonisation of discourse and Foucault’s theory of power 
(see Fairclough, 1995). CDA scholars selectively combine those theories and concepts 
to establish a CDA framework. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.12) propose the basic 
theoretical premise of CDA. 
 
1) Language is not a reflection of a pre-existing reality. 
2) Language is structured in patterns or discourses – there is not just one general system of 
meaning as in Saussurian structuralism but a series of systems or discourses, whereby meanings 
change from discourse to discourse. 
3) These discursive patterns are maintained and transformed in discursive practices. 
4) The maintenance and transformation of the patterns should therefore be explored through 
analysis of the specific contexts in which language is in action. 
 
According to the above theoretical basis, CDA researchers have proposed different 
interpretation and understanding of discourse and reality depending on their 
epistemological position. According to Howarth and Torfing (2005), “discourse can be 
defined as a relational ensemble of signifying sequences that weaves together semantic 
aspects of language and pragmatics aspects of action” (p.14). Wodak and Meyer (2009) 
claim that “discourse means anything from a historical monument, a Lieu de mémoire, a 
policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, 
a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se” (p.3). Mills (1997) highlights 
that “we have to apprehend reality through discourse and discursive structures” (p.54). 
Among these kinds of various attempts at defining CDA, Fairclough and Wodak 
(1997)’s definition is largely accepted and quoted by CDA scholars.  
 
CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. 
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular 
discursive event and the situation(s), institutions(s) and social structure(s), which frame it… the 
discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them. 
To put the same point in a different way, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially 
shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and 
relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it 
helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to 
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transforming it. Since discourse is so socially influential, it gives rise to important issues of 
power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects (p.258) 
 
What we may need to pay attention to here is that CDA assumes that discourse shapes 
world, namely, culture and society, and discourse is also shaped by them, that is, 
discourse constitutes society and culture. Thus, discourse, for CDA school, is not a mere 
medium conveying and delivering ideas, but a creature having its own structure and 
order. As Fairclough and Wodak (1997) indicated, not only does discourse contribute to 
sustaining and reproducing the existing condition but also it transforms the present state. 
CDA does not simply see and observe such social phenomena, but “critically” interpret 
it. In other words, it is not descriptive and merely explanatory, but interpretative and 
critical. Especially, CDA concerns heavily about how discourse functions and is 
involved in the process of the social phenomena, that is to say, social (re)production and 
transformation, by focusing on power, ideology and hegemony. During the process of 
the (re)production and transformation of society, discursive practices and strategies 
supported by and related to power relations can be hidden, opaque and even 
manipulated. One of the most important aims of CDA is to make such ambiguous and 
abstract characteristics of discourse clear and transparent.   
 Actually, CDA is highly interested in critically examining power abuse, 
inequality, bias and discrimination. Scholars in this field try to find if there are 
discursive strategies that justify improper and irrational behaviours done by dominant 
and majority groups. It means that they keen on explaining “discourse and its functions 
in society, and the ways society, and especially forms of inequality, are expressed, 
represented, legitimated or reproduced in text and talk.” The subjects to be considered 
can be “patterns of access and control over contexts, genres, text and talk, their 
properties, as well as the discursive strategies of mind control” (Van Dijk, 1995, p.24). 
As Habermas (1967) indicated, “language is also a medium of domination and social 
force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power” (p.259).  
 This can especially be true when it comes to defining national interest and 
nationalism by the states. States could announce that “something is our nation’s interest, 
so we have to protect it.” Then, any forms of pursuit of that national interest may easily 
be justified and legitimised by the states as well as the public even if the general people 
do not have enough information on it. It goes without saying, the words like “our” and 
“nations” are very sensitive, nationalistic and difficult to resist it in most cases. Even 
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states could claim that “against it directly means damage to our national interests.” It is 
highly possible that the interest defined by the states can actually be those for the 
dominant groups. In any case, the people cannot help in taking a passive 
position―states and dominant groups conveniently control over talk and text. North 
Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities can make a striking example. The government of 
North Korea argues that having nuclear weapons are our national pride and national 
interest. Regardless of whether the argument is right or not, how much nuclear 
capabilities can help North Korean people is questionable, considering the fact that 
North Korea is still suffering from poverty and developing nuclear capabilities could 
add an excessive financial burden to North Korea. Is it really national interest and pride 
for the general people in North Korea? It might depend on the different circumstances, 
but in view of the current situation that North Korea is undergoing, not many people 
could totally agree with what the North Korea government announces.  
 CDA seeks the reasons why these kinds of social problem and imbalance are 
caused in the concepts of ideology, hegemony and power. As indicated in the 
constructivist framework part, this thesis especially focuses on power. Many CDA 
scholars highlight the role of power and power abuse, “in the way discourse 
(re)produces social domination” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.9). According to Van Dijk 
(1995), “[P]atterns of discourse control and access are indeed closely associated with 
social power” (p.20). Obviously and undoubtedly, Foucault provides CDA scholarships 
with the theoretical foundation in terms of the concept of power. His epistemological 
concern was how language is used and how the use of language is related to social and 
cultural behaviours (see Foucault, 1972; 1978; 1980; 1990). Important aspect is that 
according to him, discourse and discursive structure pre-define what can be said about 
the given topic. It means that there is truth defined by discursive structures, and the truth 
generates power. He (1980, p.93) argued that “[W]e are subjected to the production of 
truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of 
truth.” In other words, the process of production of truth, that is, discursive formation, is 
medium of exercising power and vice versa. 
 Especially he highlighted the relations between knowledge and power. Foucault 
(1990) indicated that “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together” 
(p.100). This can be interpreted that there is no knowledge without (pre)existence or 
formation of power relations, and discourse is not just about active exercise of 
communication, but something creates knowledge. This clearly shows that the 
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relationship between knowledge and power relations that constitute the knowledge is 
discursive. About this, Foucault (1979, p.27-28) summarised it in the following manner: 
 
…power produces knowledge… power and knowledge directly imply one another… there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These ‘power-
knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge 
who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, 
the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of 
these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. 
 
Important thing related to this theme is that Foucault did not think of power as 
necessarily negative force unlike many CDA scholars do today. Actually researchers in 
this area usually regard power as driving force behind social inequalities (see Van Dijk, 
2009; see also Billig, 2008). Foucault was, however, wary of the idea that power is 
recklessly described as negative terms such as exclusion, repression and manipulation 
(see Foucault, 1979). He argued that “power produces; it produces reality; it produces 
domains of objects and rituals of truth” (p.194). The “truth” here is not universal and 
eternal truth. It is dependent on how discourse makes it true. Once the constructed truth 
is believed, it becomes legitimised and justified truth in a certain place (see storey, 
2009). Foucault also claimed that it is true that discourse creates, transmits and bolsters 
power, but it is also true that discourse challenges, distributes and subverts power 
(Foucault, 2009). His notion of power is in accord with the constructivist framework of 
this research. National interest and nationalism are defined and delivered within the 
power structure and believed as true interests and positive things through discursive 
practices; the concepts are not necessarily negative forces that restrict flow of people’s 
ideas and actions; and the concepts can be discarded as well if they are regarded as 
obsolete.  
 So far, this study has reviewed theoretical understanding of CDA and its notion 
of power. Then, it is necessary to have an analytical strategy based on the theoretical 
premise we have explored. This research adopts discourse-historical approach (DHA) 
which “has made the systematic analysis of context and its dialectical relationship to 
meaning-making one of its priori ties” (see Wodak, 2011, p.627; see also Wodak and 
Reisigl, 2001; 2009). According to Wodak (2009), 
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DHA provides a vehicle for looking at latent power dynamics and the range of potentials in 
agents, because it integrates and triangulates knowledge about historical sources and the 
background of the social and political fields within which discursive events are embedded. 
Moreover, the DHA distinguishes between three dimensions which constitute textual meanings 
and structures: the topics which are spoken/written about; the discursive strategies employed; 
and the linguistic means that are drawn upon to realize both topics and strategies. (p.38, 
emphasis added) 
   
DHA assumes that discourses are historical, and can only be understood by examining 
the contexts with the extralinguistic factors such as culture, society and power (see 
Wodak and Meyer, 2009). DHA tries to analyse historical dimension of discursive 
practices by examining various genres50 of discourse which can be changed in history. 
It seems that DHA adopts the idea that history and historical context are discursive 
production, which is in accord with the understanding of theorists such as Foucault, 
Derrida, Barthes and Lyotard (see Park, p.180). DHA could find out consistent, 
contingent and abnormal tendencies and language use of particular situations and events 
that the researchers are interested in. All the change and consistency within the 
particular timescale can be subjects to be contemplated. During the course of history, 
discursive formations and practices may affect and shape the actors’ perception of the 
events and ideas. Especially so far as the concept of relations concerned, through 
historical conflicting narratives and languages between the plural actors, it may be 
possible to grasp the discursive construction process of their conflicts.   
 This thesis, following Wodak’s idea, analyse China and India’s historical 
discourses on their national interests vis-à-vis Tibet by examining three dimensions of 
analytical framework: topics, socio-cultural practice and discursive strategies. In the 
analysis of Topics, this thesis attempts to find agenda that is deal with when it comes to 
defining and articulating the national interest with regard to Tibet. This would highlight 
what aspects were significantly regarded at the time and how it has been changed or 
consistent. Second part is socio-cultural practice. Wodak (2009), one of the founders of 
DHA approach, proposed linguistic means as stated before. This study, however, 
replaces this into socio-cultural practice that Fairclough suggested (see Fairclough, 
1995). This thesis more focuses on macro-level analysis having fairly large timescale. It 
                                           
50 A genre is a particular usage of language which participates in, and constitutes, part of a particular 
social practice, for example, an interview genre, a news genre or an advertising genre (Fairclough, 1995, 
p.56). It can be interpreted as “a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular 
type of social activity” (p.14). 
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seems that linguistic means can particularly be helpful in analysing short-term 
consecutive events in the sense that it more concentrates on micro-level analysis that 
delves into specific use of oral and written forms of words. Thus, linguistic means may 
not meet the analytical needs for this research. Socio-cultural practice is, however, can 
greatly help understand various contexts about the research topic. Since socio-cultural 
practice rightly accompanies examination of social and cultural structures, it would be 
helpful in discovering social and cultural background, situations and circumstances in 
which discursive practices and formations take place. Especially, examining cultural 
structure and practice can play an instrumental role in understanding latent meanings 
and actions in the long-term processes of defining and pursuing interests in the sense 
that it can highlight the long-term construction processes of identity. As indicated in the 
previous chapter on constructivist framework, “identities inform interests and, in turn, 
actions” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.221). Therefore, it would allow this study to grasp how 
much cultural practices influence the pursuit of national interest. Historical and socio-
political context will be dealt with to grasp cultural structure and practice because: 1) 
history gives background knowledge (cultural structure) to understand actor’s own 
rationality behind its behaviour; and 2) such behaviour and discursive interaction 
happen in the structure of power politics.  
 Last thing is discursive strategies. This would mean the strategies to facilitate 
consensus building (see Wodak et al., 2011). This research particularly focuses on the 
role of nationalism here. The actors, namely, China and India can take a strategy to 
awaken dormant nationalism to legitimise their interest-defining and pursuing activities. 
Even it can be used as momentum to “deal with” the conflicts that they face. How 
nationalism is shaped (produced) and delivered (consumed) in relation to the concept of 
national interest, who does and why it happens are key themes to be analysed.   
 The reference period for the analysis adopting DHA is from 1904 to 2015, 
given that 1904 was the point at which the Chinese foreign ministry firstly claimed their 
sovereign over Tibet in response to British invasions of Tibet. Lastly, the sources to be 
analysed here are the published volumes of each of the governments involved, as well 
as those of scholars, and the coverage of the countries in various media. Basically each 
framework shares the material, but primary sources, for instance, White Papers, journals, 
newspaper and magazine articles and original interviews, are more actively utilized for 
tackling the research questions in constructivist framework to avoid unintentional bias 
affected by the interpretations of secondary sources that deal with the content of raw 
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material. Conversely, with the rationalist framework, along with first-hand material, 
various secondary sources including article, book and literary reviews and biographies 
are widely used to find out themes and issues of the given topic. 
 
2. Interviews 
 
Interview is a method to produce knowledge through a conversational practice between 
interviewer and interviewee in qualitative research. It has become one of the most 
common modes of collecting qualitative research data (Brinkmann, 2008, p.470). This 
thesis also conducts interviews in order to gather research data to be extensively used 
and analysed in chapters VI and VII. There are many different types of interviews such 
as structured and unstructured interviews – and among them, this research uses semi-
structured interview. Semi-structured interview is “a qualitative data collection strategy 
in which the researcher asks informants a series of predetermined but open-ended 
questions” (Ayres, 2008, p.810). This means that it is with “room for the respondent’s 
more spontaneous descriptions and narratives” (Brinkmann, 2008, p.470).  
This thesis believes that semi-structured interview is the best method for this 
research, because 1) the interviewees are experts in the field of China-India relations 
and Tibet, so during the interview, the contents and opinions that need to be deeply 
discussed more can be presented; and 2) the purpose of this interview is to enhance 
validity and reliability of the interpretation and analysis made before the interview. To 
have a reflexive and active discussion on the analysis, open-ended questions are 
necessary. About the interview modes used, face-to-face interviews are preferred in this 
research for more active interactions between interviewer and interviewee; but in the 
case where face-to-face interview is not available, online interviews via email, Skype, 
and instant messaging are conducted under the mutual agreement.  
Validating interview data is also one of the key issues of interviewing.51 Indeed, 
it is possible that respondents do not honestly say what they think; do not have enough 
(or desired) knowledge; or do not want to discuss their opinion (see Flinders, 1997, 
pp.287-288). To overcome these issues, with the consent, it may be necessary to have 
                                           
51 This process is usually called triangulation. It is usually regarded as a means of improving the 
reliability and validity of research by giving the combination of multiple methodological approaches and 
theoretical foundations About this please see Denzin, 1970; Mathison, 1988; Thurmond, 2001; see also 
Adeniyi, 2008; Jick, 1979; Kimchi et al., 1991).  
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multiple meetings (formally and informally) with the same interviewee asking the same 
or similar questions each time to check consistency (Griffee, 2005, p.37). Most of all, 
the transcript of the interview will be immediately shared with the respondent for cross-
checking. From the interviews, it is expected that not only does this thesis improve the 
validity of analysis, but it gains a fresh account on the research topic. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Research methodology is a crucial part of research design as it gives guideline on the 
analysis of research questions. This thesis has three and four research questions for the 
rationalist framework and the constructivist framework, respectively. To tackle the 
questions, this study employs two qualitative methods: qualitative content analysis and 
critical discourse analysis. Qualitative content analysis is adopted to approach the 
research questions of rationalism and its primary purpose is to find out the various 
themes that have been dealt with in this research topic. The contents are analysed by 
categorising the data into three dimensions: economy, security and geopolitics, as the 
category is concerned with objective factors that are of interest China and India’s 
national interest vis-à-vis Tibet. With the attempt at overcoming the quantitative 
approach to content analysis focusing on frequencies, this research tries to interpret the 
data actively in order to discover the consistent tendency of the pursuit of national 
interest of China and India with regard to the Tibet issue. 
 To approach the constructivist research questions, this study adopts critical 
discourse analysis. The viewpoints of CDA may be in accord with this thesis’s 
understanding of the role of discourse and reality. CDA would clearly support the basic 
assumption of this research that national interest is social construction that can be 
realised and represented linguistically. CDA group, especially influenced by Foucault, 
regards “language as social practice,” and considers “context of language use” to be 
crucial (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.5). They also believe that in the social rule and order 
shaped by discourse, the way of people’s thinking is determined (Van Dijk, 1997). 
Under the given theoretical basis that “discourses produce knowledge and knowledge is 
always a weapon of power” (Storey, 2009, p.130), this thesis uses discourse-historical 
approach. DHA in this research has three dimensions of analytical framework: topics, 
socio-cultural practice and discursive strategies. Especially in discursive strategies part, 
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nationalism is dealt with in order to understand the relationship between national 
interest and nationalism. 
Semi-structured interview is used for collecting and generating data to be used 
and analysed mostly in chapters VI and VII. It is expected that semi-structured 
interview elicits reflective and productive data.
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Chapter V. China and India’s National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet: 
A Rationalist Perspective 
 
 
What are the factors that affect China and India’s interests with regard to Tibet? If China 
and India are rational actors who try to maximise their interests, it can be assumed that 
Tibet has significant aspects that are of interest to the two countries, considering their 
ongoing tension over the Tibet issues. This chapter attempts to find out such intriguing 
points that attract China and India’s interests and how such factors lead to a conflict of 
interest between China and India, in order to draw a picture of their relations over Tibet 
from a rationalist perspective. This chapter also examines if this picture can give an 
adequate description of the courses of action of China and India towards Tibet and each 
other. 
 
Economic Factors 
 
From a rationalist viewpoint, as already indicated in Chapter 2, economic factors are 
generally regarded as objective inducement to arouse actors’ interests. In this regard, 
examining Tibet’s economic value can elicit meaningful clues concerning China and 
India’s pursuit of interests with regard to Tibet. However, since China controls most of 
the Tibetan Plateau, it can be argued that India does neither enjoy any significant 
economic benefits from Tibet nor can have direct interests in it. This assumption, 
however, can be rejected if the economic assets generated by Tibetan people and culture 
are also considered as part of Tibet. India is the host to the largest Tibetan refugee 
population estimated around 94,000-110,000 (see Planning Commission of the Central 
Tibetan Administration, 2010; see also United States Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, 2003). Of course holding such big refugee population may incur 
expenses, but at the same time, the presence of Tibetan refugees can economically 
contribute to India – for instance, many people have visited India to listen to the Dalai 
Lama’s teaching and experience Tibetan Buddhism through different religious leaders 
and institutions. Therefore, it may not be desirable to underestimate India’s economic 
gain from Tibet even if it might be less than that of China. In this respect, not only 
tangible economic assets in the Tibetan Plateau but also potential intangible properties 
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are included in the analysis of the two countries’ economic interests vis-à-vis Tibet. Also, 
again, it should be noted that the focus here is not to just find out whose interest is 
bigger than whom; or what points of Tibet attract the two countries. Rather, this chapter 
attempts to examine how their interests in economic value of Tibet influence on their 
relations; and how and why rationalist accounts on this issue is circumscribed to 
explicate the complicated relationship between China and India, which has received far 
less rigorous analysis. 
 Many studies and reports have highlighted the mineral resources of Tibet. There 
are many different data and estimates about them, but the data from China’s Ministry of 
Land and Resources, whose survey began in 1999, have widely been referenced even 
though it is largely based on speculations and is not fully reliable.52 According to the 
report released by the ministry in 2007, the Qinghai-Tibet plateau has deposits of 102-
126 types of mineral, including around 30-40 million tons of copper, 40 million tons of 
lead and zinc and billions of tons of high-grade iron, with an estimated USD 100-128 
billion. It is also reported to hold large reserves of coal, lithium, chromite, borax and 
uranium (see also Xinhua 2007; The Times of India, 2010). If this survey is reliable, 
while India does not possess any significant portion of the reserves owing to lack of 
control over the territory, it can be assumed that the PRC, undoubtedly, can benefit from 
these mineral resources as it can substantially contribute to reducing China’s mineral 
imports. 
 Indeed, it is one of the greatest future challenges for the PRC to secure the 
mineral resources – China’s mineral consumption has increased exponentially over the 
past decade as its economy has been growing at a rapid pace (see Tse, 2013; see also 
Drysdale and Hurst, 2012). In this circumstance, Tibet’s potentially abundant reserves 
of precious minerals are enough to attract the PRC’s interest. Especially, Tibet’s copper 
can ease the surprisingly strong Chinese copper demand. Copper is the most extensively 
used industrial mineral commodity, found in sectors ranging from manufacturing 
companies to construction industries (see Ng, 2014). In fact, China became the largest 
consumer of refined copper by 2012, with usage of around 8.8 million tonnes (ICSG53, 
2013, p.6). It also dominated the world copper smelter output with a 32 % market share 
in the world (ICSG, 2013, p.17). 
                                           
52 This aspect will be discussed in the last section, Problems of Rationalist Approach to China and India’s 
National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet. 
53 International Copper Study Group 
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[Fig. 1] Copper Smelter Production by Country (2012)54 
(Thousand metric tonnes) 
 
 
The important issue here is that China’s imports of copper are increasing day by day as 
its requirements of copper in infrastructure facilities are continuously rising (see Day 
and Shumsky, 2014).55 Actually current domestic copper mines of China supply less 
than 30 % of its demands for copper concentrates (Tse, 2013, p.8.6). It means that 
around two thirds of the raw materials used in China’s copper industry are covered by 
imports (Hammer and Jones, 2012). Considering the recent upward trends in world 
copper price as shown in Fig.2, it could be an effective long-term strategy for China to 
increase domestic copper production. 
 
[Fig. 2] Average Annual Copper Prices (LME, Grade A, Cash), 1960-201256 
                                               (US$ per tonne) 
 
                                           
54 Data and Diagram Source: ICSG (2013, p.17). 
55 Tse (2013) indicates that in 2012, China imported 22.8% more coppers than 2011. Also, according to 
SMM (Shanghai Metal Market) (2013), China’s total copper metal unit imports shows the highest record 
in January of 855 kilo tons (Kt), surpassing the previous high of 808Kt in September 2013. 
56 Data and Diagram Source: ICSG (2013, p.33). 
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As indicated above, the Tibet Autonomous Region potentially has huge veins of copper 
and given that the area is relatively unexploited than any other regions, developing the 
area could help China reduce the burden of the excessive copper imports. In fact, 
according to NBSC 57  (2012), copper mine production in Tibet accounts for an 
insignificant percentage of the total production, even though the data from the same 
body shows that basic reserve of copper in Tibet consists of around 8 % of the total 
reserve of copper in China. Thus, it can be argued that it is the PRC’s interest that 
exploiting the mineral resources in Tibet to meet its future demand for important 
mineral commodities.  
 The TAR is also known as a rich repository of natural energy resources. This 
aspect can help China set the future energy supply and demand plan. As Fig.3 and Fig.4 
illustrate, China’s energy use is constantly growing, reached at 2,029 kg and its Fossil 
Fuel dependency was 88.3 % of total in 2011, drawing upward trend. Currently, coal 
consists of around 70 % of total primary consumption (oil 18% and gas 4% each), and 
non-fossil, namely, renewable energy such as hydro, solar and wind power accounts for 
about 8 % (US Commercial Service, 2013; see also IEA58, 2013). As China’s electric 
power consumption has increased (see Fig.5), its coal consumption has also soared to 
generate electric power. Around 50 % of China’s total coal output has recently been 
used by power industry, and this coal-generated electric power occupies two-thirds of 
China’s total electricity (Tse, 2013, p.8.10). Not only can this huge coal consumption 
harm environment by generating carbon dioxide emissions, but also it can exacerbate 
China’s coal trade dependency on foreign countries.59  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
57 National Bureau of Statistics of China 
58 International Energy Agency 
59 Actually China is the largest coal producer in the world, but its increasing demand for coal made China 
become a net coal importing country (see Tse, 2013). And despite potential risks in excessive using coals, 
its domestic coal demand will not be decreased in a short period of time due to its high profitability and 
advancement of clean coal technology. Still, there is technological limitation to generate enough electric 
power to meet the demand by the alternative sources as well (see Tu, 2011). 
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[Fig. 3] Energy use of China60 and World (kg of oil equivalent per capita)61 
 
 
[Fig. 4] Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total) 
 
 
[Fig. 5] Electric power consumption of China and World (kWh per capita) 
 
 
To overcome this situation, in its 12th Five-Year Plan for 2011-2015 (2011), China set 
the aim of increasing the share of primary energy consumption from non-fossil fuel 
resources to 11.4 % by 2015 and 15 % by 2020. In fact, it seems that this goal can be 
achievable in that China today is already at the second of a renewable energy ranking in 
RECAI index62 conducted by EY (EY, 2014; see also Morales, 2014).63 Harnessing 
                                           
60 Except Hong Kong and Macao SAR (Special administrative region) 
61 Data and Diagram Source of Fig.3-5: World Bank (2014, a;b;c). 
62 Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index 
63 China scored 73.1 out of 100, following 74.4 of the US. 
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natural energy resource of Tibet could contribute to achieving this goal more, while 
there is little evidence that Tibet’s coal reserves are big enough to significantly relieve 
the China’s demand for coal (see Li, et al., 2013). 
 Tibet has ample solar energy resources. Its average sunlight is around 3,000 
hours (ranging from 1,600 to 3,400 hours), and the average annual intensity is about 
6,000 to 8,000 Mj/ , second greatest amount in the world following Sahara (Wang 
and Qiu, 2009, p.2182). In fact, Tibet started using solar energy in the 1980s and it has 
the most solar power generators than any other provinces in China (CNTV, 2012; see 
also Li, 2011). Recently, in Shigatse / Xigaze, one of the biggest solar photovoltaic 
power generation bases has been built as well (Xinhua, 2012; see also Duggan, 2014). 
The PRC government also has a plan to construct more solar energy power stations in 
Tibet, according to its recent Five-Year Plan. 
 Tibet is also rich in wind energy. In general, it is estimated that Tibet’s annual 
wind energy reserves are between 77.3 and 93 billion kilowatt hours (Wang and Qiu, 
2009; see also Xinhua, 2013a). Actually, China is already the world’s biggest generating 
and consuming wind energy country, sharing 26.7 % of the world total wind power 
capacity followed by the US with 21.2 % (GWEC64, 2012). Considering that China has 
recently completed installing World’s highest wind farm built in Tibet with five wind 
turbines (29 more turbines planned) (Xinhua, 2013b), China will continuously develop 
wind energy in the TAR. 
 Hydropower in Tibet may be in the PRC’s greatest interest among the natural 
energy resources of the region. Tibet has abundant water resources with good quality, 
and serves as the headwaters of many of Asia’s rivers – Tsangpo / Brahmaputra, 
Mekong, Salween, Huang He / Yellow and Yangtze. According to Survey conducted by 
the Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, the TAR has around 448.2 billion cubic 
meters of surface water resources that are the highest amount in China (People’s Daily 
Online, 2011a). A former officer of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Li (2005)’s 
book title Tibet’s waters will Save China shows the PRC’s interest in Tibet’s water 
sources very well. Even its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011, emphasis added) clearly states 
that “Develop hydropower actively on the precondition of proper ecological 
conservation and resettlement, focus on the construction of large-sized hydropower 
stations in southwestern China, develop medium and small river waterpower resources 
                                           
64 Global Wind Energy Council 
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based on local conditions, and plan and construct pumped storage power stations 
scientifically.” The plan also indicates that the PRC will “construct large-sized 
hydropower stations in key watersheds, such as those of the Jinsha and Yalong Rivers, 
and commence the construction of hydropower projects with a total installed capacity of 
120 million kW.” Actually, to gain electricity from Tibet’s high altitude water, China has 
already been damming the rivers on the plateau, represented by Dam projects at the 
Yarlung Tsangpo river (known as the Brahmaputra in India) basin, in particular, Zangmu 
Dam. Even though dam construction in this region always generates the severe tension 
with its neighbouring countries, especially with India, the PRC government has 
explicitly and implicitly expressed its desire to construct more dams in the various 
rivers originated from Tibet to secure the hydropower. 
 Not only does the PRC seek electricity from Tibet’s water resources but it wants 
to resolve the water scarcity problem in China. China is facing severe drought and 
desertification problems. It is reported that in China, about 27.46 % land is desertified 
(Yao, 2013; see also Patience, 2011) and the average annual economic loss triggered by 
water scarcity is continuously rising, reached at USD 52.52 billion in 1994 and rose to 
USD 87.5 billion in 2000 (Wang, 2006; see also Tudela, 2012). Especially the water 
shortage in arid northern China is severe (see Tay, 2014; see also Lee, 2011).  
 
[Table. 3] Spatial Distribution of China’s Water Resources and Other Social Variables65 
Basin 
Mean 
Annual 
Surface 
Runoff 
( , %) 
Groundwater 
( , %) 
Total Annual 
water 
Resources 
( , %) 
Population 
(millions, %) 
Arable Land 
(million 
hectares, %) 
Annual per 
Capita 
Water 
Resources 
( ) 
North  334.3 (12.3) 168.9 (20.3) 405.4 (14.4) 520.5 (44.4) 57.4 (59.5) 778.9 
Song-Liao 165.3 (6.1) 62.5 (7.5) 192.8 (6.9) 113.2 (9.6) 19.5 (20.2) 1703.2 
Hai-Luan 28.8 (1.1) 26.5 (3.2) 42.1 (1.5) 117.6 (10.0) 10.8 (11.2) 358.0 
Huai 74.1 (2.7) 39.3 (4.7) 96.1 (3.4) 190.5 (16.2) 14.7 (15.2) 504.5 
Huang 66.1 (2.4) 40.6 (4.9) 74.4 (2.6) 99.2 (8.4) 12.4 (12.9) 750.0 
South 
2260.8 
(83.4) 
591.7 (69.3) 2276.6 (80.9) 627.4 (53.5) 33.5 (34.8) 3628.6 
Yangtze 951.3 (35.1) 246.4 (29.7) 961.3 (34.2) 402.5 (34.3) 22.9 (23.8) 2388.3 
Pearl 468.5 (17.3) 111.6 (13.5) 470.8 (16.7) 141.5 (12.1) 6.5 (6.7) 3327.2 
Southeastern 255.7 (9.4) 61.3 (7.4) 259.2 (9.2) 65.1 (5.6) 2.4 (2.5) 3981.6 
Southwestern 585.3 (21.6) 154.4 (18.6) 585.3 (20.8) 18.3 (1.6) 1.7 (1.8) 31983.6 
Inland 116.4 (4.3) 86.2 (10.4) 130.4 (4.6) 24.7 (2.1) 5.4 (5.6) 5279.4 
Total 2711.5 (100) 828.8 (100) 2812.4 (100) 1172.6 (100) 96.4 (100) 2398.4 
                                           
65 Table source: Xie, 2009, p.46. 
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As Table.3 indicates, a gap between North and South, in terms of water resources, is 
significantly wide. Given that there are many mega-cities including Beijing in northern 
China, it may be crucial for the PRC to resolve this issue to retain the pace of economic 
growth in that varied strategic industries such as mining, refining, steel and high-tech 
industries are located in northern China.66 To do so, China has adopted so-called South-
North Water Transfer Project.  
 
[Fig. 6] South-to-North Water Diversion Project67 
 
 
The project aims to build three artificial canals, namely, central, eastern and western 
routes, to divert water from the Yangzi River to northern part of China. Tibet’s water is 
the subject of western route project planned to be completed by 2050.68 Despite huge 
controversies over project feasibility, environmental issue and international conflict,69 
                                           
66 Especially, it is reported that around 62% of total coal reserves are located in northern China (Veeck, 
2011, p.277). 
67 Diagram Source: The Economist, 2012. 
68 For more details, see Office of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project Commission of the State 
Council. 
69 A cost estimate for the western route is around USD 36 billion, more than double the cost for the other 
two projects (pearce, 2007, p.220), and owing to this economic issue as well as technical difficulty, there 
have been severe controversies over the western project. China’s neighbouring countries such as India and 
Bangladesh have expressed serious concerns over this project because of potential reduced water flows as 
well (see Freeman, 2010).  
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the PRC is showing firm willingness to continue this project. Zhang Jiyao, former 
Director of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project Commission Office, expressed 
that “Western route of water transfer project very much possible” (He, 2012). This 
clearly shows that how much China is interested in, or obsessed with Tibet’s water 
resources to keep its socio-economic development in northern part.  
 Unlike the mineral and other natural resources, water resources in Tibet are 
greatly of interest to India because its northeastern region, which is densely populated, 
depends on the Brahmaputra River whose origin is in southwestern Tibet. As Chellaney 
(2007) argues, “[W]ater shortages in much of Asia are beginning to threaten rapid 
economic modernization.” To secure water resources, India, like China, also has 
conducted various water projects such as building dams and reservoirs in throughout the 
Brahmaputra River (see Vidal, 2013). Indeed, New Delhi is very ambitious to build 
dams on India’s future powerhouse, the Brahmaputra – to date, more than 160 big and 
small dams have been planned, which is expected to generate around 60,000 MW of 
electricity (Cooke, 2014). Tibet’s water resources are a matter of utmost importance to 
plan and operate such projects in that Tibet is the origin of the harnessed waters. India is 
particularly concerned about China’s actions and plans to build dams in Tibet as these 
kinds of massive dam projects can seriously reduce water flows in the Yarlung Tsangpo 
/ Brahmaputra and harm ecological environment of downstream areas (see Denyer, 
2013). In early 2013, Chinese government announced that they will construct three 
more dams (Dagu, Jiacha and Jiexu) on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra River in 
Tibet (see Krishnan, 2013; see also The Economic Times, 2013a). As Pomeranz (2009) 
claimed, “[T]he potential for such a project (damming the rivers) to create conflicts 
between China and India… is gigantic.” Even though China and India have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Trans-border Rivers every five years since 
2002, the mistrust and tension on this issue between the two countries remain 
unresolved. India wants more data and information on China’s plans on the rivers (See 
Gupta, 2013), China manifests dissatisfaction with India as it regards “[I]ndian threat-
mongering over water resource disputes” as “dangerous fantasy” (Zhifei, 2013, see also 
Hussain, 2013). In 2010, in spite of India’s opposition, China pushed ahead with the 
construction of the Zangmu dam though the MoU in 2008 was still in effect. Also, the 
two countries renewed the MoU in October 2013, but it is still nonbinding and the 
agreed points are not specific at all but very broad and equivocal. 
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- Both sides agreed that cooperation on trans-border rivers will further enhance mutual 
strategic trust and communication as well as strengthen the strategic and cooperative 
partnership. 
 
- The Chinese side agreed to extend the data provision period of the Yarlung Tsangpo / 
Brahmaputra River… The two sides shall implement this in accordance with related 
Implementation Plan. The Indian side expressed appreciation to the Chinese side in this 
regard. 
 
- The two sides agreed to further strengthen cooperation on trans-border rivers, cooperate 
through the existing Expert Level Mechanism on provision of flood-season hydrological 
data and emergency management, and exchange views on other issues of mutual interest.  
(Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (MEA), 2013, emphasis added) 
 
Above is part of the MoU between China and India in 2013.70 There are no specific 
details and definitions about the terms such as “data provision” and “emergency 
management.” These terms can be interpreted differently depending on the 
circumstances and actors. Also, this MoU lacks detailed plans and concrete measures to 
achieve the goals that the two countries agreed, for example, “enhancing mutual 
strategic trust and communication”; “strengthening the strategic and cooperative 
partnership”; and “exchanging views on the issues of mutual interest.” These are all 
about a pure political spin. Considering the fact that the disputes over this issue between 
the two governments have been intensified since 2002, the year their first MoU was 
agreed, it is questionable for India if this MoU can be a substantive legal basis upon 
which to prevent China’s dam projects. However, India’s pursuit of interest in Tibet’s 
water resources will continue as it is not just only a matter of economic interest but also 
that of survival. 
 Tibet’s tourist resources can also draw China and India’s interest. Especially, 
China’s investment on tourism business in Tibet seems to be very aggressive. Even 
recently, China opened Daocheng Yading airport in the TAR, world’s highest airport, to 
promote for tourism (The Guardian, 2013). Indeed, the PRC promotes its achievement 
in tourism business in Tibet very actively.  
 
                                           
70 Full content of the MoU is available at MEA, 2013. 
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[Table. 4] Number of Tourists and Foreign Earnings in Tibet (China)71 
Year 
Number of 
Tourists 
Number of 
Overseas 
visitors 
Arrivals 
Foreigners 
Number of 
Civil 
Tourists 
Total 
Tourism 
Revenue 
(10,000 
yuan) 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Earnings 
(USD  
10,000) 
(1) 1981 8,624 2,056 2,005 6,568 258 171 
(2) 1986 87,968 31,000 29,553 56,968 2,970 620 
(3) 1987 127,554 108,750 42,889 18,804 5,600 800 
(4) 1988 103,255 56,293 21,835 46,962 6,229 700 
(5) 1989 29,833 8,287 3,341 21,546 3,726 222 
(6) 1990 23,954 6,654 9,842 17,300 684 145 
(7) 1991 117,169 38,286 14,768 78,883 5,069 770 
(8) 2007 4,029,438 365,370 338,744 3,664,068 485,160 13,529 
(9) 2008 2,246,447 67,997 62,934 2,178,450 225,865 3,112 
(10) 2009 5,610,630 174,910 162,458 5,435,720 559,870 7,873 
(11) 2011 8,697,605 270,785 249,026 8,426,820 970,568 12,963 
(12) 2012 10,583,869 194,933 174,631 10,388,936 1,264,788 10,570 
(13) 2013 
(estimate) 
12.91 
million 
223,000 - - 
16.51 
billion yuan 
- 
 
Based on statistical data conducted by government-controlled bureau, China emphasises 
the increasing number of tourists and infrastructure development in Tibet. Indeed, as 
shown in the lines (1) to (12), the number of total visitors in Tibet has gradually been 
increasing and so has been tourism income year by year.72 Estimates for the year 2013 
also indicate that the total number of visitors jumped around 22 % from 2012, and the 
total revenues increased by 30.6 % from 2012 as well (Xinhua 2014). The data and 
China’s promotion on tourism in Tibet may show that China is interested in fostering 
tourism in the region. Also, aside from Tibet’s historical and cultural assets to attract 
domestic and foreign tourists, China, in its 12th Five-year Plan, states that “[W]e will 
comprehensively develop domestic tourism… we will comprehensively promote eco-
tourism, encourage in-depth development of cultural tourism…” Given that Tibet is one 
of the most eco-friendly sites within the Chinese-controlled areas, Tibet can be the best 
option for the PRC to bring the expected results. 
 India also benefits from cultural and religious tourism related to Tibet. By 
holding the biggest Tibetan refugee population and the Dalai Lama, India attracts many 
domestic and international visitors as indicated before. It is even very difficult to 
                                           
71 Data Source: Lines (1)-(12) are from Tibet Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics & Tibet General 
Term of Investigation under the NBS, 2013; and National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013. Line (13) is 
from Xinhua, 2014. 
72 The years of 1989 and 2008 show a downward tendency, maybe because of Tibetan unrest.  
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calculate exactly how many people visit India to go to Dharamsala and other Tibet-
related Buddhist holy places. Whatever the purposes are, namely tourism, research, 
study or meditation, it is clear that significant number of people visit India and spend 
their money in the land of India. Given that one of the biggest industries of India is 
tourism,73 Tibetans certainly contributes to India’s economy to some extent (see Hurber, 
2008). 
 In view of Tibet’s economic factors, it is undeniable that the PRC has bigger 
interest in Tibet than India as it shares majority of the Tibetan Plateau. In terms of 
mineral resources and other natural energy resources such as solar and wind energy, 
India cannot take any actions to take them other than invasion of the region, which will 
hardly occur – it is difficult to argue that Tibet has such a big economic asset to drive 
India to bring on war with China; and it is also doubtful if India has enough capacity to 
break the present order of the region, where there are many other stakeholders such as 
Pakistan and the U.S. are involved.  
 However, water resources of Tibet are different. As stated above, it seems clear 
that water resources are one of the critical matters affecting their relations. With the 
waters, both countries eager to generate electricity as well as resolve water shortage 
problem. China obviously has the initiative in the negotiations over the water resources 
as it holds the source / upstream of the rivers, especially that of Yarlung Tsangpo / 
Brahmaputra, flowing into India. Yet, India has not presented practical solution and plan 
to secure the waters from China. MoUs between China and India are not legally binding, 
lacking concrete and detailed regulations of enforcement. To date, India’s concern about 
the water resources from Tibet has been a matter of anxiety. However, this can change 
into threat if the negotiation over the Tibet’s waters cannot result in any practical and 
concrete outcomes. That is to say, this aspect can be the biggest thorn in the future of 
the Sino-Indian relations.  
 Tibet, however, could also give an opportunity to build amicable economic 
relations between the two countries. Developing the trade routes that traverse Tibet 
between China and India can boost their economic cooperation (see Karackattu, 2013). 
Since China and India have modernised transportation system throughout the region, 
new overland trade market can become more viable. Actually China and India, in 1954, 
signed the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region” and the trade 
                                           
73 According to The World Travel & Tourism Council (2014, p.1), India’s total contribution of Travel and 
Tourism to GDP was INR 6,631.6bn (6.2 % of GDP) in 2013 and is forecast to rise by 7.3 % in 2014. 
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agencies and banks of both parties were established (see MEA, 1954). However, after 
1962 China-India border conflict, the majority of trade routes including the Nathu La 
pass74 which runs between India’s Sikkim and Yadong county in TAR were blocked, 
until the “Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade” was signed on 1st 
July 1992 (see Lintner, 2015, p.251). And eventually, in 2006, based on the 
Memorandum signed in 2003 (see MEA, 2003), reopening of the Nathu La pass was 
agreed by the both parties (Zhigang, 2006). According to the two governments, the trade 
volume will reach USD 100 billion by 2015 (Patranobis, 2015). And aside from the 
economic aspect, it is also expected that the pass will act as a symbol of cultural and 
religious exchanges between the two countries (see The Hindu, 2015; see also NDTV, 
2014). However, still limited products (29 items from India and 15 goods from China) 
have been allowed as a registered trade (see Karackattu, 2013, p.697; see also 
Patranobis, 2015) and both countries suspect each other that the routes can be abused 
for impure purposes (see Bhaumik, 2013). Also, especially, India is concerned about an 
influx of Tibetan refugee through the Nathu La pass. Pushpita Das (2006), associate 
fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) of India, indicated that: 
 
The people of Sikkim are also apprehensive that opening of the border pass would lead to a 
massive influx of Tibetan refugees. There is simmering resentment among the people of Sikkim 
towards the Tibetans… Since the Tibetans were better educated compared to the local Bhutias, they 
were able to grab top positions in government as well as in other economic and social spheres… A 
substantial influx of Tibetan refugees can also have adverse political implications. Sikkim is a 
small state… Even a small addition of Tibetans to the voter’s list can alter the political destiny of 
the state… Complacency in guarding the borders can cost us dearly… India should be prepared to 
meet the challenges it might pose in maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the strategically 
sensitive border regions. (emphasis added) 
 
Without establishing the mutual trust, Tibet as a new place for the major trade between 
China and India will not be developed and realised in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
74 There is no accurate statistics, but it is believed that around 80 per cent of China-India border trade 
happened through the Nathu La pass. 
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Security and Geopolitical Factors 
 
China and India share a border in Tibet, and yet, there are no definite national 
boundaries that are mutually agreed. Each side draws different lines – while New Delhi 
claims that disputed border between China and India covers around 4,000 km, Beijing 
argues that there is only 2,000 km shared land border (The Economic Times, 2013b; see 
also Zhang and Li, 2013, p.2).  
 
[Fig. 7] China, India Disputed Borders75 
 
 
Even though old concept of Tibet as an independent buffer state may be no longer 
meaningful as the PRC’s control over the region is becoming more stable, Tibet’s 
geographic location and ongoing security and geopolitical issues are still, or more 
strongly, attracting both states’ interests. In this part, Tibet’s security and geopolitical 
implications for China and India that affect their relations are explored. 
 When it comes to explaining Tibet’s geographic implications, an average 
elevation of the Tibetan Plateau must be discussed.   
 
                                           
75 Diagram source: Curtis and Cheng, 2011. 
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[Fig. 8] Elevation Map of the Tibetan Plateau76 
 
 
With an average elevation of 4,000-5,000 m, the Plateau itself is a formidable buffer vis-
à-vis any external forces. Major infantry troops cannot easily cross this terrain and 
securing a supply route is never easy. The PRC, who controls the region, can benefit 
from this aspect. Tibet shares four international borders with Bhutan, India, Myanmar 
and Nepal. From a military standpoint, possessing Tibet is highly advantageous to 
defend the own territory from these neighbouring countries.77 The Tibetan Plateau 
offers highly effective natural concealment and obstacles to prevent or delay military 
movement. Given that the PRC already secures and develops key terrains on the Plateau 
by placing military bases and constructing rails, roads and airports, it is very difficult for 
the other forces to attack China via the Tibetan Plateau.  
 This relatively stable condition can also allow the PRC to focus on the other 
border areas. China has 14 land borders and 5 maritime borders (see China Briefing, 
2014).78 Especially, tensions surrounding the maritime borders have seriously increased. 
China already has had territorial disputes in the South China Sea with the countries 
including Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. The 
Senkaku / Diaoyu islands dispute is becoming more contentious, and China’s imposition 
of new air defence zone has made another conflict with Japan and South Korea who are 
strong U.S. allies (see Harlan, 2013). Defending maritime borders and coastal areas is 
obviously one of the greatest defence priorities of China in the sense that China’s 
economy is highly dependent on relatively prosperous coastal regions. 
 
 
 
                                           
76 Diagram source: Yin, 2006. 
77 About the military aspects of terrain and Military Terrain Analysis, see Department of the Army, 2003. 
78 China shares land borders with Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. It shares maritime borders with 
two Koreas, Japan, Taiwan and Philippines. 
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[Table. 5] China’s 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) & Composition of GDP by 
Region79 
(composition of GDP = 100) 
Region 
GDP 
(¥100m) 
Primary 
industry 
Secondary industry Tertiary Industry 
 
Industry Construction 
 
Transport, 
Storage / Post 
Whole Sale & 
Retail Trade 
Beijing 17801 0.8 22.8 18.5 4.3 76.4 4.4 12.8 
Tianjin 12885.2 1.3 51.7 47.5 4.2 47 5.6 13 
Hebei 26575 12 52.7 47.1 5.6 35.3 8.4 7.5 
Shanxi 12112.8 5.8 57.9 52 5.8 36.4 6.6 8.1 
Inner Mongolia 15988.3 9.1 56.5 49.8 6.7 34.5 7.3 8.7 
Liaoning 24801.3 8.7 53.8 47.2 6.6 37.5 5.2 8.9 
Jilin 11937.8 11.8 53.4 46.8 6.6 34.8 3.9 8.2 
Heilongjiang 13691.6 15.4 47.2 41.3 5.8 37.4 4.3 8.7 
Shanghai 20101.3 0.6 39.4 35.6 3.7 60 4.5 16.4 
Jiangsu 54058.2 6.3 50.2 44.2 5.9 43.5 4.3 11 
Zhejiang 34606.3 4.8 50 44.3 5.7 45.1 3.7 10.7 
Anhui 17212.1 12.7 54.6 46.6 8 32.7 3.8 7 
Fujian 19701.8 9 52.2 43.9 8.3 38.8 5.6 8.4 
Jiangxi 12948.5 11.7 53.8 45.2 8.6 34.5 4.4 7.3 
Shandong 50013.2 8.6 51.5 45.6 5.9 40 5.2 12.7 
Henan 29810.1 12.7 57.1 51.5 5.6 30.3 3.6 6 
Hubei 22250.2 12.8 50.3 43.8 6.5 36.9 4.2 7.6 
Hunan 22154.2 13.6 47.4 41.3 6.2 39 4.9 8.4 
Guangdong 57067.9 5 48.8 45.4 3.3 46.2 4.1 11.1 
Guangxi 13031 16.7 48.6 41.2 7.4 34.7 5.1 7.1 
Hainan 2855.3 24.9 28.1 18.3 9.9 46.9 4.7 10.8 
Chongqing 11459 8.2 53.9 45.2 8.7 37.9 4.5 7.4 
Sichuan 23849.8 13.8 52.8 45.3 7.5 33.4 3 5.6 
Guizhou 6802.2 13.1 39 32.3 6.8 47.9 10.1 7.6 
Yunnan 10309.8 16 42.9 33.5 9.4 41.1 2.3 10.4 
Tibet 695.6 11.6 34.7 7.9 26.8 53.7 3.5 5.5 
Shanxi 14451.2 9.5 55.9 47.4 8.5 34.6 4.3 8.3 
Gansu 5650.2 13.8 46 36.7 9.3 40.2 5.7 7.1 
Qinghai 1884.5 9.4 57.9 47.5 10.4 32.7 3.8 5.8 
Ningxia 2326.6 8.6 49.8 37.8 12 41.6 8.4 5.3 
Xinjiang 7466.3 17.7 47.7 39.2 8.4 34.6 4.5 5.5 
※ Note: The indices in this table are calculated at prices of 2013 
 
As shown in the Table.5, coastal regions such as Guangdong (57067.9), Jiangsu 
(54058.2), Shandong (50013.2) and Zhejiang (34606.3) show far higher figures in GDP 
than those of the Western provinces including Tibet (695.6), Qinghai (1884.5), Gansu 
(5650.2) and Xinjiang (7466.3). Also, industries of eastern China generally consist of 
                                           
79 Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013.  
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those of secondary and Tertiary that are usually regarded as a high value-added business. 
In this regard, it can be argued that security of these coastal areas is China’s core 
interest. This situation may be one of the important reasons for China’s rising military 
spending. The PRC government recently revealed its plans to increase defence budget 
by 12.2 % to around USD 132 billion 2014, which is the highest growth rate since 2011 
(Zhu, 2014; see also Martina and Torode, 2014). Under this circumstance, Tibet’s “great 
wall” obviously lessens China’s strategic as well as financial burdens. Tibet’s terrain 
allows China to deploy a missile depence system effectively, and it may be enough to 
contain its neighbours, especially India. Since China already has the Qinghai-Tibet 
Railway and airports in Tibet, there is no serious problem in military logistics as well.  
 Tibet also can serve as a buffer zone between eastern China and its 
southwestern adjacent powers. The social and economic gap between China’s east and 
west is very wide. Even though annual growth of the western regions is about 12 %, 
which is higher than the national average thanks to the PRC government’s aggressive 
investment, it is mostly state-owned companies who benefit from such development and 
investment (Richburg, 2010; see also Xinhua, 2010). As indicated in Table.6 below, still 
western China is far behind than the east in which the capital city, Beijing, is located 
and important infrastructures and facilities are concentrated. While eastern provinces 
account for 51.3 % of the China’s total GDP, Western regions only share 19.8 % by 
2012. By possessing the large and high Tibetan Plateau, the PRC government can 
maintain security of eastern China from the other countries of China’s southwest, such 
as India, Nepal and Vietnam. 
 
[Table. 6] GDP Comparison between Eastern and Western China in 201280 
(CNY 100 million) 
 
(1) Eastern 10 Provinces and Cities (2) Western 12 Provinces 
 
Proportion of the 
Total GDP in 
China 
 
Proportion of the 
Total GDP in 
China 
GDP 
(Region) 
295665.3 51.3 113914.6 19.8 
※ Note: (1) Eastern provinces (municipalities) include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan. (2) Western provinces (Regions and municipalities) 
include Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. 
 
 
                                           
80 Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013. 
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India actually cannot get many advantages from the Tibet’s terrain and geography 
discussed so far, as it does not control any significant parts of the Tibetan Plateau. India 
may certainly recognise its disadvantages with the presence of Chinese power at higher 
altitude in the Tibetan Plateau (see Chaudhury, 2013). To overcome the difficulties, New 
Delhi even built three major military airports close to the Tibetan Plateau in 2008 (see 
Chang, 2008). However, despite such effort, it seems that India is still struggling to deal 
with China’s occasional incursions81 through the Tibet (see The Times of India, 2014b, 
2014c; see also BBC, 2013b; Loiwal, 2013; The Hindu, 2013). In this situation, 
discussion on India’s soft power and security of Himalayan border region has surfaced. 
 As India hosts the largest Tibetan diaspora community and Dalai Lama, it has 
obtained good, at least better, image compared to China domestically as well as 
internationally. Also, one important point is that Dalai Lama’s presence means the 
flourishing of Tibetan Buddhism. According to Gautam, et al. (2012), 
 
After the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, it is possible that the movement will fizzle out or 
splinter. It may lack the charismatic leadership of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, but 
Buddhism will certainly survive. This suggests that instead of treating it as a leadership 
issue, we need to reinforce the institutionalisation of the faith. A Tibet with its indigenous 
people provides greater security to India than Hanised Tibet. (pp.13-14, emphasis added) 
 
This means that Tibetan Buddhism can contribute to securing a stable imagined border 
by promoting religious faith and power to Buddhists as well as religious people living in 
Himalayan (Tibetan) border area. This argument seems plausible in that people cannot 
fully enjoy religious freedom in China. Furthermore, it should be noted that 14th Dalai 
Lama is considered as the symbol of the non-violence by international communities. 
China’s hard line policy against Dalai Lama worries many people in India and other 
countries. India obviously benefits from this concern as it has provided Dalai Lama with 
shelter, which has enhanced its soft power. 
 Actually the concept of soft power was developed by Joseph Nye (see Nye, 
2011; see also 2005). He argued that “on an increasing number of issues in the twenty-
first century, war is not the ultimate arbiter” (p.9). He also claimed that “outcomes are 
shaped not merely by whose army wins but also by whose story wins” (p.19). It can be 
                                           
81 India has accused China of launching an incursion in Indian territories many times, but China has 
denied such military actions (see BBC, 2013c). 
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argued that India’s stories with Tibet certainly enough to shape and improve India’s soft 
power vis-à-vis China. With the soft power, India expects security improvement in 
Himalayan border regions especially in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Ladakh thanks 
to pro-India Tibetan exiles and residents of those areas (see Moynihan, 2014; see also 
Dellios and Ferguson, 2011). Anand (2013) clearly argues this aspect: 
 
India cannot retract its recognition of Tibet as part of China’s sovereignty. But India 
should recognise the importance of Tibetans for India’s security. Security in the 
Himalayan borderlands does not come only from only a military build-up in which India 
cannot surpass China, or new border infrastructure, but also from the pro-India sentiments 
of its inhabitants. That pro-India sentiment arises from the significance of India for 
Tibetans. India must closely study the uncertainties of the post-Dalai Lama scenario while 
continuing to support and provide hospitable space to all Tibetan Buddhist leaders. 
(Anand, 2013, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, for India, promoting soft power can be an effective long-term strategy to improve 
security situation in border area touching the Tibetan Plateau. As the issues on Tibet 
obviously contribute to enhancing India’s soft power, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Tibet is in India’s security interest.  
 It is India’s interest to boost its soft power to secure its Himalayan border area 
by giving space to Tibetan exiles and Dalai Lama, and at the same time, it is China’s 
interest to strengthen domestic social integrity by possessing Tibet. The PRC is trying to 
(re) unify its 56 ethnic groups including Han and Tibetan to realise “one-China” policy. 
Although China’s control over those minority regions is fairly stable despite frequent 
unrest situations, minorities on the periphery, especially those in peripheral regions such 
as Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang resist the Han PRC’s rule. Not only can the 
disintegration of these areas threaten China’s physical security, losing geographical 
barriers, but also it would harm internal integrity. Given that federalism based on full 
regional sovereignty is not an option for the PRC as it is contradictory to its philosophy 
and practice of one-China policy, it may need coherent social integrity with other 
effective ways of control over those areas, that is, consolidating Han dominance and 
control power.  
 Strong nationalistic Han Chinese help the PRC consolidate control power in 
minority areas. Actually, many Han Chinese are already living in those regions and a 
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large number of Han Chinese continuously migrates to those places – many of them are 
encouraged by Chinese government.  
 
[Table. 7] Population by Selected Nationalities in TAR, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, 201082 
Region Population 
Tibet 3,002,165 
Han Tibetan 
Actual Number Ratio (%) Actual Number Ratio (%) 
245,263 8.17 2,716,388 90.48 
Xinjiang 21,815,815 
Han Uyghur 
Actual Number Ratio (%) Actual Number Ratio (%) 
8,829,994 40.48 10,001,302 45.84 
Inner 
Mongolia 
24,706,291 
Han Mongolian 
Actual Number Ratio (%) Actual Number Ratio (%) 
19,650,665 79.54 4,226,090 17.11 
※ Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places. 
 
Table.7 shows that in Xinjiang, the number of Han Chinese is almost the same with that 
of Uyghur, whose people are mostly living in Xinjiang Autonomous region. Inner 
Mongolian case is more astonishing. Mongolians only account for 17.11 % which is far 
lower than Han population ratio with 79.54 % – even they worry that their nation will 
vanish in the near future because of the ceaseless Han migration (Patience, 2014).83 
Interestingly, Han population in the TAR accounts for 8.17 %, far lower than the other 
autonomous regions. The reason for this may vary – omission of the number of seasonal 
residents (see Fischer, 2008); intended or unintended data error84 (see Sehgal, 2014); 
and poor living standard and harsh environment. It also can be assumed that China’s 
interest vis-à-vis Tibet is less than that in Xinjiang and Inner-Mongolia. In particular, 
economically, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, for the PRC, could be more appealing than 
Tibet as both areas are known as a huge verified repository of high-value mineral 
resources, especially coal that is China’s most needed commodity, hardly found at Tibet 
(see Aden, Fridley and Zheng, 2009). Xinjiang is also a gateway of China’s gas 
pipelines from Russia and Central Asia countries including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan producing around 28.2 % of the world’s gas by 2012 (see BP, 2013). 
 However, when it comes to Han dominance and the PRC’s control power in the 
TAR, the above assumption can be rejected if population distribution and economic 
structure are considered. 
                                           
82 Data source: Population Census Office under the State Council, 2010, Table 1-6. 
83 For the detailed information on this Han domination phenomenon in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, see 
Fischer, 2008. 
84 Potential data manipulation issue will be discussed later. 
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[Table. 8] Urban-Rural Distribution of the Population in TAR, 201085 
(% (T) = Percent of total population; % (N) = Percent of nationality located in) 
 
Cities Towns Rural Areas 
Number % (T) % (N) Number % (T) % (N) Number % (T) % (N) 
Han (a) 99,084 36.38 40.40 (b) 99,683 24.42 40.64 (c) 46,496 2.00 18.96 
Tibetan (d) 165,778 60.88 6.10 (e) 297,719 72.92  10.96 (f) 2,252,891 97.04 82.94 
Others 7,460 2.74 18.41 10865 2.66 26.82 22189 0.96 54.77 
Total 272,322 408,267 2,321,576 
※ Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places. 
(1) Total Han population in the TAR= 245,263 (a+b+c). 
(2) Total Tibetan population in the TAR = 2,716,388 (d+e+f). 
 
At a glance, Tibetans in the TAR are majority in every sector. Thus, it can be argued that 
Han domination in the TAR is not strong enough (see Hao, 2000). However, this may 
not be true. As it is shown in the Table.8, majority of Han people in the TAR, more than 
81 % of the total, is living in urban (cities and towns) areas. Only around 19 % of Han 
Chinese is in rural areas. On the contrary of this, around 83 % of Tibetans are rural 
residents, and only around 17 % is in urban areas. Even Tibetan presence in urban areas 
is concentrated in towns than in cities. Actually, this tendency has been being continued 
since 2000.  
 
[Table. 9] Urban-Rural Distribution of the Population by Han and Tibetans in TAR, 
200086 
% (N) = Percent of nationality located in 
 
Han Tibetan 
Population % (N) Population % (N) 
Cities 69,799 44.02 141,551 5.83 
Towns 56,270 35.48 227,606 9.38 
Rural 32,501 20.50 2,058,011 84.79 
Total 158,570 2,427,168 
※ Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places. Total population of the TAR in 
2000 is 2,616,329. Ratio of Han of the total is 6.06 %, that of Tibetan is 92.77 %.  
 
It seems that there has been no major change in terms of urban-rural distribution, but the 
data clearly show that between 2000 and 2010, urban population of Han Chinese in the 
TAR has increased by around 1.5 %, whereas Tibetan urban population has decreased 
by 1.8 %. Most notably, the 2010 figure represents an increase of 29,285 Han People 
                                           
85 Data source: Population Census Office under the State Council, 2010, Table 1-6b, c, d.  
86 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2000, Table 1-6b, c, d. 
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and 24,227 Tibetans in cities since 2000, respectively. The total Tibetan population in 
cities heavily outnumbers than Han population, but the pace of increasing population of 
Tibetan is rather slower than that of Han. This tendency is only found in the case of 
cities. That is to say, there must be a big influx of Han people into Tibetan cities from 
outside. Actually there has been a great deal of reports on economic dominance of Han 
people in urban areas of the TAR – Han businesspeople occupy a large portion of 
secondary and tertiary industries, in particular (see Wong, 2010). According to Table.9 
above, Tibet’s composition of GDP is highly concentrated in tertiary industries with 
53.7 % of total. This figure is the third-highest ratio in China, following Beijing 76.4 % 
and Shanghai with 60 %. It is surprising that more than half share of industrial 
outcomes results from tertiary businesses considering Tibet’s economic backwardness. 
Without a state-planned initial big investment, this phenomenon can hardly happen in 
such physically harsh areas. Actually, a large share of investment of the TAR, 66.62 % 
(see Table.10), is being used in the state-owned units.  
 
[Table. 10] Total Investment in Fixed Assets in TAR, 201287 
(10,000 yuan) 
Index Total 
State-owned 
Units 
Collective 
owned Units 
Individuals 
Other Types 
of 
Ownership 
Investment 7,099,822 4,730,059 147,424 320,375 1,901,964 
Ratio 100 66.62 2.08 4.51 26.79 
※ Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places. Other types of ownership refer to 
the types of ownership other than state-owned units, collective-owned units and individuals, including 
joint-owned economic units, shareholding economic units, foreign-funded economic units, economic 
units funded by the entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, etc. 
 
These things clearly indicate that Tibet’s economy is mostly driven by government-
supported Han Chinese who control majority of secondary and tertiary sectors; and of 
course generally pro-government as well. Therefore, it is evident that no matter what the 
actual number of population is, Han dominance and the strong PRC’s influence 
undoubtedly exist in the TAR.  
 This dominance does not simply mean economic dominance. It should be 
interpreted as the PRC’s intention of bolstering social and political stability with 
dominant Han people. As indicated above, presence of nationalistic and pro-government 
Han Chinese greatly supports the PRC’s control over the region. Even though there 
                                           
87 Tibet Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics & Tibet General Term of Investigation under the NBS, 
2013 
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might not be many Han Chinese outnumbering Tibetans, the control power of the PRC 
is very vivid thanks to the growing subordination of the Tibetan economy to that of Han. 
In this regard, it can be argued that the PRC is highly interested in consolidating stable 
status of Tibet.  
 Security and geopolitical concerns between China and India are mostly related 
Tibet as they share land borders in the Tibetan Plateau. Tibet is also related to their 
internal security affairs as well. After the Dalai Lama’s exile and the Sino-Indian war in 
1962, Tibet had been regarded as an India’s bargaining chip vis-à-vis China. It is, 
however, questionable whether this aspect is still meaningful to explain the relations 
between Beijing and New Delhi considering India’s trade dependency on China and 
surging economic and military influence of China on the Tibetan Plateau. India virtually 
cannot take any strong actions vis-à-vis the PRC with Tibet card physically and 
politically. India’s military build-up surrounding the region can hardly overtake that of 
China given their overall economic gap and military budget. India also has a similar 
question to China – Kashmir. India would not be willing to have a zero-sum game (from 
a state perspective) with the PRC, criticising or blaming each other for human rights and 
minority issues. This may be why many analysts and scholars emphasise the importance 
of soft power strengthened by Tibetan and Buddhist settlements in India. In the 
circumstance that the possibility of a war between China and India is significantly low 
as their priority seems economic development, enhancing soft power for securing 
Himalayan border area can be a great strategy for India in that it could help overcome 
its military inferiority to China and allow New Delhi to get more international 
recognition and respect.  
 Tibet also greatly helps the PRC draw up a security and geopolitical plan as the 
TAR itself is an excellent line of defence of China’s southwestern border. Also, by 
increasing military armaments and having military drills (see China Military, 2010; see 
also The Times of India, 2013), the PRC is reinforcing the security of the border areas in 
the Tibetan Plateau much more. Presence of Pakistan, India’s enemy state, near Tibet 
also helps China contain India’s any kinds of potential military provocations in the 
region. In this regard, even if China could face local and limited war with India in the 
region due to the unsettled border areas, major warfare in the Tibetan Plateau between 
the two countries can hardly occur. Actually, China’s anxiety and suspicion vis-à-vis 
India with the Tibet issues mostly come from Dalai Lama’s presence in India. At the 
same, or higher, level with the physical security issue, the PRC is concerned about 
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Tibet’s implication on its domestic integrity. China’s perception of India and Dalai 
Lama might be: without India’s help, Dalai Lama cannot freely spread his middle way 
approach internationally. This means that while China is confident about its physical 
security affairs vis-à-vis India to a large extent, it cannot get rid of doubt and suspicion 
about India with regard to the Tibet issues, especially those related to Dalai Lama. As a 
method to weaken such potential India’s strategy to use Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles; 
and secure domestic integrity that is expected to be hardly swayed, the PRC has 
attempted to strengthen its control power in the TAR by supporting state-owned 
businesses controlled by Han Chinese. The PRC would believe that in the long term, the 
TAR will be much more stabilised thanks to Han dominance in the economic and 
political sectors.  
 
Problems of Rationalist Approach to China and India’s National 
Interest vis-à-vis Tibet 
 
So far, this chapter has examined Tibet’s various factors that can attract China and 
India’s interests and how such interests affect their relations. Rationalist perspective on 
this issue greatly helps draw overall and clear picture by focusing on visible aspects – 
economy, security and geopolitics. Thanks to its theoretical parsimony assuming that 
seeking such objective variables are natural, rationalism lends a clear framework to 
analyse China and India’s actions and attitude towards the Tibet issues. However, it 
should be noted that fundamental rationalist assumption on the rationale behind the 
actors’ behaviours to seek and maximise the interests has its own weak points (see 
chapter 2). Also, the situation has usually been oversimplified and few differences have 
been found among the analyses of this topic. The most importantly, little has been done 
to reflect on the potential problems and counter-evidence that can refute long-used and 
trusted data as well as assumptions. Here, this chapter attempts to refute the above 
rationalist analysis of China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet and their 
relations. 
 First thing that must be dealt with is that there are not enough detailed and 
concrete data on this issue. Evidence that can explain actors’ rationality to maximise 
what they believe to be the best interests is usually weak. To take an example, data on 
Tibet’s mineral resources are vague, just depending on the estimates. Actually exact data 
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on proved reserves of minerals in Tibet are hardly found, whereas estimated amount of 
mineral deposits shows fairly high figures. As indicated above, when it comes to Tibet’s 
mineral resources, survey data conducted by China’s Ministry of Land and Resources 
are used in general. However, even though the survey began in 1999 and presented the 
broad estimates in 2007, further survey data that go beyond such estimates have not 
been published by the ministry yet. Also, it is almost impossible to realise if the 
estimated reserves have enough economic feasibility (Kim, et al., 2008). To date, there 
has been little significant commercial production in this sector as well (Reuters, 2008). 
Most studies in this topic have depended on this kind of potential for high value 
minerals of Tibet. Considering the vagueness of the data, it is highly questionable 
whether it is a right approach to conjecture and evaluate the actors’, especially China’s, 
pursuit of interests with regard to Tibet depending on the current data of Tibet’s mineral 
resources. 
 Relate to the problem of specific data shortages, scholars in this field also have 
overly depended on speculation when it comes to analysing China and India’s interests. 
Argument on India’s Himalayan belt security and soft power cannot be free from this 
criticism. The beliefs of soft power and Himalayan belt secured by Tibetan Buddhism 
suffer from lack of practical evidence. It is still a mere speculation at best. Researches 
on how those who are living in the regions think of the Tibet issue and Buddhism are 
quantitatively and qualitatively very weak. Many questions remain unanswered: how 
many people in those areas have knowledge about the Tibet issue?; how much are they 
sensitive to the issue?; and how much has the issue is significantly discussed by those 
who actually reside in Himalayan border areas? Actually, explanation on India’s interest 
in this issue is purely from the state perspective and oversimplified. The research on 
how discourse on Himalayan belt security potentially strengthened by Tibetan culture 
and Buddhism can be formed and developed into the concept of interest has to be 
conducted. 
 Furthermore, for India, to boost the security situation in Himalayan border areas, 
it may be difficult to give any preferential treatment to Tibetans considering the fact that 
there are many other refugees and similar issues in India. This means that there is a 
possibility of causing fairness problem. Given that there is no visible cooperation, 
mutual understanding and emotional sympathy among refugee groups in India, if a 
particular minority group receives a better treatment or elicit a meaningful policy 
implication, other minority groups would not just welcome and congratulate the 
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minority on that success. India might be concerned about the potential situation that 
other minorities, especially Kashmiri people, become more active to take a better 
position. In this regard, the relationship between Himalayan border security and Tibet 
could not be regarded as clear outcome of India’s pursuit of interest in Tibet, but 
speculative mirage, until now. 
 Analysis of Tibet’s ample solar and wind energy, with exaggeration, may be 
speculative as well. The picture that the PRC is surely interested in Tibet’s natural 
energy resources needs to be more specific. Due to Tibet’s high-altitude terrain and 
harsh environment, still around 30 % of the wind and solar power has not been 
connected to the grid yet (see Lee, et al., 2011; see also Duggan, 2014). Despite China’s 
effort and investment, the pace of the connection has slowed down. In his interview 
with Bloomberg, Guo Yanheng, the deputy director of the National Renewable Energy 
Engineering Information Management Center, said that “The nation is approving 
projects in more proper areas and withdrew those where grids are unable to meet 
conditions” (Bloomberg News, 2013). Actually, in China’s major project of seven wind 
power bases to be completed by 2020, Tibet is not included in the planned areas (see 
21st Century Media Report, 2010, p.28; see also International Energy Agency, 2011).88 
This means that Tibet is not one of the prioritised strategic areas in the PRC’s renewable 
energy policy. Indeed, it must be very costly to connect between Tibet’s renewable 
power stations to the grid due to the geographic characteristics, which means that 
economic profitability in the business is not very appealing to the PRC. Therefore, it is a 
hasty generalisation to argue that Tibet’s natural energy resources provoke the PRC’s 
appetite. Rather, the reason for prevailing discourse on development of Tibet’s abundant 
natural energy resources may be more important to seek China’s true interest behind 
this scene. 
 China’s interests in tourism income from Tibet also have to be carefully 
examined. It seems that China’s recent Tibet tourism has been very successful as 
discussed above. However, foreign tourists of Tibet only accounted for 1.73 % in 2013 
and majority of tourists are from inside China, whose number is even far more than Han 
population of the TAR (see Table.4 and 7). Domestic tourists are also important to boost 
tourism business, but actually this kind of increasing number of Chinese tourists is seen 
in every province of China. Thus, when it comes to evaluating China’s tourism market, 
                                           
88 The areas include: Hami, Jiuquan, Hebei, Jilin, Jiangsu, east and west Inner Mongolia. 
Chapter V. China and India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet: A Rationalist Perspective     Seokbae Lee 
  112 
the number of foreign visitors is an obviously important yardstick. In this regard, 
China’s interest in Tibet tourism does not seem to be very high in the sense that foreign 
tourists, when they travel the TAR, are still required to get special permit from Tibet 
Tourism Bureau (TTB) (see China Tibet Train, 2014) along with Chinese visa, which is 
far from attracting foreign tourists. Also, considering the fact that the PRC has 
frequently imposed travel restriction on tourists to Tibet (see BBC 2011), it should be 
careful to evaluate that China is highly interested in tourism revenues from Tibet – it 
may be an ancillary cause of China’s interest in Tibet, at best, regardless of the PRC’s 
coherent argument that “there is no question that tourism is highly significant to Tibet’s 
development” (see People’s Daily Online, 2011b).  
 A paucity of reliable data is also one of the major problems that rationalists are 
suffering from. Owing to China’s control over Tibet, majority data is from the Chinese 
side. It does not necessarily mean that Chinese-provided data are always unreliable or 
wrong. However, a cross-validation analysis of the data is hardly possible, and most of 
all, it is questionable that the PRC would openly reveal every information on Tibet, the 
most sensitive topic of China. Actually Chinese figures especially in economic sector 
have been questioned by international communities in many times (see Cary, 2013; 
Koch-Weser, 2013; Yueh, 2013) – the PRC has been suspected of manipulating the data 
to fit its interest. Of course technical problems can bring out some errors, but here, the 
concern is political interference. As Tibet is internationally recognised issue and China 
has been criticised for human rights and exploitation issues of the TAR, the PRC has 
always promoted their efforts to develop the areas to defend its rule over Tibet. The 
information and data presented by the PRC mostly represent an optimistic picture. 
However, it seems that the doubt has not been resolved yet. As an example of the 
potentially manipulated information, the data of Tibet’s population, especially those of 
Han Chinese, are highly suspicious whether the data are true. As shown in Table.7, Han 
population of the TAR only accounts for 8.17 % of the total. The word only may be 
properly used here if the Han population of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia autonomous 
regions is considered. All three regions are politically sensitive and the PRC’s economic 
and social influences are strong enough to dominate the areas. However, while Xinjiang 
with 40.48 % and Inner Mongolia with 79.54 % show a huge number of Han people, 
Tibet’s Han population remains around 8 %. If Tibet’s economic situations and living 
standards have been improved / are improving like Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia as the 
PRC promotes, it would actually be very difficult to find the clear reasons for Tibet’s 
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stagnant trend of the growing number of Han people. 
 As discussed so far, it seems that there are critical problems in analysing China 
and India’s interests with regard to Tibet from a rationalist perspective – a scarcity of 
detailed data; data credibility issue; and unhealthy controversies, merely arguing who is 
right, caused by interpretation and analysis of such quantitatively and qualitatively weak 
data. In other words, there are not enough specific and accurate data available on this 
topic, and this aspect can result in arbitrary interpretation on China and India’s interests 
with regard to Tibet, which is far from analytical advantages of rationalism, presenting 
concise and logical picture.  
Actually, aside from these issues, fundamentally, there is a theoretical problem 
when it comes to tackling the research questions – the problem of objectivity. The main 
task of this chapter is the search for Tibet’s objective factors that are of interest to China 
and India. However, evaluating objectivity is not easy. Every actor has different criteria 
for judging objectivity and rational choice. According to Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 
(2003), rationalists believe that “whatever actors want (and this is canonically to 
maximize utility), they choose what they believe to be the best means available to attain 
it” (p.12). With a rationalist account, we only can “conjecture” that a particular factor 
(security, material power, or both) drives actors to make their own rational choice. 
However, actually it is difficult to find out a real cause (that goes beyond above three 
aspects) of such choice that are believed to be rational. What is more important is that 
the belief can be subjective, rather than objective – it is questionable whether it is 
possible for any actors to have a belief which is totally exogenous to social interaction. 
To overcome these problems, the research on this topic needs to escape from 
focusing on factors per se that are regarded as fixed and pre-defined by rationalists. 
Instead, it is necessary to concentrate on how the various factors have been interpreted 
and used by the actors to shape and share the concept of interest. No matter what the 
data are true or not, in China as well as India, there have been varied attempts at 
legitimising and justifying the course of action to shape the national interests with 
regard to Tibet. Examining this aspect may greatly help grasp how and why the two 
countries’ relations have been affected by their interests with regard to Tibet. In short, 
analysing the process of constructing national interest of China and India can give a 
fresh account on Sino-Indian relations, which can become seminal for the development 
of this research area.
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Chapter VI. Constructing National Interest:  
China’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet 
 
 
This chapter examines how China’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been 
constructed in discourse, focusing on domestic political complexity. As indicated in 
previous chapters, this thesis assumes that national interest is a discursive construction; 
and the discourses and actions of the elites in power have a great impact on such process 
of construction. This research especially focuses on elites’ use of nationalism as a tool 
for representing and justifying their interests as those of nation. Before examining the 
process of discursive construction, this research reviews historical and socio-political 
context that can help understand the background to the interest formation. The historical 
context explains the controversies between China and Tibet over the Tibet issues in 
history. The socio-political context examines the philosophy and rationale behind its 
attitudes towards minorities and Tibet. In the last section this chapter examines the 
discursive patterns and strategy of the CPC to realise its national interest vis-à-vis Tibet.  
 
Historical Context 
 
1. Late Qing Dynasty 
 
Expansion and invasion of Western imperialist powers, that is, the British and Russian 
imperialists, rocked the relations between the Qing dynasty and Tibet (see Addy, 1994). 
When the British government of India invaded Tibet in 1888 and 1904, the Qing did not 
send reinforcements. Actually during this period, the Qing dynasty was mentally and 
physically unable to support Tibet against the British owing to her defeat in the First 
(1839-1842) and Second (1856-1860) Opium Wars (Kim, 2008, p.48). The Thirteenth 
Dalai Lama could not help signing the Treaty of Lhasa on 7th September 1904, failing 
to get any substantial help from the Qing China as well as Russia. The British India’s 
invasions of Tibet forced the Qing China to reset the relations with Tibet and generated 
the complicated relationship between China-India-Tibet (ibid., p.49). 
 After the Treaty of Lhasa, the Qing Empire attempted to strengthen her 
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influence over Tibet by adopting the “Xinzheng”89 (see Reynolds, 1993; see also Shi 
and Reynolds, 1995, p.137; Gabbiani, 2003) and “Gaituguiliu”90 policy (Yang and 
Tamney, 2011, p.212). The purpose of such policies was to secure its sovereignty over 
Tibet by making the Dalai Lama as a religious leader without political powers, which 
was against the position of the 13th Dalai Lama. In 1905, the Qing also tried to bring 
the French to contain the British, promising a grant of land to the French Catholic 
priests and a reduction of the number of monks in Batang. They, for the next twenty 
years, prohibited the recruitment of monks as well (Goldstein, 1991, p.46). These efforts 
were not successful, but rather, triggered a revolt led by monks which was pacified in 
1908 by Zhao Erfeng, the last amban91 in Tibet. 
 In the winter of 1909, the Qing eventually sent troops to Lhasa, resulting in the 
13th Dalai Lama’s flight to India in February 1910. The Qing dynasty unilaterally 
deposed him, which incurred Tibetan people’s anger. The Qing did not have enough 
power or ability to appease their resentment and to make matters worse, “the Xinhai 
Revolution” broke out in 1911 that led the dynasty to collapse. With the outbreak of the 
Revolution, Tibetan soldiers rose in arms and by April 1912, they surrendered about 
3,000 Chinese soldiers and officers. The Tibetans forced them to withdraw from Tibet 
via India in late 1912 (see Lin, 2006, p.9; see also Goldstein, 1999, p.29). The 13th 
Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in January 1913 and expelled remaining Chinese officials 
and Han Chinese. This means that at that time, Tibet became free from Chinese control, 
that is to say, they enjoyed de facto independence. 
 The de facto independence implies that the Tibetans had a different sense of 
national identity to that of the Manchu empire as well as Republicans who replaced the 
Qing dynasty (see Kim, 2008, p.49; Goldstein, 1999). The Tibetans wanted to retain 
their identity as a Buddhist nation and stay independent from foreigners. 13th Dalai 
Lama’s declaration of the independence of Tibet around that time well shows this 
aspect:  
 
During the time of Genghis Khan and Altan Khan of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty of the Chinese, 
and the Ch’ing Dynasty of the Manchus, Tibet and China cooperated on the basis of benefactor and 
                                           
89 新政. Also known as the New Policies or Xinzheng reforms. 
90 改土归流. According to Xinhua (2009), the policy means “appropriating the governing power of local 
hereditary aboriginal chieftains and setting up the system of appointment of local administrators by the 
central government in the minority areas.” For more details, see Arcones (2012); Hostetler (2001); Su and 
Teo (2009). 
91 Amban literally means “high official,” or “counselors” (see Wakeman, 1985, p.54).  
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priest relationship. A few years ago, the Chinese authorities in Szechuan and Yunnan endeavored to 
colonize our territory. They brought large numbers of troops into central Tibet on the pretext of 
policing the trade marts… Meanwhile, the Manchu empire collapsed. The Tibetans were 
encouraged to expel the Chinese from central Tibet… Now, the Chinese intention of colonizing 
Tibet under the patron-priest relationship has faded like a rainbow in the sky… Peace and 
happiness in this world can only be maintained by preserving the faith of Buddhism… To keep up 
with the rest of the world, we must defend our country. (Shakabpa, 1967, pp.246-248, emphasis 
added) 
 
By 1912, many institutions and Buddhist ties between China and Tibet almost perished. 
The Qing dynasty pressurised and insulted Tibet; and even occupied Tibet by military 
force. These courses of action just brought about the Tibetans’ anti-Qing and China 
sentiments and reinforced the willingness for independence. 
 
2. Republican Period 
 
The new Republic of China (ROC) did not give up control over Tibet. They attempted 
to annex Tibet to the administrative structure of China. On 15th February 1912, the first 
President Yuan Shikai proclaimed that the new Republic of China will take over all 
former periphery territories under Qing rule and suzerainty, including Manchuria, 
Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang (O’Neill, 1987, p.57; see also Swaine and Tellis, 2000). 
On 22nd June 1912, Republicans discussed the establishment of an administrative 
centre in Tibet, but this plan evoked a strong opposition by Tibet as well as the British. 
After this, even though three countries, China, Tibet and Britain had talks in Simla in 
1913 and 1914 to discuss the status of Tibet, the ROC finally rejected the accord 
because they did not agree over the border line, indicating that the ROC will lose their 
control of strategically important areas, for example, Chamdo (Goldstein, 1991, p.75). 
Anyway, the ROC could not gain any substantial benefits from the convention – the 
ability of the ROC was too weak to achieve its ambition of securing the Tibetan areas 
(see Swaine and Tellis, 2000, p.35). 
 During this period, the ROC could not exercise sovereign power over Tibetan 
headquarters, and at the same time, Tibet also did not have the power to control over 
Kham and Amdo in which many Tibetan groups resided (ibid., p.35). Hostilities 
between the two countries continued especially around Kham areas. One of the crucial 
factors of the conflict between the ROC and Tibet was their different national goal and 
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identity (see Kim, 2008). As indicated above, Tibet dreamed of building a Buddhist 
country based on Tibetan Buddhism. Spiritual as well as political power became largely 
concentrated in the hands of the Dalai Lama (Shakabpa, 1967). On the contrary to this, 
even though the ROC’s control over Tibet was very limited, they had a clear framework 
for understanding its ethnic issues, namely, “one nation and one leadership.” Republican 
intellectuals promoted the concept of “Zhonghua Minzu,” 92  “Chinese nation,” in 
English, which meant that five nationalities93 surrounding China proper, Han, Manchus, 
Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans actually have the same origin (see Barabantseva, 2013, 
p.155). The ROC argued that to resist the Western challenge, Chinese national cohesion 
should be achieved. 
 At the same period of time, the Communist Party of China (CPC), founded in 
1921, endeavored to gain the support from the minority groups to defeat the 
Kuomintang of China (KMT). By claiming that the minority nationalities should 
possess the right of self-determination allowing them to establish their own nations (see 
Ma, 2010, p.17), the CPC tried to appease and conciliate the minority groups. Initially, 
the CPC proposed a federal system. In November 1931, they declared that the 
minorities in China can decide whether to join the CPC-led federation.94 However, after 
the second Sino-Japanese War, the CPC abolished the federal system and adopted the 
system of regional autonomy that did not allow minorities to withdraw from CPC-led 
nation. This change meant that the CPC’s minority policy became eventually in line 
with that of KMT, indicating that Tibet is part of China (see Kim, 2008; see also Swaine 
and Tellis, 2000). 
 
3. After establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
 
The CPC almost defeated the KMT in the Chinese civil War in 1949, and on 1st October 
1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). The PRC’s Tibet Policy was not very different from that of the KMT in the 
Republican period as both claimed sovereignty over Tibet. Right after the establishment, 
radio Beijing even announced that “the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must liberate 
                                           
92 中华民族. This will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
93 In this period, actually Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the ROC between 1928 and 1975, considered 
these minority groups as tribes of the Chinese nation, not nationalities or nation (Ma, 2010, p.16). 
94 At that time, Chinese Soviet Republic was established by CPC leader Mao Zedong and General Zhu 
De. 
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all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan” (Lal, 2008, p.115; 
see also Roberts, 2009, p.8). However, different from the KMT, the PRC enjoyed more 
secure domestic and international circumstances to aggressively pressure Tibet. On 2nd 
November 1949, the Tibetan government, grasping the situation, dispatched a 
delegation to Mao for resolving the territorial problem between China and Tibet. They 
also sent India, Britain and the US a copy of the diplomatic document which was sent to 
Mao to ask for support. However, the PRC’s response was not favourable to Tibet. The 
PRC’s requirements were to cede military power; and to recognise that Tibet is part of 
China, which could not be acceptable for the Tibet government (Goldstein, 1991). 
 On 25th June 1950, Korean War broke out and it gave the PRC a good 
opportunity to invade Tibet, as the Allied Powers, especially the US and Britain, did not 
have capacity for caring about the Tibetan issues. The PLA, on 7th October 1950, 
attacked Tibet and on 25th, it occupied Chamdo where the majority of Tibetan soldiers 
defended the borders. The PRC tried to diplomatically isolate Tibet as well. Especially, 
the Chinese government was sensitive to India’s involvement, or interference, in the 
Tibet issue as the memory of the British India’s strategy vis-à-vis Tibet remained – 
keeping Tibet as a buffer state under the “weak” suzerainty of China; and it seemed 
obvious that Tibet purchased weapons from India (ibid., pp.667-676). On 30th October, 
the PRC gave a note to India that Tibet is an integral part of China and no foreign 
interference would be tolerated as it is the domestic affair (see Sali, 1998, p.74; see also 
Schoettli, 2011, p.133; Tripathy, 2012). On 16th November 1950 again sent a document 
explaining China’s minority policies to the Indian government. Meanwhile, the Tibetan 
government sent a letter to the UN secretary-general to ask for the international 
community’s intervention on China-Tibet conflict. However, the US and Britain were 
reluctant to approve the Tibet’s request because they did not want the war with China in 
the Korean peninsula to be expanded to Tibet. India also strongly addressed the need of 
a peaceful solution between China and Tibet in order to avoid the unwanted conflict 
with China. The Tibetan government, on 8th December 1950, again appealed to the UN 
secretary-general to intervene, but the result was the same (see Lal, 2008, p.117). All 
these situations made the Tibetan government and Dalai Lama send a delegation to 
Beijing in April 1951, and on 23th May 1951, Beijing and Lhasa signed “the Seventeen 
Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.”95 The agreement was finally 
                                           
95 About the full content of the agreement, see <http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/china/china3.html>. 
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confirmed by Dalai Lama on 24th October 1950, and the PLA advanced on Lhasa 
immediately. 
 Not only did the PRC justify their invasion of Tibet as an integral part of China 
in history, but also it had socialist cause for invading Tibet to liberate the ordinary 
Tibetans from a feudal theocracy (see Norbu, 2001, p.195). By using mass meetings, 
dramas and films, the PLA propagated “unity of nationalities against class exploiters 
and foreign imperialists” (Smith, 1994, p.63; see also Goldstein, 2009, p.38). Actually, 
during this time, the PRC did not totally exclude the Tibetan elites as well as the Dalai 
Lama in politics, but rather, Beijing tried to justify the rule over Tibet by using them. On 
22nd April 1956, a “Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet” 
(PCART) was formally established to achieve democratic reform in Tibet and the PRC 
appointed the Dalai Lama as a chairman. However, he was nominally the leader – the 
CPC actually ran the committee. The Chinese government had virtually all authority 
over human resources and Tibet did not have their own discretion (Marcello, 2012, 
p.82; see also Shakya, 2000), which was against the 4th point of the 17-point agreement, 
“The Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers 
of the Dalai Lama.” 
 Also, despite the 11th point that “In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, 
there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities,” the CPC imposed 
the agricultural collectivization96 on Amdo and Kham in 1956. They also forced 
nomadic herdsmen into settling for facilitating socialist construction, which provoked 
an angry backlash among Tibetan nomads who made up the majority of the Tibetan 
population (Smith, 1994, pp.64-65). This was, for Tibetans, also not accord with the 
promise that “the people’s [Tibetans] livelihood shall be improved step by step in 
accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet,” 10th point of the agreement.  
 All these situations caused armed conflict between the PLA and Tibetan rebels 
around Amdo and eastern Kham, in the summer of 1956 when the CPC introduced 
“Democratic Reforms” (Kim, 2008). The PLA responded by a military crackdown on 
the armed resistance. The Tibetans also re-organised their scattered guerrilla bands, 
mainly from the areas of eastern Tibet,97  into a single resistance army, “Chushi 
                                                                                                                           
The Tibetan Government in Exile has claimed that the agreement is legally invalid since the Tibetan 
delegation signed the document under duress. 
96 Also known as “the high-tide of collectivisation.” About this, see Walker (1966). 
97 in which Amdo and Kham located 
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Gangdruk”98 on 16th July 1958 (see Norbu, 1994, p.194; see also Alpi, 2012, p.65). In 
1956, The Chinese government attempted to conciliate the Tibetans with a pledge that 
reforms should not be carried out within 6 years, followed by Mao Zedong’s remark in 
January 1957 that “The reform of the social system must be carried out, but the timing 
can only be decided by the great majority of the people of Tibet and their leading 
figures when they consider it practicable, and one should not be impatient” (State 
Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (SCIO), 2009). However, 
the armed coercion continued and unlike Mao’s promise, reforms were recommenced in 
Eastern Tibet and Chamdo (Smith, 1994, p.66). Tibetan’s hostility to the PRC rule had 
been continued, or exacerbated, and the guerrilla warfare was also ceaseless.  
 Meanwhile, in early March 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama was invited to the PLA-
led theatrical performance planned on 10th March. According to the Dalai Lama, he was 
asked not to bring any bodyguards, which made him and his advisors suspect the real 
intention behind the invitation of the Chinese government (Dalai Lama, 2008, p. 132). 
On 10th March, thousands of Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lama’s summer palace to 
prevent him from attending the performance. Finally, on 17th March, the Dalai Lama 
fled to India and established the Central Tibetan Administration99 on 28th April 1959. 
The PLA began to shell the palace and suppress the uprising on 19th March and on 28th 
of the same month, the state council dissolved the government of Tibet and the PCART 
turned into the main governing body in the Tibetan areas (Norbu, 2001, pp.224-227; see 
also Harrer, 2000). 
 The situation in Tibet did not become normalised after the Dalai Lama’s flight. 
In the aftermath of “the Great Leap Forward” (1958-1961), Tibetans suffered from the 
famine from 1960 to 1962. Tibetan harvests during that period were sent to Han Chinese 
in Tibet; the provinces close to Tibet; the PLA; and Chinese cadres in Tibet, which 
brought about a severe scarcity of food in Tibet. The Chinese government explained that 
Tibetans should share the responsibility and fate as part of China (Smith, 1994, p.68). In 
such turbulence times, the PRC, on 1st September 1965, eventually declared the 
creation of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This meant that the Tibetan area under the 
Dalai Lama’s control from 1951 to 1959 became incorporated within China’s 
                                           
98 Four Rivers, Six Ranges of the Faith Volunteer Army. Not only did Chushi Gangdruk fight against the 
PLA but also they played a pivotal role in the 14th Dalai Lama’s escape to India in 1959. For more details, 
see Arpi, (2012). 
99 Also known as the Tibetan Government in Exile.  
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administrative units. The chairman of the TAR was a Tibetan, but the Tibetan regional 
Communist Party actually had the power in the region. In addition to this, the “Cultural 
Revolution” from 1966 also fostered anti-Chinese sentiment in Tibet. Many precious 
contents of monasteries were looted and the majority of temples including Jokhang 
temple that is regarded as the most sacred one by Tibetans were destroyed. This caused 
an armed revolt in 20 of the 70 counties of the TAR in 1968. The revolt was not 
suppressed easily – even until the spring of 1970, the PLA could not regain the control 
in some areas in Tibet (Smith, 2008, p.128). 
 Despite Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door Policy” after Mao Zedong’s death in 
1976, the situation Tibet was not very changed. Notably, the 1987-1989 Tibetan unrest 
brought international attention on Tibet (Schwartz, 1995, p.6). On 21st September 1987, 
the Dalai Lama proposed a “Five Point Peace Plan”100 for Tibet at the United States 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus that was immediately rejected by the PRC, 
criticising the Dalai Lama for trying to split China. The enraged Tibetans held anti-
China demonstration on 27th September 1987 in Lhasa, but soon the Chinese police 
began to suppress the protest. On 15th June 1988, the Dalai Lama, in his speech to the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg, elaborated his plan by proposing that “The 
Government of the People’s Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet’s 
foreign policy” to have negotiations with the Chinese government.101 This was the first 
attempt at acknowledging that Tibet could accept Chinese sovereignty, but the Chinese 
government again rejected the proposal because they still suspected that the Dalai Lama 
was yet to give up the idea of independence (see Smith, 2008, p.218; see also Mingxu 
and Feng, 2005, pp.308-309). The situation in Tibet was getting worse. On 28th January 
1989, the sudden death of the Panchen Lama of Tibet caused a massive demonstration 
as not only did many Tibetans suspect that the Panchen Lama was murdered by the PRC 
but they became furious that China tried to interfere in the reincarnation process as well. 
Eventually, on 7th March 1989, martial law was issued in Lhasa by the state council and 
                                           
100 1) transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; 2) abandonment of China’s population 
transfer policy; 3) respect the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; 4) 
protection of the Tibet’s natural environment and abandonment of the use of Tibet for the production of 
nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; 5) and earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet. 
For more details, see Central Tibetan Administration, <http://tibet.net/important-issues/sino-tibetan-
dialogue/an-overview-of-sino-tibetan-dialogue/sino-tibetan-dialogue-a-row-over-the-internationalisation-
of-the-tibet-issue-1987-1990>. 
101 Also known as Strasbourg Proposal 1988. Full script is available on < 
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/strasbourg-proposal-1988> 
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all foreigners including journalists and tourists were expelled (see Sapio, 2010, p.45).102 
After the three-year unrest, in December 1989, the Dalai Lama received the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his peaceful approach towards liberation of Tibet, which aroused 
China’s anger as well as made it more sensitive to the West’s intention to contain China. 
 Since 1997, “the Middle Way” approach that pursues genuine autonomy within 
China, not independence (according to the Dalai Lama), has been the official position of 
the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA). This change of direction – from 
independence to genuine autonomy – has happened maybe because of China’s surging 
influence all over the world. Indeed, during the 2008 Tibetan unrest, practical support 
from international community was very limited. The Dalai Lama again claimed that 
Tibet does not seek the separation of Tibet at that time (CNN, 2008). However, the PRC 
did not change its position on the Dalai Lama and his middle way policy which could be 
against China’s interest in Tibet. Rather, the Chinese government has accused of the 
Dalai Lama of encouraging a self-immolation protest by the Tibetan people (see The 
Telegraph, 2012); and warned foreign leaders that meeting the Dalai Lama in any form 
is tantamount to encroaching on China’s core interest (see Mengwei, 2015). Even the 
Dalai Lama and the CPC are having an argument on Tibet’s reincarnation system after 
the Dalai Lama’s remark that the tradition could end when he dies. The CPC claims that 
the tradition has to continue and they will approve the next Dalai Lama whereas Dalai 
Lama criticises the CPC for its arrogance by saying that “The Chinese Communist Party 
is pretending that they know more about the reincarnation system than the Dalai Lama” 
(Wee, 2015). Reviewing the history, there is little sign that the Chinese government will 
change their attitude and position vis-à-vis Tibet. To understand this situation, its 
philosophical and political intent over the Tibet issues must be examined. 
 
Socio-Political Context 
 
1. Theoretical Foundations on New Chinese Nation 
 
After defeats in the First and Second Opium wars, Chinese elite in the late Qing dynasty 
attempted to reform the country. “The Self-Strengthening Movement” (1861-1895) is 
one of those efforts. Some officials such as Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong and Sheng 
                                           
102 The martial law continued until 1st May 1990. 
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Xuanhuai claimed that in order to compete the West and strengthen the dynasty itself, it 
is essential to adopt and use Western technological knowledge. Even though it is usually 
evaluated that the movement had failed as the elite only focused on economic and 
military reforms, which may meet their own interests (see Fairbank, 1980, pp. 167-176), 
it had some meaningful impacts on the society. One of the noticeable results of the Self-
Strengthening Movement was that China was beginning to accept the modern Western 
philosophical concepts from the Western countries and Japan. The concept of nation, in 
particular, strongly influenced Chinese elite groups (see, Jo, 2010). 
In the history of Chinese empires until then, there had been many concepts 
related to patriotism (or nationalism), chauvinism and racism. The root of those 
concepts were not mere loyalty to the states or ethnicities, but culture. Under such 
culturalism, in other words, view point on “Tianxia,”103 Chinese people, Han, in 
particular, regarded the Chinese culture as the most advanced and the only civilisation 
in the universal (see Levenson, 1953). According to their belief, even if other aliens, 
especially Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing, changes the states by military forces, they 
cannot subvert the cultural superiority of Han – however, if they accept the values and 
teachings of Chinese culture, the aliens also can be incorporated within the cultural 
boundary (see Zhao, 2004, p.16). 
This idea was, however, challenged by a massive influx of strong external forces. 
Advanced technologies and flood of different ideas of Western powers demanded a 
fundamental change in Chinese people’s perspective on the Tianxia (see Song, 2005). 
They needed a new conceptual framework to reformulate their identity and nation state; 
and the concept of nation and nationalism from the West and Japan greatly helped re-
examine the traditional and old ideas.104 A number of Chinese intellectuals tried to 
overcome the crisis of identity by actively adopting and reshaping such concept of 
nation and nationalism. Even though the scholars have one thing in common that they 
all attempted to overcome the national crisis by achieving modern nation-building, they 
disagreed over the way they reach the goal. Intellectuals who advocated constitutional 
monarchy such as Liang Qichao aimed at building a nation based on equality among 
                                           
103 天下. 
104 Levenson (1953; 1968) argued that this moment was the dramatic disjuncture between traditional 
China, Tianxia, and the modern nation-state demanding new identity. Therefore, there was no modern 
concept of nation of nationalism in the Chinese empires in history. However, Duara (1996) opposed this 
radical idea as he maintained that the traditional culturalism also includes the idea on ethnicity that is one 
of the elements of modern nationalism. However, they both claimed that there was a feeling of crisis in 
identity among Chinese people and need of change of traditional culturalism.  
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different ethnicities (or nations); and equal rights and duties among members of a 
constitutional society (Song, 2005). Especially, Liang’s idea of “Da Minzu Zhuyi,”105 
“great (or broad) nationalism,” well represents his notion of nation that embraces 
various ethnicities (see Zhao, 2004; see also Bulag, 2002). Although he also emphasised 
the central role of Han people and their cultural assimilative power, Liang, when it 
comes to a form of nation, did not exclude other ethnic groups, especially the Manchu 
people who had failed in defending the country from outer threats. Also, it was Liang 
Qichao who first used the term Zhonghua Minzu,106 Chinese nation, implying that 
various ethnicities surrounding China has shared the same history in competition (see Jo, 
2010). 
On the contrary to this, Revolutionary intellectuals, for example, Zhang Binglin 
and Wang Jingwei took an anti-Manchu stance in the Sino-centric and Han-centric 
context. They highlighted the importance of a racial revolution (see Dikötter, 1997). For 
them, ethnic conflicts are inevitable as each group has its own interest; so a country 
with diverse ethnicities cannot last long owing to political turmoil. In this sense, if 
ethnic conflicts are not resolved, any kinds of political problems could not be solved. 
With this logic, they aimed at establishing a nation with a single ethnic group (see 
Crossley, 2002, p.352). Importantly, they actually did not totally deny the concept of 
assimilation of ethnic groups that was argued by Liang Qichao. However, the difference 
between the two was while constitutional monarchists believed that different ethnic 
groups can constitute a nation, and the assimilation (into Han) will occur spontaneously 
as time goes by, revolutionaries claimed that the assimilation and having a unified 
ethnic group is a prerequisite for nation-building (see Kenji, 1990). In other words, they, 
revolutionaries, maintained that the nation state should consist of a single ethnicity. In 
this respect, it can be argued that revolutionaries’ concept of nation was based on ethnic 
nationalism of Han, rejecting the coexistence of people from other ethnic groups (see Jo, 
2010, pp.196-197; see also Crosseley 2002; Song, 2005). 
Initially, it seemed that revolutionaries took the initiative in the philosophical 
competition as they succeeded in overthrowing Qing dynasty during the Xinhai 
Revolution. However, their concept of nation had to be revised because revolutionaries 
confronted a problem of controlling the territories under the Qing influence. 
                                           
105 大民族主义. 
106 中华民族. 
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Independence movements from the minority areas such as Tibet and Mongolia revealed 
the weakness of Revolutionaries’ Han centric nation concept. New nationalism after the 
fall of the Qing could not be shared by non-Han people (Park, 2005). Eventually, their 
ideas on nation and nationalism were replaced with Sun Yat-sen’s discourse on “Five 
Races under One Union.” Sun emphasised the integration of the five major ethnic 
groups in China, Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans, under one nation. Actually 
he was also indulged in the anti-Manchuism and ethnocentrism of the Han (see Sun, 
1973, p.118). Sun changed his stance after the Xinhai Revolution because he also 
recognised that anti-Manchuism and political strategy to retain all Qing territories are 
incompatible (Bovingdon, 2010, pp.34). He justified this change by arguing that the 
target of Revolutionary before the fall of the Qing dynasty was actually not whole 
Manchu people, but the Qing government who suppressed other ethnicities and caused 
severe ethnic and political inequalities. He also maintained that now the inequality 
problems are solved thanks to the success of the Revolution, so the five ethnicities now 
should protect the country together. He eventually claimed that we, five ethnic groups 
share a common responsibility to make China the most advanced country (Sun, 1982, 
pp.438-439). 
In 1920, Sun Yat-sen developed his idea once more by highlighting the term 
Zhonghua minzu. By adopting Liang Qichao’s notion, he emphasised the importance of 
“ronghe107,” “fusion” in English, of all ethnic groups in China. His model was the US, 
the strongest nation in which people from the varied European nations are fused (Sun, 
1985, pp.473-474). However, the Han hegemony was still vivid in his ideas. In 1921, he 
mentioned that Manchu, Mongolia and Tibet try to depend on the foreign countries 
because they are incapable of ruling their own nations by themselves – therefore we, 
Han has to help them rely on us. The way he proposed to do so was “tonghua,”108 
“assimilation” into the Han (Sun, 1985, p.474). In this regard, it can be evaluated that 
his concept of Zhonghua minzu was not based on real equality among the ethnicities – 
but another name of the “Great Han” (see Song 2005, p.23; see also Kim, 2008). This 
Han-centric ethno nationalism has never vanished even until today (Lee, 2008; see also, 
Yoon, 2006). 
One clear common thing found among the above ideas is statism (see Park, 
                                           
107 融合. 
108 同化.  
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2005). The intellectuals emphasised the role of states and it has shaped the tendency 
where personal and individual rights and voices can be easily neglected.109 This statism 
forms one of the notable characteristics of today’s Chinese nationalism (Duara, 1995). 
However, a sense of popular sovereignty and civil society did not totally disappear 
during this period. Indeed, one of the biggest reasons for the CPC’s success at that time 
was to politicise the issue of popular sovereignty to compete with the KMT. The KMT 
was, on the contrary to this, a self-conceived elitist party and arrogant in approaching 
civil society and minorities (see Cheng and Lin, 1998, p.225). However, as discussed in 
the previous section, the CPC also shifted their position once they took over power – 
they have focused on ideological control over the people and tried to form a stronger 
central government since then. All these ideas and practices provided theoretical 
foundations with the CPC who established the PRC in 1949, and have been merged with 
the CPC’s political socialism (see Lee, 2008, pp.11-14). 
 
2. The Communist Party of China’s Philosophy on Chinese Nation and 
Tibet 
 
According to Marxism-Leninism, a nation is a historical product which exists in a 
certain stage in human development. There are different forms of nations in each stage, 
that is, slave society, feudalism, capitalism and socialism – however, nations will 
necessarily become extinct once the development of society reaches a stage where every 
class vanishes. Especially Lenin, who put great importance on revolutionary practice, 
discussed the right of self-determination for all oppressed nations (see Stalin, 1924). 
Mao, when he fought against KMT, adopted this idea that is federation and guarantee of 
self-determination, to attract minorities and ordinary people, as indicated in the previous 
section.  
 The CPC describes China as a unified multi-ethnic country. Before establishing 
the PRC, the CPC formed the Anti-Japanese National United Front with the people from 
the diverse ethnic groups against Japan. After the establishment of the PRC, those ethnic 
groups were not integrated into the party voluntarily, but rather, the CPC had to 
“control” them with an effective method. Shaping and giving a new identity as a 
member of the PRC to the minorities was one of the most important tasks to stabilise 
                                           
109 Duara (1995) defined this situation as “a weak state and a strong statist discourse” (p.170). 
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the new state (see, Lee, 2008, pp.14-16). This situation led the CPC to adopting Joseph 
Stalin’s theory of nations as Stalin also experienced the similar ethnic conflicts in a 
socialist country (see Yan, 1992, pp.17-20). 
 Stalin (1913) defined a nation as “an historically constituted, stable community 
of people, united by community of language, of territory, of economic life, and of 
psychological make-up, which expresses itself in community of culture” (cited in Davis, 
1967, p.163). According to him, following Marxism-Leninism, each nation is not 
wholly assimilated or absorbed in socialist countries, but if socialist world system 
reaches the final stage of the period of world “dictatorship of the proletariat,”110 
“national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world 
language, common to all nations” (Stalin, 1929). Stalin named this new form of 
common entity “modern nation” where “every demand of a nation may be made 
compatible with the interests of the proletariat” (Stalin, 1913). 
 Broadly, two forms of nations are found in Stalin’s concept of nation (see 
Kubálková and Cruickshank, 1989, pp.57-58). One is a naturally developed nation 
based on common cultural and social basis. This includes various minorities in the 
Soviet Union, sharing common characteristics. The other is modern nation where people 
realise their identity as a member of the Soviet Union. It is a superordinate concept of 
the naturally shaped nation. Through the dialectical approach, the former type of nation 
becomes the latter as “the world socialist system of economy becomes sufficiently 
consolidated; and socialism becomes part and parcel of the life of the peoples” (Stalin, 
1929). Through the concept of modern nation as a higher level of ordinary nation, Stalin 
tried to theoretically solve the problems regarding the ethnic minorities in the Soviet 
Union; as well as provide other socialist countries with a formula to solve minority 
problems successfully (Kubálková and Cruickshank, 1989).  
 CPC’s approach towards nations which is based on Marxist, Leninist and 
Stalinist theories of nation and nationalism can be explained as follows. Firstly, like the 
Soviet Union, soon after the establishment of the PRC, the CPC needed a framework to 
embrace many different ethnic groups (Lee, 2008, p.14). They acknowledged the 
existence of a transitional form of nations in a post-revolutionary society. The 
                                           
110 Simply, rule by the proletariat, working class. Marxists argue that in capitalist society, bourgeoisie, 
capitalists, seize political power in a country. During the transition period towards the establishment of 
communism, the proletariat is to destroy the bourgeoisie-controlled production system under capitalism 
and participate in the political process. This phase is called, dictatorship of proletariat. For more details, 
see Ollman (1977).   
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government of the PRC, by conducting the identification of the nationalities of the PRC, 
declared that there are 56 ethnic groups in China that are categorised as the naturally 
occurring nations. They did not attempt to radically assimilate them initially (ibid., p.14-
15; Park, 2008, p.124-125). 
 Secondly, the CPC claims that such ethnic groups, through the stage of a fusion 
of nations, will be fused into Zhonghua minzu eventually, and any ethnic problems 
caused by inequality and suppression between them will be solved as well (Choi, 2009, 
p.277). Before the last stage, it is possible for every ethnic group to coexist peacefully, 
preserving their own cultural identity. Sudden socialist transformation of whole nation is 
virtually impossible because each ethnic group with the distinct characteristics has its 
own time and pace to reach the final stage where every class is emancipated. 
Lastly, the CPC’s concept of fusion, ronghe, is a Chinese version of Stalin’s 
modern nation (ibid., p.279). To set the last destination, the CPC has adopted and 
developed the concept of Zhonghua minzu. Thus, if every ethnic group goes through the 
revolutionary stage in socialist nation, everyone will become Zhonghua minzu 
identifying themselves as a member of the PRC (see Yoon, 2005). As briefly introduced 
in the previous chapter, Fei’s Plurality and Unity well supports and represents the CPC’s 
idea. He argued that “The Chinese term for Chinese people is Zhonghua Minzu; that for 
any of the fifty-odd ethnic groups also is “Minzu,” but they are Minzu on different 
levels” (Fei, 1988, p.217, emphasis added). Fei also indicated that “The future will be 
marked by a still higher level of the configuration of plurality and unity of the Chinese 
people, a level on which China will be like a gigantic flowerbed blossoming with 
greater vitality than ever before” (ibid., p.220, emphasis added). By dividing level of 
Minzu, he clearly claimed that Zhonghua Minzu is a superordinate concept to each 
minority nation, and the scope of Zhonghua Minzu will be expanded.  
 Considering all these, it can be claimed that the ultimate goal of the CPC’s 
policy on nations is the extinction of every respective ethnic group and birth of new 
Chinese nation (see Lee, 2008). However, even though the subject of extinction and 
fusion includes every nation including Han theoretically, actually 55 minorities are a 
real target for assimilation (Choi, 2009, p.280). In other words, the subjects to be fused 
into Chinse nation is not Han, but other ethnic minorities. The role of Han is specified in 
many ways. For instance, in the Chinese Government’s white paper on “National 
Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China,” it is mentioned that: 
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Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the state has spared no effort to promote the 
common development and progress of all ethnic groups. In accordance with the actual conditions in 
the ethnic minority areas, the state has worked out and adopted a series of policies and measures to 
assist these areas in developing their economies, and mobilize and organize the developed areas 
where Han people live to support them. (SCIO, 2000, emphasis added) 
 
Fei (1988) also pointed out Han’ role as a main body of the nation.  
 
In history there are cases where the groups with more advanced levels of economics and culture 
were integrated into other groups with less advanced levels of economics and culture. The 
integration of the Han into other groups which had less advanced economies is a good example… 
The Hans during their process of development have absorbed a lot from other groups, and 
meanwhile they have also contributed to these other groups. (p.198, emphasis added) 
 
In view of the facts that 92 per cent of the total population is Han and majority of 
leaders of the PRC is also Han, it seems almost impossible that Han and other 
minorities can be integrated and fused in an equal relationship and position. Therefore, 
it can be argued that for the minorities in China, the meaning of any national minority 
policies and concepts proposed and implemented by the CPC is nothing but assimilation 
into the Han Chinese (Choi, 2009, pp.292-293). 
As discussed so far, the CPC may think that the PRC today is in the transitional 
period. If it is applied to the Tibet case, Tibetans are also a subject to be Zhonghua 
Minzu in the future. In other words, for the CPC, the Tibetan people will become a 
member of the PRC and Tibet as a separate nation will vanish while going through the 
stages of integration and fusion (Kim, 2008, p.73). The extinction of the nation of Tibet 
means that the common possession of principal characteristics of nation, as Stalin 
(1929) argued, “a common language”; “a common territory”; “a common economic 
life”; and “a common psychological make-up” (national culture) are replaced with a 
new form of the common possession designed by the CPC (see Choi, 2009, p.281).   
 Then, the important thing is CPC’s recognition of Tibet’s stage. That is to say, it 
can be said that theoretically, the CPC’s attitude and policy implementation is dependent 
on how they perceive the status of Tibet. If it is evaluated that Tibet is still in a pre-
revolutionary period, the PRC may take a moderate pace in the assimilation process as 
the development of the revolution is not enough to organise the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Mao’s remark on the CPC’s Tibet policy in 1952 makes a striking example 
Chapter VI. Constructing National Interest: China’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet        Seokbae Lee 
  130 
on this aspect: 
 
As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can start for at least two or three years… 
While several hundred thousand Han people live in Xinjiang, there are hardly any in Tibet, where 
our army finds itself in a totally different minority nationality area… We must do our best and take 
proper steps to win over the Dalai [Lama] and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the 
handful of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, bloodless transformation of the Tibetan 
economic and political system over a number of years. (Mao, 1952, translated and transcribed by 
the Maoist Documentation Project, emphasis added) 
 
Conversely, if the CPC thinks that Tibet is ready to move to the next stage where the 
fusion of nations is possible, relatively a radical policy line can be implemented. One 
more crucial point here is the contents of the CPC’s Tibet policy to complete the 
socialist revolution. Again, the CPC, according to Marxism-Leninism, regards its Tibet 
minority national issue as part of the class struggle of the proletariat. The CPC initially, 
as a method of solving the class struggle, emphasised the need of destroying the feudal 
system inside Tibet. However, after the Chinese economic reform, the CPC has more 
highlighted the Tibet’s economic development; relationship with the central 
government; and patriotism (see The Guardian, 2015). This may imply that the CPC is 
currently taking a radical assimilation policy thinking that Tibet is now approaching the 
final stage of fusion into Chinese nation under the CPC rule (see Lee, 2008; Park 2008; 
Choi 2009). For the CPC, if the project becomes successful, the Tibet case, the most 
well-known and sensitive issue, can be an excellent model of their achievement of 
socialist development.  
 
Discursive Construction: China’s National Interest in Tibet 
 
1. Topics of the discursive construction and discursive strategy 
 
Reviewing the historical and socio-political context, this research examines the pattern 
of the discursive construction found at the Chinese government documents and elite 
discourses particularly since 1959, point at which the 14th Dalai Lama’s flight and the 
Tibetan uprising occurred. From that moment, the CPC’s policies towards Tibet became 
more aggressive. Even though to date, there have been varying degrees of their attitudes 
vis-à-vis the Tibet issue according to the historical context, but generally the CPC has 
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taken a hard-line stance on Tibet since then. 
This research distinguishes between three semantic macro-areas related to the 
discursive construction of China’s interest vis-à-vis Tibet. It should be noted that each 
process of discursive construction in the matrix is interdependent.  
 
1) the discursive construction of Chinese nation: Creating a myth 
2) the discursive construction of an anti-Chinese separatist: Searching for scapegoats 
3) the discursive construction of a collective present and future111: Justification of rule 
 
This research also focuses on the strategies involved in the discursive construction. As 
discussed in socio-political context, it seems obvious that nationalism is at the centre of 
the CPC’s strategies in their discursive constructions to realise the national interest. This 
paper distinguishes between three types of strategies: 1) strategy of generating 
nationalism; 2) strategy of stimulating nationalism; 3) strategy of neutralising 
nationalism. Each strategy may not be used independently – it is also interdependent.  
 
2. Discursive construction of Chinese nation: Creating a myth 
 
About the discursive construction of Chinese nation, it is necessary to understand how 
the CPC describes its minority issues. In the white papers related to the ethnic minority 
groups, they mention that “The People’s Republic of China is a united multi-ethnic state 
founded jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups… China has been a united multi-
ethnic country since ancient times” (SCIO, 2000). They also claim that: “The people of 
all ethnic groups fought unswervingly and succeeded in safeguarding national unity 
against acts aimed at splitting the country, which went counter to the historical trend and 
the will of the Chinese nation, including plots for the ‘independence of Tibet’… hatched 
or engineered by a few ethnic separatists with the support of imperialist invaders” 
(SCIO, 2000). As indicated above, the CPC’s policy towards minorities is based on the 
theory of unity of pluralistic society of Chinese nation. Actually the concept, Chinese 
nation, does not merely mean aggregation of ethnic groups – it clearly contains the 
meaning that every society must be integrated in the name of motherland, China. 
                                           
111 This research hires this area of discursive construction from Cillia et al. (1999). This aspect includes 
the topics of “citizenship, political achievement, present and future political problems, prospective 
political aims and political virtues/values.”  
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Following statement can prove this idea: “Regional autonomy for ethnic minorities in 
China means that, under the unified leadership of the state, regional autonomy is 
practiced in areas where people of ethnic minorities live in compact communities” 
(SCIO, 2005). It goes without saying that the centre of the unified leadership of the state 
has always been monopolised by Han people. In this regard, as it is indicated, seemingly, 
the PRC emphasises the aim of co-existence, but actually, its policy towards minorities 
intends to achieve the assimilation of minority ethnic groups into Han, in the long run. 
The position of the CPC on Tibet is, of course, in line with this. Its white papers 
related to the Tibet issue112 contain the statements that “Tibet has been an inseparable 
part of China since ancient times”; “So-called ‘Tibet independence’ was part of 
imperialist aggressors’ attempt to carve up China”; “The Liberation of Tibet was an 
important part of the cause of the Chinese people’s liberation” (SCIO, 2011). Elite 
discourses on this matter are not different, even stronger. Former President Hu Jintao, in 
the annual meeting of the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in 2008, said that “Our conflict 
with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human 
rights problem. It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the 
motherland” (Xinhua, 2008). In an interview with Xinhua in 1991, Li Peng also 
indicated that “We have only one fundamental principle, namely, Tibet is inalienable 
part of China. On this fundamental issue, there is no room for haggling. The central 
government has always expressed its willingness to have contact with the Dalai Lama… 
All matters except ‘Tibetan independence’ can be discussed” (Ram, 2007).   
The headings of “unification,” “motherland,” “part of China,” “history” and 
“liberation” have been extensively used in such discourses to construct the status / 
notion of China’s Tibet and Chinese nation. These terms may serve to mythologise new 
Chinese nation under the rule of CPC. The CPC has continuously tried to instill this 
constructed myth into their ethnic minorities including Tibetans. Deng Xiaoping, with 
the interview with AP correspondents in 1978, mentioned that “[T]he Dalai Lama may 
return, but only as a citizen of China… we have but one demand, patriotism. And we 
say that anyone is welcome, whether he embraces patriotism early or late” (SCIO, 1992, 
emphasis added). This remark may provide a microcosm of the CPC’s approaches 
towards the minority groups to nourish the new Chinese nation – they have tried to 
generate a new form of nationalism, designed to embrace (or assimilate) the minorities. 
                                           
112 Until 2014, they have published 92 white papers on the various issues since its establishment, and 10 
of them are related to Tibet issue. It is more than 10% of the total publications.  
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However, unlike many other minority groups, their attempts to impose this nationalism 
on Tibet may have not succeeded in making a soft landing. Still many Tibetans are 
struggling against China’s rule over Tibet and the 14th Dalai Lama, who is regarded as a 
separatist by the CPC, is leading an active life as a spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. 
The CPC may have realised that they need a different strategy that goes beyond just 
generating and imposing the nationalism. This is a starting point of CPC’s attempts at 
setting the discursive construction of an anti-Chinese separatist. 
 
3. Discursive construction of anti-Chinese separatists: Searching for 
scapegoats 
 
After / while constructing the myth of the Chinese nation, the CPC needs to fortify the 
imagined castle. They have done strong antagonising and exclusionary discursive 
practices to achieve this goal. Indeed, creating a common enemy, or othering,113 could 
help strengthen the majoritarian unity. Insofar as Tibet is concerned, the Target has 
usually been the 14th Dalai Lama. It is not surprising anymore to see that Chinese 
leaders criticise and smear the Dalai Lama. Xi Jinping said that “We should thoroughly 
fight against separatist activities by the Dalai clique by firmly relying on all ethnic 
groups... and completely smash any plot to destroy stability in Tibet and jeopardise 
national unity” (BBC, 2011). Hu Jintao also once stated that “As long as the Dalai side 
stops activities splitting the motherland, stops activities scheming and instigating 
violence… we are ready to continue contacts and talks with him at any time” (Xinhua, 
2008). Jia Xiudong, senior research fellow at the China Institute of international studies, 
in his interview with BBC, said that “He [Dalai Lama] doesn’t use the word 
‘independence’, he says the ‘highest autonomy’, but to the ears of people here in China, 
when they look at the specific demands by the Dalai Lama, people believe that actually 
behind all those words of ‘highest autonomy’ it actually means ‘independence’. So that 
is the problem” (BBC, 2015). Zhu Weiqun, the Vice Minister of the United Front Work 
Department of the CPC, has taken a more aggressive position.  
 
After he ran away to India he organized a puppet government and declared a puppet constitution. 
All of his behaviour demonstrates he had already separated himself from the motherland and its 
people. This political situation persists today. In 1995, the central government, considering the 
                                           
113 For more details on this concept, see Said (2003).  
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separatist activities of the Dalai over the years, awarded him ‘four hats’: the head of the political 
body embarking on separatism in order to achieve ‘Tibetan independence’ and becoming the loyal 
tool of the international anti-China force, the general purpose being to provoke social instability in 
Tibet and the biggest impediment to Tibetan Buddhism maintaining normal social order. Since then, 
the Dalai has successively proven that the ‘four hats’ exactly match his head, by his words and 
behaviour. (Aiming, 2011, pp.7-8, emphasis added) 
 
He also said “Their [The Dalai Lama’s side] false assumption regarding the alleged 
bankruptcy of the CPC and collapse of the Chinese government was due to their 
misunderstanding of the circumstances in Beijing after the turmoil of 1989... However, 
it was rather unfortunate for the Dalai Lama because China did not collapse at all” 
(China’s Tibet, 2010). Most recently, about the reincarnation issue briefly dealt with 
above, he mentioned that “Politically speaking, he has betrayed his homeland… 
Religiously speaking, he has betrayed Tibetan Buddhism and the succession system of 
the Dalai Lama which requires strict religious rituals… Now the Dalai Lama has to tout 
his own religious title to gain attention, which has no future” (Xinhua, 2015a; see also 
Buckley, 2015). He criticise the Dalai Lama not only for betrayal of the PRC but for that 
of the Tibetan people. The keywords of these kinds of remarks are “separatist,” 
“violence,” “instability,” “betrayal” and “anti-China.”   
The CPC needs to consolidate the internal integrity for establishing new Chinese 
nation. Exceptional cases would not be acceptable to achieve this goal – the 2014 Hong 
Kong protests114 may convince the CPC of this idea. Protesters opposed the Hong Kong 
electoral reform proposed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(NPCSC) that the chief executive candidates have to love the country and love Hong 
Kong (see Woo, 2015), which implies that anyone who is against the central 
government cannot be a candidate (see Mitchell and Sevastopulo, 2014; see also 
Cheung and Chong, 2013). Many Hong Kong people still keep the memory of the time 
they sought refuge from political turmoil on the mainland including Cultural 
Revolution; and the experience of different system to the mainland China until 1997. 
They still suspect that the CPC will restrict Hong Kong’s autonomy and finally annex 
Hong Kong by force. Indeed, the CPC has confronted with difficulties in dealing with 
“one country two systems” (see Mckirdy, 2014) – in this regard, for the CPC, accepting 
the Dalai Lama’s concept, genuine autonomy, is unthinkable for fear that Tibet can be 
                                           
114 About the protests, see BBC (2014a). 
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another Hong Kong, which is a big obstacle to continuing her long-term project, 
building new Chinese nation under the CPC leadership. 
Many analysts argue that the CPC is highly concerned about the situation that 
losing single minority can bring the domino effect. Indeed, except special administrative 
regions, that is, Hong Kong and Macau, no minority has been allowed to have high 
degree of autonomy. Behind the Beijing’s offering minority welfare scheme like a quota 
subsidy system (SCIO, 2005), its attitude towards any voices and actions on sensitive 
topics such as autonomy and separation is extremely aggressive. In this situation, 
internationally well-known Tibet burdens the CPC to keep enforcing the minority 
policies. Even though many foreign countries including the U.S. cannot practically 
pressurise the CPC, continuing Tibetan people and Dalai Lama’s movements on the 
genuine autonomy or free Tibet can harm China’s international image and its discourse 
on Chinese nation and peaceful rise. The recent CPC’s reaction against Obama and 
Dalai Lama’s “spiritual” meeting115 well represent this aspect. 
 
Issues regarding Tibet concern China’s core interests and national sentiments. Beijing has long 
made it clear that the Dalai Lama, who has for decades tried to separate Tibet from China, should 
never be hosted by leaders of other countries… Frankly speaking, Obama needs the Dalai Lama 
not because the latter is respectful, as Obama claimed, but because the Dalai Lama is useful. For 
one thing, he is a separatist. For another, he comes from China and is against his own 
motherland… In essence, the Dalai Lama is just a handy tool for Obama to scramble for short-term 
gains, show off his moral clarity and score easy points at home. (Dongdong, 2015, emphasis added) 
 
This burden, however, can ironically help the CPC secure more domestic integrity. Here, 
it may be necessary to see the CPC’s strategy of stimulating nationalism. Obviously any 
separate movements (from the CPC’s perspective) and international concerns can 
awaken and stimulate dormant nationalism of Han people who account for around 92 % 
of the total population of China. New powerful Chinese nation under the CPC rule and 
the experiences of Century of Humiliation may have made Han Chinese sensitive to 
international (Western, especially) voices on China and any actions regarded as a 
separatist movement. Actually international concerns and pressures on minority issues 
have not had any serious influences on the PRC’s policies and actions, defended by the 
saying, interference in China’s domestic affairs; and this kind of discourse seems to be 
strongly supported by Han Chinese in general (Wang, 2012). The PRC’s accusation of 
                                           
115 About this event, see BBC (2015).  
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separatist movements of Dalai Lama can be interpreted as part of such discourse to 
stimulate Han Chinese nationalism. That is to say, the most sensitive Tibet can be the 
biggest burden for the PRC, but at the same time, it is the most powerful tool to unite 
majority people in China, which is China’s key interest (Beijing Review, 2013). As the 
spiral of silence theory 116  indicates, minorities could lose the opportunities or 
willingness (even feel threatened) to express their opinions against dominant views in 
this situation ― it can be argued that this is the path towards assimilation. 
 
4. Discursive construction of a collective present and future: Justification 
of rule 
 
Not only has CPC accused separatists of a trickster who threatens the development, 
integration and security of Chinese nation, but also they have propagated the 
development plan (especially on economy) designed for the minority areas to resolve 
dissatisfaction of the minority groups and to emphasise common prosperity. Here, again, 
the role and contribution of the central government are underlined. In the white paper on 
ethnic policy, it is stated that “the CPC and the Chinese government have carved out a 
path for the successful solution to ethnic issues with Chinese characteristics, exercised 
the ethnic policy featuring equality, unity, regional ethnic autonomy, and common 
prosperity for all ethnic groups” (SCIO, 2009). Especially, the economic development 
and improvement of living standards of the minority-dominated areas are usually 
highlighted to justify the CPC’s control over the regions, indicating that “This correct 
ethnic policy in line with China’s actual situation has fostered the unity and harmonious 
coexistence of all ethnic groups who are striving with one mind for economic 
development, political stability, cultural prosperity and social harmony” (SCIO, 2009, 
emphasis added). Statements on the Tibet case are not different. Following is one of 
many statements on the development of Tibet, related to economic growth in particular. 
 
Following the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Central Government has always given top priority to 
helping Tibet develop its economy, enhance its people's living standards, and change its 
impoverished and backward situation. It has issued a series of favorable policies, and made great 
achievements in promoting Tibet’s economy. Currently a relatively complete socialist market 
system has been established in the region, and historical leapfrog development has been realized in 
                                           
116 About the theory, see Noelle-Neumann (1974). According to him, people tend to follow the view of 
the majority for fear of being isolated from society or group.  
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terms of economic aggregate. Tibet’s economy is growing steadily and quickly. (SCIO, 2013, 
emphasis added) 
 
Almost all such statements include the role of the central government. The logic is 
simple: without motherland China (and CPC), without prosperous ethnic minorities and 
most of all, Chinese nation.  
According to this logic, China’s leaders promote a success story of their attempts 
at developing Tibet. Xi Jinping mentioned that “The extraordinary development of Tibet 
over the past 60 years points to an irrefutable truth: Without the Chinese Communist 
Party, there would have been no new China, no new Tibet” (BBC, 2011). Li Keqiang, 
the current Premier of the State Council of the PRC, also said that “Efforts should be 
given to the development of agriculture and animal husbandry and related processing 
business, making Tibet an important tourism destination in the world, and promoting 
commerce and trade with South Asia to boost the Tibetan economy” (Xinhua, 2015b). 
Wen Jiabao, to defend the Chinese government’s hard-line policies towards Tibet, 
argued that “The situation in Tibet is on the whole peaceful and stable. The Tibetan 
people hope to work in peace and stability… Tibet’s economic development in recent 
years proves the policies we have adopted are right” (Bodden, 2009). Zhu Weiqun also 
stated that:  
 
Since the opening-up, the central government has cared a great deal about the development of Tibet 
as one of the provinces of China and in succession held Tibetan works conferences five times. To 
my knowledge, Tibet is the only province given such special care by the central government… Not 
only does the central government give it special attention, but so also do all the people in our nation. 
That is why the central government has a special policy of caring about Tibet and the whole nation 
supports Tibet... and vice verse [sic]… We believe the 3 million people in Tibet, while they are 
receiving care and help from the people of the whole nation, are supporting the nation in return. 
(Aiming, 2011, pp.10-11, emphasis added) 
 
Not only do all these remarks legitimise the CPC’s control over Tibet by highlighting 
the economic growth, but they also describe such development as the common 
achievement of Chinese nation. In other words, the CPC’s argument is that we (as 
Chinese nation) have achieved the same goal and will share the same prospective aim – 
common prosperity led by the CPC. This means that by providing Tibetans with a clear 
vision, development, The CPC tries to stabilise the status of Tibet. They would not 
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expect Tibetans to become ardent patriots to wave the Chinese flag in a short period of 
time – they may need silent followers to conform to the rule of CPC at present. In this 
sense, the purpose of CPC’s conciliatory policy of development is nothing more than 
neutralisation of existing nationalism of Tibetans in order to make them ready to adapt 
to new Chinese nation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Considering all discursive practices and strategies so far, the CPC is not just interested 
in Tibet per se. They are also interested in Tibet as a tool to gain momentum to design 
and strengthen new Chinese nation under the CPC rule. Some scholars and analysts 
have described Beijing’s approach towards Tibet and Dalai Lama as irrational paranoia. 
This research, however, would argue that it is well-calculated paranoia to provoke Han 
nationalism. At the same time, the CPC attempts to neutralise the existing nationalism 
of Tibetans in China by emphasising the development agenda. In the short run, the 
purpose of such attempt may be to make silent followers – in the long run, it would be 
the path towards assimilation as it is de-mythologising existing identity of Tibetans in 
China, which may be the CPC’s real interest that has long been pursued and shaped.  
 It seems clear that the CPC evaluates that Tibet is reaching the last stage of the 
socialist development. Indeed, different from what the CPC has propagated, its aim of 
any practices in Tibet is heading for the path towards assimilation. To take an example, 
the CPC argues that their policy on regional national autonomy has been designed and 
implemented to guarantee that each minority can keep its own cultural identity during 
the transitional period. However, actually this may be also designed for the fusion of the 
minorities into Zhonghua Minzu because: 1) anyway the autonomous regions are part of 
the PRC’s administrative structure; 2) any political activities in the regional level must 
be approved by the CPC; 3) Han migration is recommended and implemented by the 
central government; 4) the minority cadres are trained and appointed by the CPC, and 
they usually play a role in conveying and executing the central government’s policies 
(see Potter, 2011, pp.78-82). The PRC’s national minority education also contributes to 
completing the socialist development in Tibet. Xi, in the meeting on the work of 
southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, addressed that “efforts should also be 
made to incorporate education on socialist core values into courses in schools at various 
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levels, popularize the national commonly-used language and script, and strive to foster 
Party-loving and patriotic builders and successors of the socialist cause” (Xinhua, 
2015b, emphasis added). In addition to this, recently, the CPC announced that every 
monk and nun has to be tested for their patriotism forcing them to install national flags, 
telephone connections, newspapers and reading rooms in monasteries (Guardian, 2015). 
All things considered, the real interest and intention of the PRC’s Tibet policies and 
attitudes is to destroy the existing identity as a Tibetan and integrate it into Han 
dominated Chinese nation according to its unique socialist nation theory.  
Lastly, before completing the chapter, one question may still remain: then how 
has India affected the internal process of China’s interest formation in Tibet? As the 
historical context section indicates, it was British India who made the Qing re-examine 
the Tibet issues with a modern nation state concept. Also, it seems that Tibet still 
remains a sensitive issue when it comes to Sino-Indian relations. However, so far as the 
domestic interest formation of the PRC is concerned, this research would argue that 
India is not one of the major variables affecting the PRC’s interest formation 
mechanism in the domestic level. Of course it is obvious that for the PRC, India can 
potentially be (or has been) one of the biggest threats who can harm the PRC’s interests 
vis-à-vis Tibet as India has been the host to the Dalai Lama and the largest exile 
Tibetans since 1959; and was the enemy in the Sino-Indian War in 1962. This, however, 
does not necessarily mean that India has direct impact on the PRC’s internal interest 
formation. Whatever India takes any actions, the PRC would pursue what it believes to 
be necessary to achieve the socialist development of Tibet; and realise Chinese nation. 
If there is no Indian variable, would the CPC’s policy line and attitude towards Tibet be 
different? Hardly thinkable. What India can touch is already shaped / defined interest, 
not by them, but by the needs of the CPC. Actually it is very different from the case of 
India. India’s pursuit of interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been highly concerned with her 
relations with China. This aspect will be dealt with in the next chapter.  
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Chapter VII. Constructing National Interest:  
India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet 
 
 
This chapter examines how India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been constructed 
in discourse. Unlike the case of China, India’s domestic interest formation vis-à-vis 
Tibet is deeply concerned with her relations with China. It was British India who 
initially included Tibet in their one of the strategic national interests to counter the 
potential Russia’s influence on Tibet that had a direct border with British India. They 
argued with the Chinese governments on the status of Tibet and border demarcation; 
and failed to have an agreement on such issues. British India’s position towards Tibet 
remained ambivalent – and this ambivalence was inherited by the independent India and 
their pursuit of interest with regard to Tibet has become “weak reactionary behaviours” 
vis-à-vis China, losing the substantial control over Tibet. This situation still remains the 
same. This chapter first briefly reviews British India’s concept of national interest with 
regard to Tibet and its legacy; and examines the discursive practices of Indian elites in 
order to find out how they are currently formulating national interest with regard to the 
Tibet issue. It is worth mentioning that in this chapter, the data generated from the 
interviews held by the researcher are extensively used. 
 
Historical and Socio-Political Context 
 
Initially, India’s political relations with Tibet were materialised by frontier British 
officials such as Charles Bell, Basil Gould and Hugh Richardson in the late 19th and 
early 20th century. Until then, there was little connection between mainland India and 
Tibet (Anand, 2012). It was also British India who initially tried to define the national 
interest with regard to Tibet. The British invasion of Tibet under the leadership of Sir 
Francis Younghusband in 1903-1904 forced Tibet to rectify its ambiguous political 
status (Anand, 2012). At that time, the primary purpose of this invasion was to check 
the Russian advance towards British Indian territories. The end of the Qing dynasty, 
there was a power vacuum in Tibet, which gave Tibet an opportunity to be de facto 
independence. The new Chinese government was too weak to restore imperial authority 
in Tibet. In the Simla conference in 1914, British, China and Tibet failed to reach a 
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consensus over the boundary alignment between Inner Tibet under Chinese suzerainty 
and outer Tibet with practically total autonomy. McMahon who supported the concept 
of buffer status of Tibet, proposed the new border line, so-called McMahon Line, but it 
was not accepted by any Chinese governments from then on. The establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) transformed the situation totally – as reviewed in the 
previous chapter, in 1951, Beijing and Lhasa signed the Seventeen Point Agreement for 
the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, and since then, Tibet has been under the PRC control. 
In 1954, India and China signed “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and it 
was the first time for India to accept Tibet as part of China. However, the flight of 14th 
Dalai Lama to India and the Tibetan uprising in 1959 exacerbated the relation between 
India and China. China soon after required the renewal of 1954 treaty, but India refused 
to sign it again. This was one of the causes of 1962 Sino-Indian War, and India was 
harshly defeated, and from then on, India has not been able to restore any substantial 
control power over the Tibetan plateau. It was 2003, the year in which India officially 
signed the declaration that Tibet is an autonomous region of China. And most recently, 
the Prime Minister Mody, reaffirm that Tibet is part of China (Panda, 2014). During this 
course of history, unlike China, India has not had any clear framework to pursue their 
interest with regard to Tibet since the independence. Actually after independence they 
still sought the advice from Britain (see IOR/L/PS/12/1433; see also 
IOR/L/PS/12/4232). Then it is important to review how British India defined her 
interests with regard to Tibet. Below table is a summary of the British India’s position 
and interest with regard to Tibet since 1912 to 1950.  
 
[Table. 11] British India’s Interests with regard to Tibet 
Year Situation Content 
1912 
The fall of the 
Qing Dynasty 
It will be remembered that in the preamble of the Anglo-
Russian Convention the special interest of Great Britain in 
the maintenance of the Status Quo in the external relations of 
Tibet was admitted… Desire of government to see internal 
autonomy in Tibet under Chinese suzerainty but without 
Chinese interference and maintenance of cordial relations 
between Tibet and India. (IOR/L/PS/11/24) 
1921 
The 1907 
Anglo-Russian 
Treaty was 
jointly 
renounced by 
Russian and 
The northern frontier of India will fall under Japanese, as 
well as under Chinese, influence. Will the new India, 
autonomous or semi-autonomous, be able to protect 
adequately fifteen hundred miles of such a frontier? Surely 
not. She will be weaker, rather than stronger, as regards 
external defence. In any case she will no longer have what is 
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British  perhaps the best land frontier in the world, the lofty plateau 
of Northern Tibet. Fifteen hundred miles from east to west, 
four or five hundred miles from north to south, never less 
than sixteen thousand feet above the sea and almost 
uninhabited, this inhospitable table-land is the real barrier of 
India to the north… Finally, we should recognise India’s vital 
interests in this problem and the dangers that threaten her in 
our present policy of inaction. (Mss Eur F80/202) 
1940 
Age of 14th 
Dalai Lama 
began 
Our interests in Tibet are maintenance there of an 
autonomous state under a stable and friendly government, 
able to preserve order and keep the peace beyond the 
northern frontier of India, and the exclusion from Tibet of 
any influence hostile to ourselves, such as that of the Soviet 
Union. It follows that the exclusion of Chinese 
administration is also desirable, because its unpopularity and 
inefficiency would lead to disorder, and because of the 
possibility that at some time in the future the Government of 
China, and hence Tibet, might fall under Soviet or Japanese 
control. The policy hitherto pursued by the Tibetan 
Government of discouraging the entry of Europeans into 
their country also accords – generally speaking – with our 
interests. (IOR/L/PS/18/B448A) 
1941-
1945 
World War II 
The behavior of the Chinese between 1904 and 1910 and in 
particular their activities in Nepal, Bhutan and the tribal areas 
of Assam, made it evident that the chief value to India of 
good relations with Tibet lay in the preservation of a friendly 
buffer state, so far as possible in political isolation. From this 
aspect, the maintenance of a friendly Tibetan Government 
sufficiently strong to defend itself, and the establishment of a 
satisfactory and accepted Indo-Tibetan frontier, in case the 
first line of policy were to break down, are the main objects 
of British policy towards Tibet. (Mss Eur F288/64) 
1947 
Independent 
India 
It follows that while the Government of India are glad to 
recognise and wish to see Tibetan autonomy maintained, they 
are not prepared to do more than encourage this in a friendly 
manner and are certainly not disposed to take any initiative 
which might bring India into conflict with China on this 
issue. (IOR/L/PS/12/4210) 
1948 
Independent 
India 
For in spite of changes within India, the same dangers 
threaten without, only more intensified, with increased 
Russian expansionalism. As before, Tibet serves India as a 
unique buffer. With the progress of science the world has 
grown smaller, and we have been told that militarily Tibet 
has not the same value as was thought before. But some 
military experts at least disagree; and we cannot foresee the 
values that others may assign to this large area with reference 
to scientific developments of the future. In any case Tibet’s 
value remains as a political and social buffer… the 
preservation of Tibetan integrity and of Tibetan friendship is 
essential to India. (Mss Eur D998/39) 
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1949 
The 
establishment of 
PRC 
It is very much in the interests of the security of India (and 
hence of the whole of Southern Asia) that Tibet should not 
fall under Communist influence. I am pretty confident that 
there is no risk at all of an indigenous Communist movement 
in Tibet and the danger consequently comes from the 
possibility of a Chinese reconquest of Tibet or the Tibetans 
becoming sufficiently frightened of the Chinese as to take 
orders from the Chinese Mission in Lhasa, in its turn taking 
its orders from a Communist Government in China. It is 
therefore in India’s interests (and indirectly in our interest 
that the Chinese Mission should be closed down. 
(IOR/L/PS/12/4232) 
 
Considering all the contents in the above table, British India and early Indian 
government desired Tibet as a buffer state against Russians and Chinese. However, 
post-colonial India’s attitudes towards the Tibet issue was somewhat passive, depending 
on Nehru’s idealism (see Topgyal, 2011) and British, since Simla conference, had never 
been sincere in resolving the Tibet question (see Anand, 2012) – and after India’s 
independence, they tried to avoid the responsibility for a derivative of their activities, 
such as McMahon line. As indicated above, this tendency of ambiguity has continued 
without clear India’s Tibet policy and interest. Then, considering this background 
information, this research examines how today’s Indian elites define and pursue the 
national interest with regard to Tibet.  
 
Discursive Construction: India’s National Interest in Tibet 
 
1. Topics of the discursive construction and discursive strategy 
 
Unlike the Chinese case, it is not easy to discover a distinct discursive framework in 
India’s pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet. The languages on the Tibet issues tend 
to be selected and practiced very cautiously and implicitly as well. However, it seems 
clear that the Tibet issue is still in one of the important categories in Indian elites’ 
discourses especially when it comes to dealing with her relations with China. This 
research attempts to distinguish between two semantic macro-fields related to the 
discursive construction of India’s national interest with regard to Tibet. Each process of 
discursive construction in the matrix is interdependent. 
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1) the discursive construction of passivity: “What can we do?” 
2) the discursive construction of positive self-presentation and negative other-  
  presentation: “We are different” 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is clear sign of the CPC’s attempts at shaping 
and using nationalism as a strategic tool to realise their interests. However, in the case 
of India, regarding the India’s pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet, nationalistic 
strategy in discourse as a momentum to gain the public supports is not very vivid. 
However, it does not mean that there is no such attempt. Especially in the second 
process of the discursive construction, this research finds out the evidence where the 
elite groups of India have tried to build and stimulate nationalism via the Tibet issue. 
This will be addressed in detail later on. 
 
2. Discursive construction of passivity: “What can we do?” 
 
As China’s rule over the Tibetan plateau has become more stable and the economic 
cooperation between China and India has significantly expanded, the elite’s use of 
discourse related to the Tibet issue may have become more discreet. Also, there must be 
a strategic calculation that India would not benefit from worsening the relations with 
China; or keeping the Tibet issue alive silently. The tendency of this “acknowledgement 
of reality” is easily seen in the elite discourse in India. By arguing that “Tibet is not 
important in Sino-Indian relations,” during his interview on 30th May 2013 with this 
researcher, Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, senior fellow of the IDSA opined that: 
 
There is no public support for Tibet… What can we do for Tibet? What does the world want India 
to do in Tibet? We [India] cannot do anything for Tibet. We cannot feed all people. We liberated 
Bangladesh, but what did we get? What can we get from Tibet liberation? Nothing. Maybe 
Americans will come and see Tibet once it becomes independent? Or Tibet will fight with India? [It 
is possible] because the Tibetan’s minds will be able to be despoiled by Americans, Russians, 
Chinese or Japanese. You see, Chinese do not claim too much land. Tibet would claim more land. If 
China is controlling Tibet, they will not claim more territories of India because they are sitting on 
Tibet. But if Tibet is independent, they will claim Ladakh, they will claim Sikkim, they will claim 
Bhutan and so on. [Currently] Part of Tibet is China, and part of Tibet is India. If it [Tibet] becomes 
independent, then India also has to sacrifice. Our territory will go. (emphasis added) 
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The “no public support for Tibet” used in this quotation is clearly an attempt at 
justifying the idea that Tibet is not “national” interest. Actually the term “public” is 
conveniently singularised to describe Indian people as a being different from the 
Tibetans. “We” used here may not include the Tibetans as he postulates that Tibet can 
demand the India’s “sacrifice,” which is against India’s pursuit of national interest. 
Similar to this argument, during his interview on 31st May 2013 with the author, Dr. 
Jagannath P. Panda, Research Fellow at the IDSA opined that: 
 
I think if we [India] try to see the Tibetan community, I don’t think the Indian Government can do 
much for the Tibetans. Because we have constitutional constraints. First, the Tibetans are 
considered as refugees. Refugees are kind of a guest. India is a democratic country, so Tibetans are 
anyway welcomed for political reasons, but nothing more than that. But I have interviewed many 
Tibetan people, and they think that the Indian Government should do something for the Tibetan 
people. And I have also met some high level officials. Now the discussion is going on. The 
discussion is that we will make the limited citizenship, or partial citizenship to the Tibetans… It 
will take much time although Tibetans are part of Indian community. (emphasis added) 
 
Even though he did not exclude the Tibetan people from the boundary of Indian 
community, his argument is also in line with the Stobdan’s idea as both may agree with 
that India cannot do much for Tibetans – obviously Stobdan’s argument is more strong 
and aggressive, claiming that there is no need to do so. This kind of passive tendency is 
found in the discourses on the controversial issues between China and India as well. 
Especially on the issue of China’s construction of dams on the Tibet’s rivers, Brigadier 
of the Indian Army, Mandip Singh, during an interview dated 30th May 2013 with the 
author of this thesis said that:  
 
It will become an issue… the practical solution would be to highlight the international level of 
commitment and treaty… we are aware of the water shortage problems in China. The point is that 
diverting water [in Tibet] is different from harnessing the water. We [India] have no objection that 
China harnesses the waters, but we definitely have a concern on diverting waters. If they divert 
waters permanently, lower riparian countries like India and Bangladesh will have a serious problem 
in irrigation in particular. They have to ensure a certain commitment… and the data regarding the 
water issues should be shared. But currently, we can’t do anything which is practical at the moment. 
(emphasis added)   
 
By saying that Tibet as a bargaining chip is neither effective nor helpful in establishing a 
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peaceful atmosphere between China and India, R. N. Das, senior fellow at IDSA 
(interviewed at his office at New Delhi on 1st June 2013), gave a similar viewpoint. 
 
Tibet issue is important, but not very much in Sino-Indian relations… The mutual understanding on 
border and water issue has much been improved. Tibet is culturally strongly connected to India, so 
it is very important guest for India, but China is also important neighbor, and in reality it is much 
more important… Dam issue is indeed a sensitive matter in Sino-Indian relations, but there has 
been a positive gesture from Chinese side and the both countries have made an improvement in 
dealing with the water issues together… and realistically, what else we can do? We have to wait 
and we have to continuously persuade China to solve this issue together. (emphasis added) 
 
Stobdan also argued that “recently Chinese prime minister agreed to have joint 
mechanism to monitor the water data and they will inform us what is happening there, 
so there has been some progress on that. Some progress. [The idea that China can stop 
or divert water] is speculation. At the moment, nobody knows. It’s only a concern at the 
moment, not a problem.” During the interviews, the above interviewees continuously 
emphasised the progress that India has made in terms of the water data sharing with 
China. However, actually what the Indian government has gained from the diplomatic 
discussion with China has been to have promise that the CPC “will share” more data in 
the near future. Interestingly, the span of the “near future” has been extended year by 
year. The interviewees acknowledged this point, but they repeated the importance of 
making progress.  
 About possibly more sensitive issue, China’s military expansion in Tibet, while 
expressing a deep concern, their attitudes remain the same. Singh mentioned that “It is a 
sensitive issue, and the Indian Armed Forces have also prepared ourselves for the 
potential conflicts with China. But there is huge gap in the military budge between the 
two countries… And it is my belief that it’s not necessary to have any battles with China. 
There is no benefit.” Stobdan asked in return, “China is doing that everywhere. For 
military point of view, it is important, but what can we do on it?”  
 The two interviewees also expressed a pessimistic view on the existence and 
usefulness of India’s soft power vis-à-vis China. As indicated in chapter V, currently 
many scholars in India have highlighted the link between the Tibetan Buddhism and 
India’s soft power. Those who emphasise this relationship argue that Buddhist heritage 
of Tibet can promote India’s soft power to international community. In particular, they 
believe that thanks to the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetans, India can secure her 
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border areas vis-à-vis China by possessing those who are Buddhist and pro-Tibet and 
pro-“generous India” surrounding so-called Himalayan belt (see Anand, 2013; see also 
Moynihan, 2014). However, Singh, as indicated above, took a cautious approach to the 
issue by saying that: 
 
Yes, to some extent [soft power thanks to legacy of Tibetan Buddhism can help India secure their 
Himalayan border areas]. Tibet has contributed to secure [sic] the Himalayan border area by 
enhancing India’s soft power. Especially in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have a predominant 
Buddhist population. However, we can’t use it explicitly in national level vis-à-vis China. If we do 
so, it can create unnecessary tensions [between India and China]. It couldn’t be a national strategy 
of India… We have to think about other important issues. Having a good relationship with China is 
one of them. (emphasis added)  
 
Stobdan directly refuted the idea of the relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and soft 
power of India.  
 
… Korea, there is Buddhism, Japan, there is Buddhism and even China, there is Buddhism. 
Buddhism is also not state religion of Tibet. Then our [Indian] polices towards Japan, Korea, China 
and Tibet related to religion are all the same. Why only Tibetan Buddhism has different something? 
Sri Lanka and Thailand are also a Buddhist country. India is not a religious country, it is a secular 
country. Yes, there are cultural relationship since Tibet has border with India, Assam, so there has 
been people to people contact, maybe, but India itself is not Buddhist. How can it support other 
Buddhist? It is a country for Muslims and Hindus. Many people do not know anything about 
Buddhism… There is some general idea about Buddhism and the Dalai Lama. But there are one 
thousand, two thousand and one million people in India who are religious. The Dalai Lama is also 
one of them. The Dalai Lama is more recognised because of Western creation, media creation, 
Western media creation. So-called American project to contain China, or CIA project. (emphasis 
added) 
 
The degree of disagreement is different but their approaches towards the Tibet issues 
and relations with China are heading the same direction. However, not every elite group 
in India takes the passive attitudes with regard to the India’s relations with China and 
the Tibet issue. The discourses on Tibet and China practiced by India’s two right wing 
Hindu-nationalist organisations, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) make a striking example. By criticising Jawaharlal Nehru 
as he “offered Tibet on a platter to China,” which has brought out the situation where 
India is “under the direct threat from China” (India Today, 2003), the former 
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International President of VHP Ashok Singhal argued that “We can liberate Tibet and 
Pak [Pakistan]-occupied-Kashmir if people unite against atrocities committed against 
them” (Friends of Tibet, 2003) and “India should tell China to free Tibet and the Dalai 
Lama should rule there” (Singhal, 2009 cited Phayul, 2009). RSS leader, Indresh Kumar, 
also maintained that “Government of India should review the policy for Tibetans living 
in India, so that they can live with ease and reach their goal of independent Tibet” 
(Kumar 2012 cited in Business Standard, 2012). By pointing out that “Tibet was never 
part of China,” he also claimed that India’s accepting Tibet as part of China was “the 
diplomatic, political and humanitarian crime” (Kumar, 2008, cited in Ramesh, 2008). 
 Some Indian scholars also criticised the Indian Government for its passive 
attitudes towards Tibet and China. Chellaney (2015), by criticising the current India’s 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi for having “resumed doing what the ‘weakling’ 
Manmohan Singh had halted since 2010, referring to Tibet as part of China in joint 
statements with Beijing,” claimed that: 
 
Tibet is India’s only important instrument of leverage against a muscular China bent upon altering 
the territorial, river-waters and geopolitical status quo and fomenting terrorism in India’s 
northeast… Tibet, ever since China eliminated it as a buffer, has been at the heart of the India-
China divide. It will remain so until Beijing pursues reconciliation and healing there. Modi, given 
his dynamic, forward-looking foreign policy, must work to gradually reclaim the Tibet leverage 
against a China that openly challenges India’s territorial integrity by claiming Indian areas on the 
basis of their alleged ecclesial or tutelary links with annexed Tibet. China’s attempt at expanding 
annexation draws encouragement from India’s imprudent acceptance since the Nehruvian era of 
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The Dalai Lama is India’s strategic asset and ultimate trump card. If 
India is to safeguard its Tibet leverage for use, it must plan to act as a pivot in the Tibetan process 
to find, appoint and shield the next Dalai Lama. (emphasis added.) 
  
Unlike Stobdan and Singh’s discreet approaches towards China and the Tibet issues, 
Chellaney actively demands the Indian Government’s stronger voice vis-à-vis China 
with the Tibet card. He also maintained that “India must not shy away from urging 
China to begin a process of reconciliation and healing in Tibet in its own interest and in 
the interest of stable Sino-Indian relations. China’s hydro-engineering projects are 
another reminder that Tibet is at the heart of the India-China divide and why India must 
regain leverage over the Tibet issue” (Chellaney, 2014, emphasis added). It seems that 
such hardline position, however, is not largely accepted by the elite groups in India. 
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Also, in view of the Indian government’s attitudes towards Tibet, anti-China discourse 
is not shared by the mainstream politicians. Indeed, the organisations that support Tibet 
to contain China are supported neither by other elite groups nor by the public as they are 
prone to be indulged in far-right approaches towards domestic and international affairs 
based on excessive Hindu nationalism (see Anand, 2011b). For example, by saying that 
Pakistan and Bangladesh are also Hindu nations, RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat claimed 
that “we need to stick to this belief [India is Hindu nation]. We can change ourselves in 
other areas, but the belief that India is Hindu nation cannot be discarded at any cost” 
(Srivastava, 2015). Singhal also stated that “I was at the Sai Baba Ashram117 where Sai 
Baba told me by 2020 the entire country will be Hindu and 2030 the entire world will be 
Hindu. I feel that revolution has started” (The Indian Express, 2015). If they firmly 
exclude non-Hindus in India, their ideas could not be widely shared and supported by 
the public. And most of all, it seems that there is tendency for Indian elites to avoid 
showing hardline attitudes vis-à-vis China and the Tibet issue explicitly, regardless of 
their actual practices. This tendency of passiveness and silence may have to be justified 
to gain the public supports in the name of strategic ambivalence, showing off their 
“well-calculated prudence.” This is the reason for their discursive practices saying, “We 
are different from China,” the discursive construction of difference, positive self-
presentation and negative other- presentation. 
 
3. Discursive construction of positive self-presentation and negative 
other- presentation: “We are different” 
 
Maybe because of the deep power imbalances, the passive voices are prevalent among 
Indian elites as seen in the above. However, at the same time, aside from the political 
question on Tibet, they actively promote India’s democratic and humanitarian value to 
the public as well as international community. This is why India has enjoyed the image 
of “better than China,” in spite of the huge inequalities in its society and a lot of human 
right issues, which is actually never better than China. Tibet, of course contributes to 
such better image and the elite groups in India use the Tibet issue to differentiate India 
from China. Basically they try to explain their passivity vis-à-vis China by comparing 
the culture and philosophy between India and China. Singh argued that: 
                                           
117 Ashram is a monastery in Hinduism. Sai Baba was an Indian spiritual master. 
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I think it [passive attitude] is from a certain culture of the ruling elites, which is so-called 
Nehrubian culture… Nehru was idealistic and had democratic background, so he believed that the 
use of diplomacy is more important than the use of military. This culture still affects Indian elites… 
that is a part of problem of democracy. Decision-making in democracy is slow and the Nehrubian 
culture is added in Indian case. I think this is a basic reason why India has taken a bit passive 
attitude vis-à-vis China… because of this passivity, actually we [India] have lost Nepal, we have 
lost the rule over Sri Lanka and we have lost the control over Bangladesh. It is only because of the 
passivity… However, personally I believe that India’s democracy and culture is more sustainable 
and stable. We could accept and still have the Tibetan refugees thanks to this aspects… Many 
people say China’s collapse, but no one says India’s collapse. (emphasis added) 
 
In his statement, the role of culture is emphasised. It is claimed that in India, there is 
less violent culture thanks to the legacy of Nehru’s idealism. Even though he opined that 
due to the passive approach towards the international politics, India has lost many 
political interests – however, he concluded his remark by pursuing positive self-
presentation with his opinion on the democracy of India which is hardly seen in China. 
He also highlighted that India’s acceptance of the Tibetan refugees has been possible 
thanks to India’s democratic and idealistic culture. Stobdan also explained India’s 
passivity with the cultural perspective. 
 
India is a soft state, India’s concept of security is not military. Indian concept of security is peace. 
If you have security, not necessarily you have peace. Tibetans could come to India not just because 
of the distance but because of this kind of culture… Security does not guarantee peace. But if you 
have peace, security is guaranteed. India’s philosophy is based on peace. Indian security is based 
on peace. We don’t have any military doctrine. Because they believe peace gives you security. Not 
military gives you security… Chinese philosophy [on security] is derived from communism, which 
is Western. Russian Stalinism, Leninism, it is Western philosophy. But originally Chinese 
philosophy was based on peace. But after communism, they changed. Whether it is Liberal 
philosophy or communist philosophy, they are all from Europe. (emphasis added) 
 
In the bottom of the excerpt, negative other-presentation is seen without an explicit 
explanation on the reason why Western philosophy and communism are necessarily 
anti-peace; and the way India has been free from the Western influence in their peace-
oriented concept of security. Anyway, he also claimed that India’s philosophy and 
approach towards the concept of security are different from those of China – and this 
difference has allowed India to accommodate the Tibetan refugees.  
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On the question of India and China’s nationalism and its role in shaping the 
national interests with regard to Tibet, the discursive strategy of positive self; and 
negative other-presentation is widely used. Col P K Gautam, research fellow of the 
IDSA, during an interview dated 1st May 2013 with the author mentioned that 
“Nationalism is necessary to shape the interests, but not violently or negatively, which 
China is now doing. India’s nationalism regarding the Tibet issue will never take that 
way” Singh opined that “In India, nationalism also matters in shaping the national 
interest vis-à-vis Tibet and China. But different thing from China is, Chinese 
nationalism is tempered by the CPC, and the CPC has extensively used nationalistic and 
emotional appeal, which India has never done” (emphasis added). By claiming that 
“India’s passive reaction against China is originated form cultural background,” Das 
also maintained that “We [India] are a peace-loving country. We are different from 
China who has materialistic and nationalistic position vis-à-vis other countries and 
Tibet… China uses nationalism to pursue their interests and sometimes it can make 
other countries uncomfortable… Indian public is also very nationalistic in terms of 
China issue and how they deal with the Tibetan people.” Panda even though he 
disagreed the idea that there is nationalism factor in India affecting the Tibet question, 
opined that: 
 
What I believe is that we anticipate that there will be a different kind of nationalism. If China’s 
constant provocation continues, probably there will be growth of nationalism in India. In that 
context, I think Indian nationalism would like to welcome the Tibetan community… the Chinese 
nationalism always tries to destroy the Tibetan community, but the Indian nationalism will likely to 
play as a big brother, to protect the Tibetans. So there is cultural difference. It is partly because 
India is a democratic country. In a democratic country, you really become a considerate society. 
You don’t become an aggressive society all the time. When it comes to China and Tibet issue, the 
discourse on Tibet in India is quite accommodative. (emphasis added) 
 
Interestingly, their emphasis of differences between India and China concerning the 
Tibet question always contains the negative and debasing aspect of China. Self-
reflective discourses are hardly found in this topic. This tendency is also found at my 
interview with Gautam. He is an author of the book Tibet and India’s Security: 
Himalayan Region, Refugees and Sino-Indian Relations, and expertised in Tibetan 
Buddhism and culture. It is worth reviewing the part of my conversation with him as it 
contains full of the pursuit of positive self; and negative other-presentation.  
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(1) A = Author; G = Gautam 
[G]: … There is very important issue, self-determination. This is important because India is also 
having the same problem of nation building, either integration or assimilation. So, we India 
says it’s integration, that is, national integration, not national assimilation.  
[A]: Can you explain it more? How is it different? 
[G]: Yes, it [what China’s concept of assimilation] is unnatural. Assimilation is what you swallow 
them up. I don’t think assimilation is possible. From that point of view, the whole society and 
culture [of India] are different from China. There is moral issue also. You can’t suppress 
people like that. Politicisation and Culturalisation doesn’t work by force though I agree with 
[China’s] conception of motherland and sovereignty [over Tibet] but no country is supporting 
Tibet because of Geopolitics and the most of all, there is no income. Anyway morality is 
important. 
 
(2) 
[A]: Is India’s approach towards her minorities especially Tibet different from that of China? 
[G]: Yes, even though India is also having difficult problems about that issue and trying hard to 
solve it using various affirmative actions, it’s not very brutal [like China] and there are many 
refugees in India, although we haven’t signed refugee convention. And some of them are 
richer than me. That’s all right… we’re still in nation building. Probably some people are 
jealous of them but it’s very local tension, it’s not national tension at all. I don’t think so. 
 
(3) 
[A]: Is helping the Tibetan people India’s national interest? 
[G]: Yes, because people support it. Tibetans are connected to India. More than Han Chinese. 
People in Arunachal and Ladakh are almost the same as Tibetans... India can give Tibet not 
just materialistic something but cultural contribution as well… Therefore, what China is 
doing in Tibet is uncomfortable… China’s violence towards Tibet is uncomfortable for most 
Indians.  
 
(4) 
[A]: What leads to a conflict of interest vis-à-vis Tibet between China and India? 
[G]: They wouldn’t convert grass lands into some other things, they wouldn’t be making huge 
dams. Supposing Tibetan society is accepted, they would have managed the natural 
environment. Chinese are now dictating that we are greater than nature. That is the problem. 
And it is too sensitive. There is link between Buddhism and ecology, I do think so… Surely 
amount water is decreasing and pollution is becoming more severe. There is limit. Developing 
that area in this manner is creating problems… They [China] are very powerful. There is huge 
military presence in Tibet – military itself is not enough, but if they are changing Tibet like 
Inner Mongolia, so after one hundred years, it could be said that there will be no Tibetans and 
environment will be damaged much more… India is different. There is University of Sarnath, 
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Buddhist University, and they are financed by the ministry of culture. India is doing many 
things to preserve Tibetan culture, even though Tibetan language studies by Indians are on the 
decline. We should study more.  
 
(5) 
[A]: How about the dam issues on Brahmaputra River? It could be a huge issue. 
[G]: Yes. India should have a Brahmaputra commission. Bangladesh, India and China. But they 
[China] are not interested in it. They are not interested because they are upper riparian and 
keep saying “don’t worry, don’t worry.” Because of dams, flood system in Indian side is 
broken already… ecology in that area will be destroyed because of divert of water… It causes 
distrust. About this sort of thing, I think Chinese are very foolish. This causes a big distrust.  
 
(6) 
[A]: If the Dalai Lama is died, how do you expect the Indian Government’s attitude towards the 
Tibetan people? Could it be brutal? 
[G]: No, how can it be brutal? I think 90 per cent of them would like to be Indians. Technically 
they are Indians actually.  
 
(7) 
[A]: Some scholars argue that the Tibetan refugees should not apply for the Indian citizenship. 
[G]: I agree. The Government as well as I don’t recommend the citizenship. They can lose their 
identity. If we [India] give the citizenship, they [Tibetans] will be happier and easier to get 
more human security, but their nation will be in threat. And still there is nationalism among 
Tibetans, which is very natural… Anyway after the Dalai Lama’s death, more Tibetan refuges 
would apply for the citizenship because of identity crisis.  
 
(8) 
[A]: Who or which groups in India have perhaps shaped the national interest vis-à-vis Tibet? 
[G]: Government, stared from Nehru and now BJP and even ruling congress. But anyway India is a 
very big country. It is difficult to say.   
[A]: Then how about the role of the public? Especially if culture matters according to you? 
[G]: Indian elites and liberals, they are very clear. They put importance on Tibetan Buddhism and 
Indian culture. There is no doubt that the relationship between the two is important. They 
have played an important role in shaping Indian national interests in Tibet.  
 
In excerpts (1) and (2), Gautam compares India and China’s approach towards their 
minorities. While criticising China for her “brutal” way of assimilation, Gautam 
describes India’s problem as local “tension.” In examples (3) and (6), he emphasises the 
cultural connection between India and Tibet and public support for Tibet. Here, he uses 
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the terms of “most” Indians; and “almost the same” as Tibetans; and “90 per cent” of 
them [Tibetans]. These imaginary referent groups are conveniently used to represent 
India who is somehow different from China. In conversation (4) and (5), he highlights 
the implications of Tibetan culture especially for environmental issues. In his logic, 
China who does not embrace the Tibetan culture is destroying the natural environment 
of the Tibetan plateau, whereas India who is trying to protect the Tibetan culture does 
not feel comfortable with China. Especially in excerpt (5), Gautam describes China as 
“foolish” causing a great dispute and distrust. In the conversation (8), he again pursues 
positive self-presentation by emphasising a deep affinity between the Indian liberal 
elites and Tibetans. All things are considered, it seems that the cultural bond and 
understanding between India and Tibet; and China’s wrong doings are emphasised. It is 
also claimed that culturally, there is less distance between India and Tibet as compared 
to that between China and Tibet.  
 In view of all discourses on positive self; and negative other-presentiaton, it 
seems clear that by using Tibet, Indian elites attempt to improve the image of India 
domestically and internationally. In many aspects – economy, military and global power, 
India actually lags far behind China. However, so far as the Tibet issue is concerned, 
India obviously has an initiative in promoting their generous and peaceful culture. Such 
discursive practices – criticising China and praising India for the Tibet question – also 
generate or stimulate a new form of Indian nationalism vis-à-vis China. Perhaps Indian 
elites are dreaming that in the future, their pursuit of interests vis-à-vis Tibet and China 
is firmly supported by the majority of Indian people – as the Chinese government has 
got from the Han people. 
 
Conclusion 
 
British India could not completely define and pursue its interest with regard to Tibet. 
Independent India has been following this vacillating attitude without clear framework 
to formulate the policy on Tibet. This is why India’s process of discursive construction 
for her national interest vis-à-vis Tibet is not very noticeable. It seems that the elites of 
India take a two-track strategy in their discursive construction. One is to express their 
inability to help Tibet taking a passive attitude vis-à-vis the Tibet question. The other is 
to show off their generous culture that can embrace Tibet in a peaceful way, which has 
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not happened in China. Regardless of the real intentions behind such discursive 
practices, it seems clear that Tibet is used as a means of promoting the bright side of 
India in elite discourse. The discursive frame, “we are different [from China]” is overly 
used in the pursuit of positive self; and negative other-presentation, in order to shape 
“better than China” image. It should be noted that their negative other-presentation, as 
seen above, is not necessarily softer than CPC’s accusing the 14th Dalai Lama of a 
separatist. Also, given that India also has numerous social problems including the 
Kashmir issue which is similar to the Tibet case, the Indian elites’ claim that “we are 
[positively] different” is not very persuasive. Thus, I would call, India’s pursuit of 
national interest vis-à-vis Tibet, “Narcissism of small differences” (Freud, 1982, p.243). 
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Chapter VIII. Conclusion 
 
This research has explored how the concept of national interest can be understood and 
utilised as an analytical tool, in order to examine China and India’s national interest vis-
à-vis Tibet. The concept of national interest is indeed vague and difficult to define. 
Many studies in this topic have suffered from arbitrary analysis owing to the inherent 
vagueness and uncertainty of the concept of national interest. Many scholars have 
profoundly discussed the concept in order to avoid such ambiguity. As indicated in 
chapter II, there are broadly two strands of thought in IR when it comes to 
understanding national interest: rationalism and constructivism. In chapter V, this study 
reviewed the factors of Tibet that can be of interest to China and India through the 
rationalist lens. Chapters VI and VII, through the critical constructivist viewpoint, 
examined China and India’s discursive construction of their national interests with 
regard to Tibet. This research also highlighted how nationalism is involved in the 
process of discursive construction.  
 About the theoretical and conceptual research findings, two dominant strands of 
international relations, realism and liberalism, are generally regarded as rationalist 
theories as they assume that actors always try to make a rational choice based on what 
they believe to be the best interests. The rationalists epistemologically assume that 
national interest is exogenously predefined and fixed, which cannot be contested 
because there are always objective interests that states pursue – the content of the 
“objective” interests consists of material forces and security matters in general that 
transcend time and place. Rationalist approach is particularly helpful in interpreting the 
dynamics of international relations where the strategic and economic interests are clear. 
It is also advantageous to elicit concise and visible results as it usually excludes 
complex and highly subjective variables such as culture and identity. Being applied to 
examine the case study, rationalist account helped identify the clear logic behind China 
and India’s pursuit of interest vis-à-vis Tibet. It is “natural” for them to be interested in 
Tibet due to Tibet’s known and potential economic and geopolitical values.  
However, since rationalists are not seriously concerned about interest formation 
which can be regarded as “subjective” process, there are some limitations to analyse the 
international situations and circumstances in which different interests collide with each 
other. Indeed, their account on national interest tends to be too oversimplified to grasp 
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how the interest is shaped and shared. To overcome this aspect, this research adopted a 
critical constructivist approach arguing that national interest is a social construct which 
is linguistically realised and represented in power politics structure. Hiring 
postmodernist’s epistemological viewpoint, critical constructivists argue that national 
interest exists in a form of linguistic representation. Thus, this thesis attempted to find 
out the way China and India’s national interest concerning Tibet is constructed and 
shared in discourses. With this framework, this research found out patterns of discursive 
practices done by elites in both countries when it comes to shaping and pursuing 
national interest. In other words, the critical constructivist approach helped understand 
the reasons for actions in Chinese and Indian elites’ discourses related to national 
interest vis-à-vis Tibet.  
One more thing that should be noted is that this research assumed that such 
discursive practices commonly accompany nationalism. Nationalism is also socially 
constructed and can be a tool for justifying and reinforcing elites’ logic on national 
interest. It is not easy to handle nationalism as it is potentially very volatile force, but at 
the same time, it can be one of the strongest ways to mobilise and unite people. Indeed, 
in Chinese and Indian elites’ discourses on Tibet, nationalism is strategically used and 
stimulated to make people accept and support elite-driven national interest. As indicated 
in Chapter III, this research claims that that nationalism can be used by the powerful as 
a political strategy to define and realise national interests. The strategy is implemented 
in many ways especially through structured and well-designed discourse. Without 
touching national sentiment, it would be difficult for elite to define and articulate 
national interest. In this regard, for the future research focusing on the concept of 
national interest, this thesis argues that it is necessary to explore how nationalism is 
stimulated and used in elite discourses when it comes to examining the processes of 
pursuing and justifying national interest. 
All in all, about the theoretical foundations for analysing the concept of national 
interest, it would not be desirable to evaluate that rationalism and critical constructivism 
are two “competing” meta theoretical bases. Rationalism helps researchers draw a “big 
picture” that actors – states – are in rivalry to maximise their national interests which 
consist of material power and security; and critical constructivism helps scholars 
understand the processes of interest formation as a form of language practice which is 
highly affected by ideational factors and historical/political context. In this sense, it can 
be argued that these two meta frameworks for analysis of national interest are actually 
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in complementary relations. By having these two theoretical foundations, it could be 
possible for researchers to answer the questions about “what” national interest is, “how” 
and “why” national interest is defined and shared – and most of all, “how” it leads to the 
situation where different interests collide with each other. 
 Concerning the research findings in the case study, I will summarise them by 
tackling the research questions given in chapter IV, methodology. There are two sets of 
research questions – one is for the rationalist approach; and the other is that for the 
constructivist. The first question of the former is “are there objectively significant 
factors in Tibet inducing China and India’s interests?” It is difficult to refute the 
argument that there are such points in Tibet. Especially China is obviously enjoying 
Tibet’s geographical advantages and abundant water resources. If we take a rationalist 
viewpoint, it can be claimed that no state would give up such benefits if there is a 
chance to take them. India is also desperately interested in Tibet’s waters although 
practically she cannot touch the origin of water resources which is located in the Tibetan 
plateau. However, it would be too early to evaluate that Tibet has a huge economic 
potential. Due to the high altitude and severe environmental circumstances, it is 
extremely difficult to harness the natural resources in Tibet. Also, even though there 
have been some “estimates” on the amount of mineral resources given by the Chinese 
government, it is difficult to exactly check the types, quantity and quality of the mineral 
resources in Tibet owing to a lack of clear and detailed data, unlike the cases of China’s 
other autonomous regions such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.  
Moving to the second question, “are the objectively important aspects of Tibet 
the leading cause of defining China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet?” 
Perhaps. If we review the Chinese propaganda on Tibet, this aspect can be understood. 
Aside from physical security implications, Tibet, domestically and internationally, also 
has a symbolic value regarding China’s “paternalistic” approaches towards Tibet’s 
development and mordernisation. Securing domestic integrity and boosting benign 
image abroad are one of the biggest “objective” interests of China for the sustainable 
development and peaceful rise. This kind of factor would drive China to define and 
pursue national interest with regard to Tibet. By providing the Tibetan refugees and 
Dalai Lama with a shelter, India also can get a better image than China as a superpower, 
which can enhance its soft power. As it seems that the PRC is still concerned with the 
possibility of India’s use of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in order to harm 
China’s image and social integrity, India still can emotionally pressurise the PRC with 
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the Tibet card as well. In this logic, it would be a better choice for India to keep the 
Tibet issue alive. 
The last question is “are the two countries’ conflicts and tensions about the 
Tibet issue a power and strategic game, pursuing the objective interests that they have 
vis-à-vis Tibet?” It is possible to evaluate that it is a power and strategic game over the 
objective interests. For example, the two countries have had severe border disputes in 
Arunachal Pradesh, South Tibet in China, and many analysts have suspected that India 
can use Tibet and the Dalai Lama as a means of claiming over Arunachal Pradesh (see 
Want China Times, 2014b). At the same time, it has also been reported that China has 
continuously used border incursion via Tibet to make India more defensive (see BBC, 
2014b). China also has not shared full data on the water flow, dam construction and 
other plans for the rivers in Tibet which are connected to India’s rivers, the Brahmaputra, 
in particular. Physically and mentally, the Tibet card has been used by both countries to 
achieve their national goals, mainly related to the security issues.  
Considering the findings above, with the rationalist accounts, it can be 
concluded that both countries are mainly concerned about the security implications of 
the issues concerning Tibet. For China, Tibet is a domestic and symbolic issue with 
regard to China’s internal integrity and modernisation of the nation, especially minority 
areas. For India, Tibet is still a useful means of emotionally containing China especially 
when it comes to dealing with the negotiations over the border disputes, whereas 
practically she cannot do anything vis-à-vis the PRC’s military expansion and water 
projects in TAR. It seems that this picture is plausible and easy to understand, but there 
are some critical issues in this logic that need to be examined. As indicated above, a lack 
of reliable and concrete data could make researchers depend on speculation in their 
analysis on the topic. Also, the explanation tends to be oversimplified, so it could 
restrict the scope of further and reflective research on the same topic. Thus, this research 
gave an alternative option by adopting critical constructivist’s idea on the concept of 
national interest. 
The first research question under the constructivist framework is “is it through a 
domestic, cultural and political complexity of causal factors that China and India’s 
national interests with regard to Tibet have been shaped and pursued?” This research 
gave historical and socio-political context to tackle this question. China needed a new 
theoretical framework for their nation-building in late 19th century and early 20th 
century. There were two strands of newly-developed Chinese version of theories of 
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nation and nationalism. So-called constitutional monarchists argued that new Chinese 
nation should embrace all the minorities based on the idea of natural assimilation into 
the Han. The other group, revolutionaries, being indulged in anti-Manchuism and 
ethnocentrism of Han, emphasised the importance of the establishment of nation with a 
single ethnic group. However, the latter’s idea was rectified after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty, because they faced the situation where they had to secure the territories under 
the Qing influence. It finally led Sun Yat-sen to developing the concept of Zhonghua 
minzu, initially proposed by Liang Qichao, arguing that Han and minorities surrounding 
the mainland China actually share the same history. This idea was accepted and 
implemented by the CPC when they established the PRC. The concept of Zhonghua 
minzu has been merged with the CPC’s socialism – and this newly-developed concept 
has been used for justifying the CPC’s actions towards the minorities including Tibet. 
They have “liberated” and “developed” Tibet under this theoretical basis as a core 
interest of the PRC without enough consultation with the Tibetan people. This domestic 
complexity has always been the reasons behind the current CPC’ pursuit of national 
interest vis-à-vis Tibet. 
India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet was initially defined by the British India, 
who wanted to keep Tibet as a neutral buffer state under Chinese suzerainty to protect 
British Indian territories especially against Russia. No Chinese ruling powers including 
the Qing dynasty, the KMT and the CPC accepted this concept. British India, China and 
Tibet failed to elicit a meaningful result and agreement on the status of Tibet and British 
India’s position towards Tibet remained uncertain. India did not have any clear vision 
with regard to Tibet even after the independence – India still sought the “advice” from 
Britain and mostly depended on and followed the leader’s personal decision in spite of 
the disagreement among elite groups. No clear vision, no clear policy and no clear 
framework for understanding the Tibet issues have made India have passive and 
reluctant attitudes towards Tibet. In India, thus, the issues on Tibet have always been 
dealt with in the context of her relations with China as reactionary and defensive 
behaviours since the independence.  
The second question is “are China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet 
driven (originated and defined) by the elites in general? In both China and India, after 
the establishment of the current regimes in respective countries, they have been in the 
nation-building process. To build a postcolonial nation-state, the elite groups in both 
countries have played a leading role in shaping the new philosophies and policies. 
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Realistically, for the general public in both countries right after the establishment of the 
current states, it may not be easy to understand the situation with regard to Tibet. As 
seen in the discursive practices on Tibet, elite groups in China and India have attempted 
to define the national interest with regard to Tibet; and share their ideas with the public. 
It goes without saying that it is not an easy task – this is why elite groups have tried to 
generate and use nationalism as a means of the pursuit of elite-defined interests and 
justification of their behaviours. This aspect is related to the question three, “in China 
and India, does nationalism play an instrumental role in the process of defining, 
pursuing and justifying (legitimising) the national interests with regard to Tibet?”  
As examined in chapters VI and VII, it seems obvious that the intention behind 
the elite discursive practices is to stimulate the nationalistic sentiments. The CPC has 
actively attempted to generate and use nationalism to achieve their national goal, 
building new Chinese nation. The problem is, the nationalism here, sometimes, or many 
times, can become an irrational collectivist doctrine, manipulated by a small number of 
elite groups – we have often seen the dark side of China’s Han majoritarianism vis-à-vis 
Tibet in many aspects. Any different or alternative viewpoints on the Tibet question 
could not be proposed and realised in this situation. Those who are against the CPC’s 
decision on the Tibet issues can be regarded as a betrayer of the nation. Many people in 
China, who are in groups called minorities, cannot benefit from such majoritarian rule; 
or suffer from mental and even physical threats. In this regard, Han majoritarianism 
cannot be rational nationalism and their interests cannot represent those of nation. The 
case of India is not different. Many Indian elites argue that India is different from China 
as they are more democratic and generous by using the Tibet and Dalai Lama case. It is 
an attempt at boosting nationalism by diminishing others, here, China. However, 
actually the Tibetan refugees are often excluded from the political and social protections 
in India. Here, it is worth recalling the statement of one of the Indian scholars in chapter 
V: 
 
There is simmering resentment among the people of Sikkim towards the Tibetans… A substantial 
influx of Tibetan refugees can also have adverse political implications. Even a small addition of 
Tibetans to the voter’s list can alter the political destiny of the state… India should be prepared to 
meet the challenges it might pose in maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the strategically 
sensitive border regions. (Das, 2006, emphasis added) 
 
In my field trip in India, it was not difficult to listen to this kind of argument. In such 
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discourses, Tibetans are often regarded as an actor who harms India’s national interests 
and causes social conflicts in India. Therefore, according to this logic, it can be argued 
that protecting the rights of Tibetans are not highly concerned with India’s national 
interest – but using the Tibet issues is clearly included in the sphere of the national 
interest of India. 
This research, using qualitative content analysis; critical discourse analysis, 
discourse-historical approach in particular; and semi-structured interviews, attempted to 
find out China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet and their domestic 
process of interest formation in discourse. In completing this discussion, I would make 
some suggestion for further research. During the last four years of conducting this 
research, I have found out that in the international and domestic political arena, there is 
a deluge of discourse on national interest. Because the concept has always been around 
us, many scholars are prone to ignore the conceptual or theoretical discussions on 
national interest. I hope that this study is not treated as one of such studies. Rather, it 
would be great if this research can contribute to discussions on methodological 
approaches towards the concept of national interest. Many studies in this field usually 
focus on the powerful actors’ behaviours and pursuit of interests. I have to confess that 
this research is also part of it. Also it should be noted that many people are 
spontaneously or forcibly sacrificing their interests for national interests. It is common 
that the rights of the oppressed and the weak are frequently sacrificed in the name of 
national interest – however, sacrificing for what for whom? This point has received little 
attention from academia, remaining as a non-mainstream subject. Once such studies are 
accumulated enough, then we, as a researcher, can properly discuss the concept of 
“genuine national interest.”  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I. Participation Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
Interview on China and India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet 
 
- Interview Details - 
1. Date and Place:  
2. Interviewee Information 
- Name:  
- Occupation / Position:  
3. Signature: I have read the information in the Participation Information Sheet, and I 
am willing to act as a participant/interviewee in the above research study. 
Interviewee                                          Interviewer 
※ If you want to give this interview on condition of anonymity, please tick the box. □ 
 
 
Dear Madam/Sir 
 
My name is Seokbae Lee, a doctoral researcher at the Department of Politics and 
International Relations in the University of Westminster in London. I am presently 
doing a project on “China and India’s National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet”. The 
purpose of this interview is to obtain your valuable perspective on Sino-Indian 
relations with regard to their interests on the Tibet issue.  
     This interview will be conducted in a semi-structured interview format. You have 
the right to ask the researcher any question regarding this project. You also have the 
right to refuse to answer questions. You may withdraw from this research any time you 
wish. This may take 30-60 minutes of your time.  
     All information obtained from this interview will be stored confidentially. Only 
researcher will have access to view any data collected during this research. The 
research intends to cause no physical or psychological harm or offence and to abide by 
all commonly acknowledged ethical codes. 
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Appendix II. Interview Questions 
 
1. Does the Tibet issue significantly matter when it comes to explaining Sino-Indian 
relations? 
 
- If “Yes,” 
1-1) how important is it? Most or medium or less? (please go to question 2) 
 
- If “No,” 
1-1) Why do you think Tibet is no longer (or has never been) important? 
1-2) What are the important issues other than Tibet which significantly affect their 
relationship? and What are conflicting interests between China and India that have 
generated the tensions? 
1-3) Who (or which group) has had a leading role in defining such interests? 
 
 
2. Could you expand more about especially what aspects and issues with regard to Tibet 
are of interest India (and China, respectively)? 
 
 
3. Then, Could you explain what probably leads to a conflict of interest vis-à-vis Tibet 
between the two countries? 
 
3-1) mainly about security (border issue, in particular)? 
3-2) economic and resources? 
3-2) any cultural and historical factors? 
3-3) geopolitical factors, say the role of USA? 
 
 
4. Who or which groups in India (and China respectively) have perhaps played a leading 
role in defining and pursuing “the national interest” with regard to Tibet? 
 
4-1) Is it mainly government driven? Which actors shape government’s ideas?  
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4-2) Is there any room for the public significantly to be involved and played in the 
process of defining the interests about Tibet? 
 
 
5. About Tibet’s contribution to India, do you think Tibet has contributed to India 
domestically and internationally? Some researchers argue that Tibet is particularly 
important as it has played an important role in securing Himalayan belt (related to the 
influence of Tibetan Buddhism), attracting tourists and enhancing soft power in India. 
Do you agree with this argument? 
 
 
6. In your view, does Indian nationalism shape India’s national interest toward Tibet and 
China?  
 
6-1) Then, how about Chinese nationalism that affects their national interest vis-à-vis 
Tibet? Do you think nationalism matters when it comes to explaining China’s national 
interest with regard to Tibet?  
 
 
7. Are there any other important issues on this topic that may need to be examined? or 
do you have any comments for this research?  
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